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1. Introduction 
 
The year 2010 is rich on a number of important anniversaries. 35 years ago, on August 1, 
1975, 35 states from the whole Euro-Atlantic area, including United States and the Soviet 
Union, signed the Helsinki Final Act. This document marked an unprecedented era of 
rapprochement between the West and the East. 15 years later, on November 19, 1990, the 
long time adversaries – North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Warsaw Treaty 
Organization signed the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe which is 
considered to be the cornerstone of the arms control regime in Europe. Until now, it is the 
only legally binding document dealing with hard security relations between Russia and 
Western European states. Only two days later, on November 21, 1990, participants of the 
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe signed the Charter of Paris for a New 
Europe and solemnly declared the Cold War to be over. Twenty years have passed since 
then and a much different era has come. New security threats and challenges have emerged. 
Some of the old conflicts have disappeared while others still protract.  
 
Twenty years after the end of Cold War it is therefore legitimate to ask the following 
question:  Do we now live in a truly unified Europe? Unfortunately, some European 
countries would not answer this question affirmatively. In the view of the Russian 
Federation, some groups of states still seek to preserve the dividing lines in Europe and 
they even continue the “old line of bloc politics”.1 According to Russian leaders, the 
principle of equal security for all states in the Euro-Atlantic space is not being fulfilled. 
 
The purpose of this paper is neither to defend the Russian thinking; nor to refute it. 
However, I cannot but agree that the recent state of relations between Russia and the West 
gives cause for serious concern. This is especially true in the area of security policy. In 
summer 2008, after the Russia-Georgia war, relations between Russia and its European and 
American partners reached the probably lowest point since the end of Cold War. Although 
the mutual relations have been gradually improving over the last two years and slowly 
come back to normal by now, this relationship is still too far from being trouble-free.  
                                               
1 Medvedev, Dmitry: Speech at Meeting with German Political, Parliamentary and Civic Leaders. Berlin, June 
5, 2008. http://eng.kremlin.ru/speeches/2008/06/05/2203_type82912type82914type84779_202153.shtml 
Accessed March 1, 2010.  
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The language of political declarations on European security sounds very promising. On 
many occasions European states have declared their commitment to strengthen cooperation 
and build a free, united, stable and secure Europe with the values of democracy and human 
rights at its core.
2
 Yet, the political reality is still distant from these worthwhile ideals. 
Europe is facing a number of unresolved security issues. As the Georgian crisis has 
revealed, the so-called “frozen conflicts”, which were largely forgotten for many years, can 
unfreeze. Local disputes over border issues and minority rights can escalate into full-
fledged interstate wars. The Georgian example has shown us that all this can happen even 
in a state where the NATO membership is under serious consideration.  
 
The US plans to place parts of the ballistic missile defense (BMD) system in Central 
Europe have burdened the relations between Russia and the United States for years. Even 
though the Obama administration has announced a reset of the US-Russian relations and 
finally altered its plans for the missile defense in Europe, this issue still continues to cause 
discomfort in Moscow. The US plans to deploy parts of its ballistic missile defense system 
in Central Europe have also constituted a serious obstacle in the negotiations of the post-
START treaty. Until today, the problem remains unresolved. Russia has declared that a 
deployment of the American BMD close to its borders may threaten Russian security and 
may be therefore considered as a legitimate reason for Russia to withdraw from the new 
START treaty signed by President Obama and President Medvedev in April 2010 in 
Prague.  
 
Similarly, the issue of continuous NATO enlargement is almost traditionally met with harsh 
Russian criticism. The question of further NATO enlargement has been put aside by NATO 
leaders during the last Summit held in April 2009 in Strasbourg and Kehl. After the 
summer 2008 conflict in Georgia and the presidential elections in Ukraine won by the pro-
Russian Viktor Yanukovych in early 2010, the adherence of either county to the Alliance 
seems quite unlikely at the moment. Nevertheless, one should not forget predictions of 
some Russian analysts who argue that a possible membership of Ukraine in NATO could 
lead to a large-scale war between Russia and the Alliance (Bordachev / Karaganov 2009: 
7). 
 
                                               
2 See for example: Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe: Charter of Paris for a New Europe. 
Paris 1990.  
9 
 
To make things worse, the current state of the arms control regime in Europe is quite 
alarming. The legal cornerstone of the hard security issues in Europe, the Conventional 
Armed Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE), is falling apart. In December 2007, Russia has 
announced its suspension of the treaty. Since then, Moscow has not been participating in 
the verification mechanism. This does not imply an automatic rearmament of Russian 
conventional forces. However, the deadlock in the CFE Treaty has surely contributed to the 
increased growth of tensions and mistrust between Russia and the West.  
 
And finally, Russian Federation is blaming that the current European security architecture 
is out of date, unable to tackle today‟s security challenges. The institutional framework of 
the European security architecture originates from the Cold War era. More importantly, it 
has not succeeded in the efforts to create a united Europe, where cooperation prevails over 
competition and where security concerns of all states are taken equally into account. On the 
contrary, the lack of serious political dialogue among all actors in the Euro-Atlantic space 
has lead to mutual misunderstanding, accompanied by an atmosphere of growing mistrust 
and security competition. 
 
Russian Federation has a vision how to cure all these problems: it suggested concluding a 
new legally binding treaty on European security which would codify the principle of equal 
and indivisible security for all states of the Euro-Atlantic area. Russia has even proposed 
that not only all individual states – current participating states of the Organization for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe, but also international organizations and alliances 
acting in this geographical area could be included in the new security arrangement. 
 
1.1. Research outline 
 
The aim of this thesis is to analyze the Russian proposals for the European Security Treaty 
(EST). My research will be guided by the central question on why does Russia seek the 
new treaty. What are the driving forces behind this endeavor? In order to be able to answer 
this question, a detailed analysis of Moscow‟s proposal is necessary. I will explore what 
exactly the Russian suggestions include. Would the new treaty create a system of collective 
security in Europe, as it is sometimes claimed? Later on, the positions of the major 
addressees of the Russian proposal will be studied. I will explore their reactions and the 
emerging dialogue on European security. What are the future prospects of the Russian 
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initiative? Which contribution does it make to the debate on the future of European 
security? 
 
My analysis will focus on three underlying research questions: 
o What is Russia proposing? 
o Why does Russia seek a new treaty on European security? 
o Which outcomes are already visible and which can we expect in the future? 
 
First part of my research will be devoted to the theoretical explanation of the Russian 
proposal. The foreign policy of Russia is generally conceived as an example of (neo-)realist 
school of international relations with strong inclination to geopolitical thinking (Wohlforth 
2001: 215, Lo 2003: 72). This is mainly due to the experience of the Cold War whose 
legacy is still present in the mindset of today‟s Russian leaders. I decided not to take this 
theoretical approach for granted and simply apply it to the current initiative of President 
Medvedev. Instead, I will use five theoretical concepts, or “security models”, which I locate 
on an imaginary “security continuum”. Each end of the continuum represents one basic 
school of international relations: realism and liberalism. Subsequently, I will try to 
determine to which security model and international relations theory the Russian proposal 
comes the closest. In order to be able to make such a conclusion, I will first look at the 
evolution of the concept of collective security and its imperfect realization in the League of 
Nations and nowadays United Nations. Similarly, I will describe some previous attempts to 
rearrange the European security landscape. Precise examination of the draft EST, the rules 
and mechanisms proposed by it, and analysis of their implication for the European security 
architecture will follow.  
 
The second part of my analysis will be empirically oriented. I will describe the background 
against which Moscow‟s suggestions on an “audit” of European security system have 
emerged. First, I will look at the basic features and main objectives of Russian foreign and 
security policy. I will study the basic documents of Russian Federation which determine the 
current trends in its foreign policy. Next, I will examine the state of relationship between 
Russia and its Western partners in the area of hard-security. I assume that to a large extend 
they both indicate the possible reasons for Moscow to propose the treaty. I will therefore try 
to reveal parallels between them and the EST initiative. And finally I will look at the limits 
of the Russian proposals. 
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The following chapter will be devoted to the reactions from Russia‟s partners. I will not be 
able to give justice to all states and all opinions voiced. I will therefore restrict the analysis 
on some major European states, respectively the EU as a whole. The United States plays a 
crucial role in the European security affairs and special attention will be given to its 
position. Both bilateral relations between Russia and the United States as well as 
Washington‟s leading role in NATO have impact on European security and will be 
therefore taken into account. In conclusion, I will analyze the debate which has unfolded in 
reaction to the Russian initiative. It is not clear yet if a real negotiation process on the 
European Security Treaty as proposed by Moscow will ever take place. However, a 
dialogue on the future of European security has already started. Western states are showing 
some willingness to discuss the Medvedev initiative. The so-called Corfu process, 
institutionalized in the framework of OSCE, has been launched in summer 2009. But the 
discussions about Moscow‟s proposals are taking place in different bilateral and 
multilateral meetings as well. So can Russia achieve its objectives? And would this be in 
Europe‟s interest? These and other questions will be analyzed.  
 
1.2. Methods 
 
This thesis aspires to explore the Russian proposal for a new legally binding treaty on 
European security from both theoretical and empirical perspective. The underlying primary 
source for my research is the draft of the European Security Treaty published on November 
29, 2009 on the official web portal of Russian President Dmitry Medvedev. Besides this, I 
will refer to many official statements and declarations of political leaders in Russia, Europe 
and North America. I will also refer to treaties and declarations made by states in the 
different international organizations in the Euro-Atlantic region. OSCE, as the only pan-
European security organization is especially relevant, so is the NATO as well as other 
international formats. As secondary sources I will mainly use recent academic articles 
dealing directly with the Russian proposals on the European Security Treaty and / or with 
the more general issue of the European security in regard with Russian foreign and security 
policy and its relations with the West. The thesis covers political developments prior to 
October 20, 2010. 
 
In terms of Waltz‟s “levels of analysis” which he later referred to as “images” (Waltz 2001) 
I will focus my analysis on the international structure states live in. I will assume that the 
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state system influences, if not entirely determines, states‟ behavior. I do agree that all three 
levels – (a) human behavior focusing on nature of men; (b) internal structure of states 
which takes into account domestic politics; as well as (c) the state system which forms the 
international structure, play a role in determining foreign policy outcomes. Therefore only a 
comprehensive analysis of all levels can account for a full understanding of international 
politics. However this thesis cannot do justice to all the images. I will concentrate on the 
international structure and leave the two other images by side. Russian internal politics, not 
to mention the role individual leaders play in it, is undoubtedly an interesting and highly 
relevant aspect influencing the foreign policy outcomes.
3
 An in-depth analysis would 
certainly be required. Unfortunately this would go beyond the possibilities of this paper. I 
have therefore decided to filter out these aspects and to narrow my scope of analysis. I will 
primarily focus on the state units as they operate in the international system; while the 
impact of domestic politics on states‟ behavior will not be taken into account.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
3 In this regard, mainly the debate about the alleged power and influence of current Russian Prime Minister 
Vladimir Putin over his successor President Medvedev is worthy mentioning. 
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2. Theoretical Concepts of Security Models 
 
 
The first part of my study is devoted to the theoretical background. In order to be able to 
answer the question why Russia is seeking a new security arrangement in Europe I will 
make use of five theoretical concepts, each describing one “security model”. These are: the 
realist world of anarchy operating on the principle of self-help; the concepts of collective 
defense; cooperative security; Deutsch‟s model of security-communities; and finally the 
model of collective security. Of course none of the theories will be able to fully explain 
states‟ behavior. But they help us to understand why states pursue certain foreign policy 
strategies. I will therefore try to locate the Russian proposal within these five security 
concepts.  
 
The five security models, which I will outline below, form an imaginary “security 
continuum” (see Figure 1). The ends of the continuum are marked by the two most 
fundamental schools of international relations – realism and liberalism. In between them, 
institutionalism, as a theory of international relations seeking to accommodate elements of 
both realism and liberalism, can be located.  
 
 
 
Figure 1. Continuum of security systems 
    
Self-help 
Collective 
Defense              
Cooperative 
Security           
Security-
community 
Collective 
Security       
 
    
Realism     Institutionalism               Liberalism 
 
 
In all the discussed security models, states are viewed as principal actors in international 
politics. But the more we move on the continuum away from the realist self-help in the 
right direction towards collective security, international institutions gain more and more 
significance. On the “midway” – in the concept of cooperative security – international 
institutions promote cooperation that will result in joint gains for all participants. At this 
stage, international institutions encourage common norms and rules but do not enforce 
them. At the far right of the continuum, in an ideal system of collective security, states‟ 
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opportunistic behavior is constrained. States not only pledge to renounce on use or threat of 
use of force as it is already the case in the cooperative security model. What is more, they 
also agree on a legally binding enforcement mechanism which will punish those who 
violate the basic rules and resort to aggression. 
 
The concept of self-help represents one of the basic features of realist theory of 
international relations. Under the conditions of anarchy, states compete for survival and / or 
maximization of power. They view each other as enemies and pursue self-help policies. 
Cooperation is rare. The system of collective defense lies between the realism and 
institutionalism. The underlying principles are attributed to realism. Alliances form as a 
means of balance of power. States enter alliances in order to survive and / or maximize their 
resources. At the same time, we see here elements of cooperation because they pledge 
mutual assistance to each other in case of an armed attack. The model of cooperative 
security can be best explained with institutionalism. States use international institutions 
with the aim to achieve their own objectives. They pursue their own interests through 
cooperation with other partners (Keohane / Nye 1993: 2 – 7).  Intensified cooperation can 
lead to integration which is characteristic for pluralistic security-communities proposed by 
Karl Deutsch. Here, due to integration, mutual cooperation, and compatibility of major 
values, armed conflicts among the members of a security-community become unthinkable. 
The model of collective security is situated on the far right of the continuum. In its ideal 
form, this concept is to be perceived more as a vision than a political reality. That is why I 
link collective security to the idealist world of Immanuel Kant, in opposition to the 
competitive and self-help world of Thomas Hobbes. 
 
According to some scholars, collective security is only a legally binding version of balance 
of power (e.g. Sedivy 1997: 138). The definition of the ideal collective security as well the 
evolution of the concept in the political reality, which led to its institutionalization in the 
United Nations Organization, will be discussed further below. We will be able to see that 
the collective security is characterized by some rather utopian than realist elements which 
bring it closer to the idealist school of international relations. First and foremost it is the 
belief that disputes can be solved in a peaceful way; that the use of force is generally 
outlawed and that illegal aggression will be automatically punished.  
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Although being placed at opposing sides of the security continuum, its two ends – 
represented by the concepts of self-help and collective security, have some points in 
common. As already mentioned, states are viewed as the major actors in all the models. 
They operate in an anarchic international structure. Anarchy belongs to the main 
characteristic features of (neo-) realism. Neither institutionalism nor liberalism contradicts 
this assumption. But they believe the anarchic structure can be mitigated by common norms 
and rules, which shape states‟ behavior. These common rules and principles are usually 
enshrined in international law and reflected in a framework of international institutions. The 
ideal collective security might be even hierarchically structured. However, as we will see in 
Chapter 3, political reality has not made it possible to create a genuine system of collective 
security yet.   
 
In order to better explain the models of collective defense and cooperative security, I 
decided to grant more space to their most relevant examples, namely NATO and 
CSCE/OSCE. They not only help us to better understand the respective security concept but 
also play an important role in current European security affairs and are especially relevant 
in respect to the relations between Russia and the West. 
 
Before I proceed to the description of each security model I would like to clarify some 
basic terms used in this study. There is a variety of definitions of the term “security”. I 
define here security as an absence of threat or the ability to defend from the threat (Gärtner 
2008: 213). In other words states are secure if no threats to their sovereignty and wellbeing 
exist, or if they dispose over sufficient (military or other) capabilities to avert any threats. 
The terms “security models”, “security systems” and “security concepts” are used 
interchangeably in this study. They all imply the nature of relationship among the units 
which are in mutual interaction. The interaction of the units is based on some underlying 
principles which shape a certain pattern of arrangement. These units are primarily 
constituted by the states, whereas international institutions can play a certain role as well. 
States choose to operate in a given security system because they believe that in this way 
they can best achieve their goals. In this study, I will assume that states act as rational 
actors and that their main foreign policy objective is to provide their own security.  
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2.1. Realism / Self-help 
 
Realism is one of the oldest and most influential theories of international relations. Being 
constantly challenged and often even proclaimed as dead, it gave birth to most other 
theories of international relations. Realism became especially relevant in the field of 
Security Studies (Burchill 2001: 70). 
 
Realism is best understood as a general approach to international politics, rather than a 
single theory (Lynn-Jones / Miller 1995: ix). The advocates of realism have developed 
many variations of this thinking, so that a number of different realist theories of 
international politics exist. They all share some core believes and assumptions about 
international politics and states‟ behavior. Hans Joachim Morgenthau with his work Politics 
among Nations: Struggle for Power and Peace, first published in 1948, laid the foundations 
of what is today commonly referred to as classical or traditional realism. In the late 1970s 
first major split from Morgenthau‟s realism occurred in the Kenneth Waltz‟s “neorealism”, 
also called “structural realism”. Since then, many other forms and variations of realist 
theory have disseminated. Nowadays, we can distinguish between several types of both 
“offensive” and “defensive” realism, in addition to “neoclassical”, “contingent”, “specific” 
and “generalist” realism (Snyder 2002: 150). Whereas classical realism of Morgenthau 
considers human nature as the decisive factor for peace and war, in neorealist view the 
structure of the international system determines the behavior of states. For the purposes of 
this study I will not make detailed distinctions between all the variations of realism. I will 
first touch on some general characteristics of this theoretical school and than proceed to the 
description of the basic tenets of structural realism primarily set by Kenneth Waltz‟s 
Theory of International Politics (1979).  
 
One of the founding fathers of realist school, Hans J. Morgenthau, perceives international 
politics as a struggle for power. States can seek different goals and ultimate aims of 
international politics. These can be defined in terms of religious, philosophic, economic, or 
social ideals. But, in Morgenthau‟s view, states always seek to realize their goals by 
striving for power (Morgenthau 1985: 31). He conceives power as “man’s control over the 
minds and actions of other men”. Military power accounts for decisive part of political 
power. “Armed strength as a threat or a potentiality is the most important material factor 
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making for the political power” (Morgenthau 1985: 33). Put simply, according to 
Morgenthau, all states strive for power which is primarily constituted by military strength.  
 
In the decades of Cold War, technological advancement and proliferation of nuclear 
weapons made the possibility of total war, which could result in universal destruction, real. 
That is why even realists consider preservation of peace to be the “prime concern of all 
nations” (Morgenthau 1985: 27). Unfortunately, this cannot be achieved by simple 
abolishment of nuclear weapons or general disarmament. Morgenthau notes: “Men do not 
fight because they have arms. They have arms because they deem it necessary to fight. 
What makes for war are the conditions in the minds of men which make war appear the 
lesser of two evils” (Morgenthau 1985: 436). The reasons why men and states fight lie in 
human nature. Men‟ desires and emotions account for states‟ behavior. Only a strong 
authority can prevent them from using force and violence in their mutual intercourse. In a 
society of sovereign nations, there is no such authority able to impose and subsequently 
enforce any norms and rules. That is why the possibility of war is always present and even 
disarmament cannot prevent it. 
 
According to classical realism, peace and stability can be achieved only in a world where 
an equilibrium, or so-called balance of power, prevails. Morgenthau sketched different 
methods how the balance of power can be created. The idea rests upon following principle: 
either the weight of the heavier side is diminished or the weight of the lighter one increased 
(Morgenthau 1985: 198). Balance of power is reached when all major states (two or more) 
enjoy the same amount of power. One of the possible methods to achieve this is the 
formation of alliances and counter-alliances. I will discuss the concept of collective defense 
alliances further below. 
 
Instead of explaining international politics with reference to human nature – as classical 
realism does, neorealism, also called structural realism, puts more emphasis on the 
environment states live in. In neorealist conviction the international structure determines 
states‟ behavior. 
 
Structural realism of Kenneth Waltz rests upon some basic assumptions about international 
system and behavior of its units. International political system is composed of two 
interacting elements: political structure and a set of interacting units – states. States 
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generate the structure, but once formed, the structure influences states‟ behavior. Structure 
is the key element which determines behavior of states. Waltz defines political structure by 
three basic criteria (Griffiths 1995: 80): 
 
- Principle of arrangement by which units relate to each other. While in a domestic 
political structure hierarchy prevails, international structure is characterized by 
anarchy. A closer definition of this term will follow. 
- Functional differentiation of the units in the structure. Unlike in domestic political 
systems with extensive division of labor, international structure is dominated by 
functionally similar units. Each state performs the same fundamental functions.   
- Distribution of capabilities among units. This is the primary criterion to evaluate 
states‟ qualities. All states are alike in the functions they have to fulfill but they 
differ in their abilities to perform.  
In both the realist and neorealist tradition of international relations, states are considered to 
be the central actors of the international system. They are not the only actors, but by far the 
most important ones. Their behavior is constrained by the structure they live it. Let us 
therefore have a closer look on the first characteristic of international structure, which is, 
according to Waltz, anarchy.  
 
Opposed to domestic political orders, which function in a hierarchy, the international 
political system is anarchic. Anarchy can be defined as an absence of “overreaching 
authority to prevent others from using violence, or the threat of violence, to destroy or 
enslave them” (Grieco 1988: 497). States are the main actors and they enjoy sovereignty. 
There is no higher authority standing above them. States pursue their own interests, 
however these are defined, in the way they judge to be the best (Waltz 2001: 238). 
 
So far we have seen that in the neorealist view, the main determinant of the motives and 
actions of states is the international structure. It is characterized primarily by the state of 
anarchy with no higher authority standing above the sovereign states. This creates the 
constraints and opportunities which explain states‟ behavior.  
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In the world of anarchy, states can rely only on the principle of self-help. This means that 
“each state must guarantee its own survival since no other actor will provide its security. 
All other states are potential threats, and no international institution is capable of 
enforcing order or punishing powerful aggressors” (Mearshimer 1990: 12). (Neo-)Realists 
argue that there is no international body with sufficient coercive power and / or authority, 
which would be able to constrain states‟ behavior. No central authority is able to enforce 
any agreements or commitments. This suggests that no one can guarantee states‟ security 
but the states by themselves. They have to rely exclusively on their own means (own 
power) in order to protect their interests and to ensure their security. By doing so, states 
will tend to resort to the threat or use of military force (Lynn-Jones / Miller 1995: ix). 
Threat or use of force is regarded as a legitimate tool for states to achieve their objectives in 
international politics. Here we can see a clear opposition to the collective security concept, 
representing the other end of the imaginary security continuum. As it will be discussed 
later, both cooperative and collective security models rest upon the inadmissibility of threat 
or use of force. 
 
According to Waltz, states‟ core interest is to ensure their survival. When trying to protect 
their security, states cannot rely on anyone but themselves. They can never be sure about 
one another‟s future intentions and actions. Since it is difficult to make any predictions, 
each neighbor is perceived as a potential enemy who can pose future security threat. 
However, this does not mean that states automatically live in a state of chaos or even war. 
Under some structural conditions, peace can be achieved. But the possibility of an armed 
conflict is always present.  
 
The principle of self help-suggests that in an anarchic environment each state is let to fend 
for its security by itself. International anarchy encourages competition and conflict, and 
limits cooperation. States compete for their survival. The willingness of cooperation is 
modest because of the lack of trust between the states. In simple terms, anarchy impedes 
international cooperation. In the realist logic, international politics are perceived as a null-
sum-game. The amount of power or other capacities gained by one state will automatically 
mean a loss for the other party. A win-win situation, from which both partners could profit, 
is not possible.  
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At the same time, realists do not deny that cooperation among states can take place even in 
the competitive setting where the struggle for power and security prevails. Joseph Grieco 
argues that there are two fundamental constrains which inhibit collaboration among states. 
Firstly, states are worried about the possibility of cheating. They do not trust each other and 
hence they cannot be sure about their partners‟ compliance to an agreement. Secondly, 
realists distinguish clearly between absolute and relative gains in power. They suggest that 
states‟ main goal is not to maximize their absolute gains, irrespectively of what the others 
will attain. States are more concerned about their relative gains. They worry that their 
partners could gain more from mutual cooperation that they would. This is a crucial point. 
States give serious attention to the gains of their partners, first of all in relation to their own. 
From a realist viewpoint, in a world of anarchy even today‟s friend may become your 
enemy tomorrow. The major aim of states is therefore not to obtain the highest possible 
individual win. If cooperation among states takes place, states‟ fundamental goal is to 
prevent others from gaining a higher increase in their capabilities than they do. At the same 
time, states seek to enlarge the gap between their strength and that of the others. If they 
assume that the partner could gain relatively more, they rather avoid the cooperation and 
renounce on the expected absolute benefits. To sum up, states‟ concerns about cheating and 
their concerns about relative gains are considered as the two main barriers in international 
cooperation (Grieco 1988: 487 – 499). Moreover, states do not want do become dependant 
because they fear that dependence makes them vulnerable. Cooperation can create 
dependence and therefore states rather prefer to avoid it. They want to protect their 
sovereignty and independence by keeping everything they depend on under their own 
control (Griffiths 95: 83). 
 
In the anarchic international system, where states struggle for their survival, the security 
dilemma can easily arise. It is based on the assumption that an increase in security of one 
state will automatically mean a decrease of security for the others. In order to increase their 
security, states generally strive for more power and better capabilities. This usually takes 
form of rising defense spending and increased armament. Other states will consider these 
measures as threatening to their security because it decreases their relative power. As a 
result, they will decide to pursue the policy of an increased armament as well. This can 
finally lead to an arms-race among competing powers (Rousseau 2005: 753). 
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Offensive and defensive realists have diverging views on what is the best way for a state to 
survive in a world of anarchy. The former ones suggest that states seek to maximize their 
power at the expenses of other states. Again, relative power matters most. In their search 
for security, states adopt offensive, rather than defensive strategies. They try to strengthen 
their power while weakening potential enemies. Sometimes, they regard aggression as the 
best means to achieve their goals (Mearsheimer 1990: 12) On the other hand defensive 
realists argue “that the first concern of states is not maximize power but to maintain their 
position in the system” (Waltz 1979: 126). States do not have to continuously compete for 
more and more power capabilities; defensive strategies are sufficient to guarantee their 
security. 
 
These variations of the realist theory are indeed important to understand and explain the 
nature of states‟ behavior but make little difference in the states‟ preferences to cooperate. 
Either to maintain or maximize their power, states can only rely on themselves. In order to 
provide their security, they must rely on their own resources, or as I will describe below, on 
the resources of their allies. This signifies the principle of self-help.  
 
Realists believe that international institutions basically reflect the distribution of power in 
the world. They rest upon the self-interested calculations of most powerful states and only 
serve what these states believe to be in their interests (Mearsheimer 1995: 7). In the realist 
view, international institutions and the norms and rules they are based on have minimal 
influence on states‟ behavior or on the stability of the system. They are fully dependent on 
national decisions of their members and are therefore no actors of they own. Since they 
have no influence on states‟ acting and have no independent authority, international 
institutions cannot prevent a state from using or threatening violence. They are in no way 
able to provide states‟ security or minder anarchy states are living in. 
 
In the (neo-)realist world of anarchy, states enjoy full sovereignty. This means that there is 
no authority above them. And international law is no exception. Realists do not deny the 
existence of international law as such. There are many “traditional rules” which have 
shaped the relations between sovereign states for centuries (Morgenthau 1985: 295). These 
include, for instance, treaties determining territorial borders, defining rights of vessels in 
foreign waters, or the status of diplomatic representatives. At the same time, realists point 
out many characteristics, which make international law comparable to “primitive law” 
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(Morgenthau 1985: 295). International law is characterized by decentralization, vague and 
ambiguous provisions which let open room for differing interpretations. Most importantly, 
there exist practically no real enforcement mechanisms, which could force states to keep 
their promises and fulfill the commitments against their will. 
 
To conclude, the left end of the proposed security continuum is characterized by the realist 
principle of self-help. We have seen that one of the main features of the conflict-prone, 
Hobbesian world is the state of anarchy. States seek to survive and / or maximize their 
power by pursuing the policy of self-help. In order to provide their security they do not rely 
on anybody but themselves. States cannot or do not want to rely on the goodwill and 
friendship of other states as it will be the case in collective defense alliances representing 
the second stage on the continuum. In the self-help world, states have no obligations 
towards each other, cooperation among them is rare, and international law has only a 
marginal impact on states‟ behavior and international peace. Competitive pursuit of power 
is the only way how states can cope with the anarchic structure of the international system.  
 
 
2.2. Collective Defense Alliances 
 
The second security concept on the outlined security continuum is the model of alliances, 
based on the principle of collective defense. Alliances were born out of the realist school of 
international relations and thus entail many elements of the realist logic.  
 
In the sense of realist tradition, alliances are among the basic methods how to achieve the 
balance of power. Hans Morgenthau explains the logic of alliances with following example: 
 
 “Nations A and B, competing with each other, have three choices in order to 
maintain and improve their relative power positions. They can increase their own power, 
they can add to their own power the power of other nations, or they can withhold the power 
of other nations from the adversary. When they make the first choice, they embark upon an 
armaments race. When they choose the second and third alternatives, they pursue a policy 
of alliances” (Morgenthau 1985: 201). 
 
In a world of anarchy, where states are let to provide their security by themselves, some 
states choose to form an alliance. From the realist point of view, states enter into alliances 
when they suppose it will increase their security. At the same time, great powers avoid 
alliances if they believe to be strong enough to provide their security without any help. 
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They shun alliances if they assume that the burden of the commitments resulting from 
participation in an alliance is likely to outweigh the expected advantages (Morgenthau 
1985: 201). The decision to enter an alliance or not is taken upon a realistic assessment of 
costs and benefits. Regarding the advantages, alliances can save costs and multiply benefits 
through the division of responsibilities, the sharing of common assets, or simply through 
the protection provided by a stronger ally (Tertrais 2004: 136).  
 
Formation of an alliance represents a form of cooperation. That is why I have classified this 
security model separately and not included it into the first category of realist self-help. In a 
system of collective defense, states do not rely exclusively on themselves but count on help 
of their allies.  
 
Bruce Russet and Harvey Starr suggest a widely accepted realist explanation of why do 
states form alliances. “Throughout the history the main reason why states have entered into 
alliances has been the desire for the aggregation of power” (Russet / Starr as quoted in 
Lake 1996: 3 – 4). States are motivated by the desire to aggregate more capabilities to be 
able to secure their survival. In other words, states form alliances in order to prevent any 
one of them from becoming strong enough to threaten their independence (Morgenthau 
1985: 223). Here again, states are not concerned about their absolute but relative power. 
Short before the end of Cold War, Stephen Walt proposed a balance of threat theory as an 
alternative to the balance of power theory. He elaborated five hypotheses why states form 
alliances:  (a) they ally against a state posing threat to them (balancing); (b) they ally with 
the state posing threat to them (bandwagoning); (c) they choose an ally with the same 
ideology; (d) states form alliances because of foreign aid provided by one state to another; 
and (e) because of transnational penetration into domestic political systems. Walt found out 
that the most common way of alliance forming is balancing against threat, while states‟ 
ideologies, foreign aid as well as penetration represent rather weak causes for alliance 
formation (Walt 1987: 5).  
 
Of course there exist various forms of alliances and numerous patterns of explanation why 
they form. Besides defensive alliances states might also form offensive ones. Furthermore, 
alliances might be symmetrical or asymmetrical, depending on the power capabilities of 
their members; they can bring together states with similar but also opposing political 
values, as it was the case of the Axis alliance between UK, US and USSR during the 
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Second World War. Alliances can also differ in their levels of institutionalization and of 
course in the basic functions they perform (Walt 1997: 157).  I want to narrow the broad 
spectrum to one specific type: military alliances which include security guarantees for its 
members. This is how I define collective defense – through the security guarantees. 
Members of an alliance guarantee to each other that in case of an armed aggression, they 
will provide assistance to the ally under attack. Contrary to the idea of collective security, 
collective defense is directed against an aggressor from outside of the system. It is an 
exclusive group; commitments for mutual support are given only to a narrow circle of 
states. 
 
Military alliance which includes a security guarantee can be either formal or informal – 
meaning with or without a written agreement. The former type has again two possible 
variations: bilateral, which is an agreement between two parties, or a multilateral alliance 
with three or more parties. An alliance or coalition may also form ad hoc, as an answer to a 
particular threat or act of aggression. When using the term alliance, I will refer here to a 
military alliance resting upon the principle of collective defense. Members of an alliance 
formally pledge security guarantees for case of an armed aggression.  
 
During the Cold War, two military alliances – the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) and the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) dominated both European and global 
security order. They were both treaties of guarantee for its members; two major powers, 
United States and Soviet Union, provided most of the security for their bloc. With the end 
of bipolarity, the Russian-dominated WTO dissolved and despite many realist predictions, 
that NATO would disappear as well, once its initial enemy and major threat is gone (for 
instance Mearsheimer 1990: 52), the North Atlantic Alliance has continued to exist. I will 
therefore use the example of NATO to closer examine the logic of alliances and the 
underlying principle of collective defense.  
 
2.2.1. Example of Collective Defense: NATO in the Cold War 
 
On April 4, 1949 representatives of 12 nations – Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, 
Iceland, Italy, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, United Kingdom and the 
United States of America signed the North Atlantic Treaty. The treaty, which entered into 
force on August 24, 1949, gave the birth to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The 
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main incentive behind this act was the increasingly assertive behavior of Stalin‟s Soviet 
Union, which was perceived as growing threat to the security of Western democracies 
(Varwick 2008: 20).  
 
Two Western European initiatives proceed the founding of NATO: the Treaty of Dunkirk, 
signed between United Kingdom and France in March 1947, which included, among others, 
provisions on collective defense and the Brussels Treaty, signed by the Benelux-states, 
France and Britain one year later. The Brussels Treaty, from which the Western European 
Union (WEU) evolved, even included a commitment of participating states to afford a 
state-party under attack “all the military and other aid and assistance in their power”.4  
 
In the late 1940s, Western Europe faced two major security threats: communist Soviet 
Union and eventually renewed aggression stemming from Germany. At the initiative of 
Great Britain, negotiations with US and Canada were held with the aim to create a new 
Western European defense organization, which would extend across the Atlantic. Denmark, 
Iceland, Italy, Norway and Portugal were also invited to take part in the negotiations. The 
final outcome – the North Atlantic Treaty was solemnly signed in April 1949 in 
Washington, DC. 
 
The treaty is composed of a Preamble and 14 Articles. Right in the beginning, it reaffirms 
the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and the commitment to refrain from the 
threat or use of force inconsistent with the purposes of the UN.
5
 More importantly, it also 
refers to the Article 51 of the UN Charter, which stipulates the right of individual or 
collective self-defense. The famous NATO clause on collective defense can be found in 
Article 5 of the Treaty: 
“The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or 
North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree 
that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or 
collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will 
assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with 
the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to 
restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area (…)” 
 
                                               
4 Art. 4 of the Brussels Treaty – Treaty of Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self-
Defense. Brussels, March 17th, 1948.  http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17072.htm  
5 Art. 1 of the North Atlantic Treaty. Full text of the Treaty available under 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm  
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This article establishes the rule “all for one”. Participating states pledge to consider an 
armed attack against an ally to be an attack against all of them and accordingly provide 
assistance to the attacked state. However, it is not specified which form this assistance 
should take. Each individual member state can decide which means are necessary to restore 
international security and in which way they wish to assist the attacked party. The formal 
security guarantees are very vague. They may include use of armed forces, but allies are 
under no legal obligation to provide military assistance. If a state-party is attacked, allies 
may decide to help only with non-military means.  
 
In a similar sense, all decisions of the Alliance have to be taken by consensus. This 
suggests that its members cannot be forced to take any action against their will. They retain 
their full sovereignty. At the same time they do pledge certain commitments to their allies. 
 
Even though there are no concrete security guarantees, which would involve use of force in 
case of an armed attack, the concept of collective defense proved to be very successful 
during the Cold War. This was mainly due to the principle of deterrence. The United 
States, as a guarantor of security of Western Europe, has deployed extensive numbers of 
combat forces, including nuclear weapons, on the territory of its European allies. If a 
European NATO-country had been attacked, these weapons could have been used 
immediately. The (assumed) readiness to act, combined with physical presence of 
substantial armed forces, accounted for the fundamental point in the philosophy of 
deterrence. This ensured the viability of Article 5. The integrated military infrastructure 
further endorsed the trustworthiness of the deterrence principle; even though NATO 
members legally committed only to “soft” security guarantees. Generally, it was presumed 
that Washington would ultimately defend U.S. troops against Soviet aggression, even with 
nuclear forces, if the need arose (Gallis 1997).  
 
To sum up, the Alliance pursued two major objectives in the times of Cold War: deterrence 
of any aggression by Warsaw Pact forces on NATO members, and an effective response to 
and containment of Soviet threat or aggression, should deterrence fail (Schwartz 1975: 
118). Besides these goals, some realists point out another raison d‟être of the Alliance. 
Kenneth Waltz regarded NATO as a tool for its most powerful member – the United States, 
to maintain American domination of European foreign and military affairs (Waltz 2000: 
21). 
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It is arguable, what is today‟s core function of NATO. After the end of the Cold War a 
transformation process of the Alliance started, which most probably has not reached its 
final stage yet. Immediately in the beginning of 1990s, the debate about future role of 
NATO emerged; and the Alliance had to adapt itself to the changing security environment. 
Realist thinkers predicted a quick dissolution of the Alliance, once its primary enemy has 
disappeared. Others suggested that the reformed alliance will take over new tasks. Their 
debate was characterized by the famous slogan Out of area or out of business? If NATO 
did not want to become increasingly irrelevant, but still remain able to tackle new security 
challenges facing Europe, it had to transform: the Alliance had to go either out of its 
geographical area or out of its original scope (Asmus/Kugler/Larrabee 1993:31). Finally, it 
went both directions. 
 
At the end of the decade, NATO conducted one of its most controversial operations. The 
“Operation Allied Force”, in which NATO carried out air bombing of Yugoslavia in order 
to prevent genocide in Kosovo, was not mandated by the UN Security Council. Through 
this operation, the Alliance evolved beyond its original purpose to prevent or suppress 
aggression against its members towards an organization taking over crisis management 
tasks beyond its borders and, as in case of Kosovo, averting humanitarian catastrophe by 
military means. As NATO Secretary General Javier Solana stated in the eve of the 
operation, “NATO is not waging war against Yugoslavia. (…) We must halt the violence 
and bring an end to the humanitarian catastrophe now unfolding in Kosovo”.6 Some 
commentators of that time argued that if NATO failed in Kosovo, the Alliance should come 
to an end as well.
7
 Now, more than a decade later, similar voices are loud in regard to the 
success or failure of NATO in Afghanistan. It is obvious that NATO has started to perform 
new tasks reaching beyond its borders. But conducting a humanitarian intervention, as we 
witnessed it in former Yugoslavia, remains rather an exception, than the rule.  
 
Despite the overwhelming structural changes in international system caused by the end of 
East-West confrontation, to which the North Atlantic Alliance had to adapt, collective 
defense remains at the core of the organization. So far, Article 5 of the North Atlantic 
Treaty has been invoked only once – in a response to the terrorist attacks on September 11, 
                                               
6 Solana, Javier: Press Statement by the Secretary General of NATO. March 23, 1999. 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_27615.htm 
7 Hanson, Victor Davis: NATO at 50: The Alliance Cannot Survive a Defeat… Wall Street Journal (Eastern 
Edition), New York, April 26, 1999. pp. A 18. 
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2001. Interestingly, this happened at the initiative of NATO Secretary General George 
Robertson, and not that of the US government (Varwick 2008: 156). The terrorist attacks of 
9/11 triggered a wave of worldwide political solidarity with the United States. In spite of 
the invocation of the NATO collective defense clause, the measures taken by the Alliance 
were mostly deemed as secondary military assistance. NATO as an organization did not 
play any role in the US-led military operation “Enduring Freedom” in Afghanistan. 
Washington preferred ad hoc coalitions over permanent military alliances. This trend of the 
Bush Jr. administration was confirmed during the invasion of Iraq in 2003, when certain 
European NATO members openly criticized the operation. Some scholars conclude that ad 
hoc coalitions of willing are becoming more relevant than permanent multilateral alliances. 
It is also argued that due to the unilateral policies pursued by the US during the last 8 years 
of Bush administration, the significance of the North Atlantic Alliance has diminished 
(Tertrais 2004).  
 
Nevertheless, the principle of collective defense has been endorsed in all the NATO‟s 
major documents in the post-Cold War era. Since its first enlargement to the former WTO 
members in 1999, altogether 12 states joined the Alliance. Nowadays, NATO has 28 
members with very heterogeneous security interests. The ongoing debate about its new 
strategic concept, which has been due many years ago, shows there are different notions 
among the member states about the future role of the Alliance and the meaning of the 
Article 5 in a post-9/11 world.
8
 The nature of security threats has changed significantly. It 
is therefore questionable, if collective defense is still relevant and suitable to face the 
current security challenges.   
 
We can conclude by saying that the Alliance has undoubtedly achieved its principal goal. 
Throughout the East-West hostilities, no NATO country had ever been attacked. The 
principles of collective defense, which evolved into a concept of deterrence, backed up by 
the military potential of a war ending in total destruction of all involved parties, proved to 
be successful, even without concrete military guarantees.  
 
 
                                               
8 On positions of Central and Eastern European NATO members towards the Art. 5 commitments see for 
example: Asmus, Roland (et al): NATO, new allies and reassurance. Centre for European Reform, Policy 
Brief. May 2010. http://www.cer.org.uk/pdf/pb_nato_12may10.pdf  
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2.3. Cooperative Security 
 
In the middle of the security continuum, between realism and liberalism, I place the model 
of cooperative security. This concept does not have that much theoretical foundation as the 
models of collective security or collective defense do. It has primarily evolved in the praxis 
and is usually referred to in connection with the Conference and later Organization for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE / OSCE). The term “cooperative security” has 
not found its steadfast place among the basics of the international relations theories and 
security concepts.
9
 In my view, the institutionalist theory offers the closest explanation of 
this security model. However, it is questionable to which extend institutions based on the 
principle of cooperative security have an independent impact on states‟ foreign policy 
strategies and outcomes as argued by advocates of institutionalism (Keohane 2005: 157). In 
this chapter, I will try to outline some basic definitions of cooperative security and then 
have a closer look on its practical design in the framework of OSCE. 
 
Cooperative security is the most general form of security-political cooperation. It can be 
defined as a joint action of several states against a common threat (Gärtner 2008: 127 – 
128). According to institutionalists, interstate cooperation occurs when states have 
significant common interests and when all partners jointly benefit from the cooperation 
(Keohane / Martin 1995: 42). Applied to the area of security studies this suggests that states 
cooperate on different issues with the common goal to increase their security. They all 
share the view that security threats can be reduced through mutual cooperation rather than 
confrontation. It assumes that a win-win situation is possible and makes the security 
dilemma irrelevant. Cooperation does not necessarily have to be rooted in a legally binding 
treaty or an alliance. It usually rests upon some general norms and rules, which define the 
framework for cooperation between the states. First and foremost it is the belief that 
security can be enhanced through mutual cooperation. But unlike the systems of collective 
defense or collective security, cooperative security does not oblige the participants to assist 
in any way a state who has been the victim of an aggression. In a system of cooperative 
security, there are practically no legal obligations, nor any enforcement mechanisms. The 
concept is totally dependant on states‟ willingness to comply with the rules and to 
                                               
9 For instance, among 14 security models introduced in: Gärtner, Heinz: Modelle Europäischer Sicherheit, 
(Wien 1997) there is no entry devoted to cooperative security.  
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undertake a joint action in case of their violation. Security is perceived as a shared 
responsibility of the whole international community (Möttölä 1993: 28). 
 
Another definition of cooperative security highlights the prevention of conflicts as its main 
objective. “The central purpose of cooperative security arrangements is to prevent wars 
and to do so primarily by preventing the means for successful aggression from being 
assembled” (Carter/Perry/Setinbrunner 1992 as quoted in Gärtner 2008: 128). This 
understanding of cooperative security is linked to the measures aimed at the prevention of 
violent conflicts; including arms control arrangements as well as confidence and security 
building measures. 
 
The concept of cooperative security has emerged in the framework of the Conference on 
Security and Cooperation in Europe, later Organization for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe. Today, it is closely linked to the OSCE concept of comprehensive security. 
Comprehensive security has a broad definition of the term “security”. Besides the 
traditional military dimension, it also includes various political, social, community-related, 
economic, ecological and cultural aspects of security (Gärtner 2008: 217).  
 
Currently, probably already influenced by the Corfu process and the debate on future 
European security, which I will elaborate on in following chapters, the OSCE Secretariat 
equals the concept of cooperative security to the principle of indivisibility of security – 
meaning that cooperation is beneficial to all while insecurity in and/or of one state can 
endanger security and well-being of all others.
10
   
 
2.3.1. Example of Cooperative Security: CSCE/OSCE 
 
The origins of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe trace back to the 
period of Cold War détente in the early 1970s when major powers were willing to start a 
dialogue about the broad issue of European security. The Conference served as a 
multilateral forum for dialogue between the East and West. In 1972, thirty-five countries, 
including United States, Canada, the USSR and all European countries except Albania, 
                                               
10 The OSCE Concept of Comprehensive and Cooperative Security. An Overview of Major Milestones. 
OSCE Secretariat, Conflict Prevention Centre, June 2009. 
http://www.osce.org/documents/cpc/2009/06/38218_en.pdf     
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entered into negotiations. The talks were concluded three years later. In 1975, participating 
states of the Conference finally adopted the Helsinki Final Act – the document which has 
influenced European security order until the end of Cold War and even beyond. In Helsinki, 
participating states committed themselves to follow ten fundamental principles in their 
mutual relations. These include: sovereign equality, renunciation on the threat or use of 
force, inviolability of frontiers, territorial integrity, peaceful settlement of disputes, non-
intervention in internal affairs, respect for human rights among states, and fulfillment in 
good faith of obligations under international law.
11
 These ten principles became also known 
as the Helsinki Decalogue. Besides the Decalogue, the Final Act established three 
“Baskets” or dimensions of security: politico-military, economic and environmental, and 
human dimension. They were viewed as complementary to each other; all three being of 
equal importance for European security. The three baskets set the framework for the 
concept of comprehensive security and until today, they represent the three basic areas of 
activities of the Organization. Not least important, the Helsinki Final Act also included 
confidence-building measures concerning major military maneuvers.  
 
It is important to point out that the Final Act, as well as all later CSCE/OCSE documents, 
has no force of a legally binding international treaty. It is to be interpreted as a political 
declaration rather than a provision of international law. And this could be seen as one of the 
major weaknesses of the Helsinki agreement. On the other hand, it would have probably 
never been possible to agree on these ten rules, if they had had legal force. 
 
Although the Helsinki Final Act is almost 35 years old by now, its core norms and values 
remain valid and relevant also in today‟s world. The Conference has evolved into a pan-
European security organization.
12
 The OSCE is reaching from Vancouver to Vladivostok; 
bringing together all countries from Western, Southern, Central and Eastern Europe, 
Turkey, USSR- successor states in Central Asia, as well as United States and Canada. The 
OSCE is the only organization where all these states meet as equals. Altogether, the OSCE 
has nowadays 56 participating states which make it to the largest regional security 
organization in the world. 
  
                                               
11 Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe: Final Act, Helsinki 1975. 
http://www.osce.org/documents/mcs/1975/08/4044_en.pdf    
12 Even though the OSCE includes the word Organization in its name, it does not have an internationally 
recognized legal personality. 
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The organization favors a comprehensive concept of security. The broad definition allows it 
to cover a very wide spectrum of security issues, including not only political but also 
human as well as economic and environmental aspects of security. Among others, the 
OSCE is working in the area of conflict prevention, early warning, conflict management 
aimed at peaceful settlement of conflicts, as well as post-conflict rehabilitation. It is 
committed to the promotion of human rights and fundamental freedom, including the rights 
of national minorities, the promotion of democracy and the fight against terrorism.
13
 The 
OSCE is also an umbrella organization to some arms control agreements among its 
participants (namely the CFE Treaty and the Treaty on Open Skies). In the political sphere, 
it serves as a channel for dialogue and cooperation aimed at political confidence-building 
among its participants. Thanks to the OSCE‟s diplomatic structures and regular meetings in 
different formats, many protracted security problems receive ongoing diplomatic attention, 
even though they are not at the top of the political agenda any more (Cottey 2001: 47). 
 
The OSCE has a very rich record of norms setting in its all three dimensions of security. 
Joint values, norms and principles shape the security cooperation. The most relevant rule in 
regard to the security models elaborated in this study is the prohibition of the use of force 
and the commitment to cooperation and peaceful resolution of conflicts. But as already 
pointed out, the rules and principles adopted by the OSCE are not legally binding. All 
OSCE documents, including the Helsinki Final Act, reflect the views of participating states 
expressed on an agreed issue. They have only a politically binding character.  
 
In all decision-making bodies of the OSCE, the 56 participating states enjoy equal rights. 
Decisions have to be taken by consensus – the decision is adopted if there are, within 
a certain time period, no objections raised. When states decide to abstain from any 
objections and therefore to enable the decision to be taken by consensus, participating states 
may request the Secretariat to duly register and circulate their formal reservations and 
interpretative statement concerning the given decision. This makes it possible to adopt a 
document even if the views of participating states differ to a certain level. However, this 
kind of “compromise” usually leads to diverging interpretations in practice. 
 
                                               
13 For an overview of all OSCE activities see the OSCE Handbook. To be found at 
http://www.osce.org/publications/sg/2007/10/22286_1002_en.pdf  
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There exist two exceptions to the consensus requirement. The 2
nd
 CSCE Council held in 
Prague in January 1992 decided that in clear cases of gross and uncorrected violations of 
CSCE, later OSCE, commitments, the consensus-minus-one rule can be applied. In this 
case, participating states can take decisions without the consent of the state concerned. So 
far, this rule has been invoked only once. In July 1992, participating states suspended 
Yugoslavia from the CSCE. It took more than 8 years until the former Republic of 
Yugoslavia could rejoin the OSCE in November 2000.
14
 The second exception was 
established at the 3
rd
 CSCE Council Meeting held in December 1992 in Stockholm when 
participating states agreed on the possibility to adopt decisions while applying the 
consensus-minus-two principle. In case of a dispute between participating states, 
Ministerial Council can instruct them to seek conciliation, even without their consent. Until 
now, this option has never been used.
15
 
 
Despite the theoretical possibility of consensus-minus-one or consensus-minus-two 
decisions these options have not prevailed in practice. The OSCE still relies exclusively on 
the consensus principle.  In case of a dispute, the organization can take action only if a 
broad endorsement is found among all the participants; meaning only if both (or more) 
conflicting parties consent to it. There exist practically no possibilities to force a state to 
any action or undertaking of any action, which is against the will of a state. The 
organization has no authority or mechanisms to enforce any norms or rules. It cannot 
impose economic sanctions or mandate a military enforcement action (Möttölä 1998: 92). 
The basic tool to bring states to compliance with the rules is political pressure. 
 
To sum up, the model of cooperative security relies on the principle that cooperation can 
solve common security problems better than competition and self-help policies. States 
therefore commit themselves to cooperate in peacetimes without being constrained by any 
legally binding rules or pledges to assistance in case of an armed attack. They agree not to 
use force in their mutual relations but do not establish any mechanisms to punish those who 
violate the rules, either. The OSCE, representing the most relevant example of cooperative 
security, is characterized by an inclusive participation, broad mandate, and consensus-based 
decision-making. It is rich on rules and norms but weak in enforcement.  
                                               
14 OSCE Feature: FRY becomes 55th OSCE Member State. November 10, 2000. 
http://www.osce.org/item/4.html  
15 See p. 14 of the OSCE Handbook (FN 13).  
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Scholars of international politics have diverging views on where to classify the theoretical 
concept of a “concert”. The Concert of Europe emerged among major powers in the 19th 
century at the end of Napoleonic Wars. The most powerful states cooperated in security-
related issues without being bound by any treaty or formal commitments. This order made 
it possible to prevent wars between the major European powers for almost four decades. 
Realism and liberal institutionalism explain this relatively long period of peace in different 
ways. From the realist point of view, it was the balance of power among major states what 
made the concert work – the balance keeps the order stable and prevents wars. More 
liberally oriented scholars describe the period between 1815 and 1854 as not only the first 
and longest lasting attempt at collective security but also the most successful one 
(Bennett/Lepgold 1993: 214). Great powers, which were tired of war after the Napoleonic 
Wars, agreed to consult and take collective action in response to threats to peace. In my 
view, both sides are partly right. It was both, the balance of power and cooperation among 
major states, what made the system viable. That is why I will classify concert as a form of 
cooperative security. It is situated exactly in the middle of the continuum where one end is 
marked by deterrence and balancing behavior among major powers, while the other end 
represents a commitment to collective actions in response to threat to peace. 
 
2.4. Pluralistic Security-Community 
 
The next stage at my continuum of security concepts is the idea of pluralistic security-
communities, developed by Karl W. Deutsch. A pluralistic security-community goes 
beyond simple cooperation among states, but it does not reach the rank of collective 
security.  
 
In the 1950s, when the Cold War continued to unfold, political and social scientist Karl W. 
Deutsch, together with his colleagues, studied possible ways how wars could be abolished. 
They examined historical cases of states‟ integration and finally elaborated the concept of 
security-communities. Once states develop shared understandings, transnational values and 
ultimately a sense of a community, they will be able to eliminate wars and create conditions 
and processes for permanent peace.  
 
From Deutsch‟s perspective, any political community is successful if it becomes a security-
community. A closer look at both terms is therefore needed. Deutsch defines “political 
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community” as a social group “with a process of political communication, some machinery 
for enforcement, and some popular habits of compliance”. A political community cannot 
rule out a possibility of war within its borders. The potential of civil wars is present. An 
unsuccessful political community will eventually end in secession or civil war. Deutsch 
therefore studied the prospects for formation of security-communities, which would enable 
to abolish wars.  
 
Deutsch and his colleagues define security-community as a group of people, which has 
become “integrated”. A successful integration goes hand in hand with the formation of a 
“sense of community”. This is to be understood as a conviction of its members about at 
least one crucial point: They all believe that common social problems must and can be 
resolved in a peaceful way, without the resort to physical force. In a security-community, 
there is a “real assurance that the members of that community will not fight each other 
physically, but will settle their disputes in some other way” (Deutsch et al. 1957: 117 – 
118)
16
. 
 
The central point in the teaching of Karl W. Deutsch is the process of “integration”. It does 
not necessarily mean the merging of peoples or states into a single unit. Rather, he 
distinguishes two different types of security-communities: “amalgamated” and 
“pluralistic”.  
 
An amalgamated security-community is formed through a merge of two or more previously 
independent units into a single larger unit. A new common government with supreme 
decision-making authority will emerge. It can have either unitary or federal structure. The 
United States of America can be named as an example of amalgamated security-
community. It arose from the merge of formerly independent units (states) into a single 
governmental unit (federation). A pluralistic security-community will form in the process of 
integration as well. However, the units, represented by separate governments, maintain their 
legal independence. Two or more governmental units can form a security-community 
                                               
16 All the quotations of the work: Karl W. Deutsch et al: Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: 
International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience (1957 Princeton University Press) and 
referring page numbers used in this paper originate from its reprint in: Nelsen, Brent / Stubb, Alexander 
(Eds.): The European Union. Readings on the Theory and Practice of European Integration (1998 Lynne 
Rienner Publishers), pp. 115 – 137. 
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without being merged into a single one. Separate units will integrate but at the same time 
they will retain their own supreme decision-making centers.  
 
In the process of integration, which leads to the formation of a security-community, it is 
necessary that a sense of community unfolds. Deutsch regards it as a “matter of mutual 
sympathy and loyalties; of “we-feeling,” trust and mutual consideration; (…) of mutually 
successful predictions of behavior, and of cooperative action in accordance with it” 
(Deutsch 1957: 123). Only this kind of relationship, based on a sense of community, can 
assure that states will settle their differences in a peaceful way.  
 
Both types of security-communities are envisaged to bring about peace among participating 
units and one cannot easily answer the question which one works better. In different 
settings with different political backgrounds one type can prove more suitable than the 
other one. I will refrain here on the detailed description of pros and cons of each type but 
rather concentrate on the concept of pluralistic security-community. This is what we could 
potentially observe in Euro-Atlantic space – independent units (states) forming a security-
community where peace prevails, while retaining their legal independence. It is not 
foreseeable that an amalgamated security-community with inclusive membership going 
beyond EU or NATO would develop on European continent.  
 
Deutsch found out, that pluralistic security-communities are easier to establish and preserve 
than their amalgamated counterparts (Deutsch 1957: 121) He identified twelve essential 
conditions, which may be necessary for an amalgamated security-community to emerge. 
Only two, possibly three of them are essential for a creation of a pluralistic security-
community as well (Deutsch 1957: 134): 
 
- compatibility of major values relevant to political decision-making, 
- capacity of participating units to respond to each other‟s needs and actions quickly, 
adequately, and without resort to violence, 
- mutual predictability of behavior.  
 
In a pluralistic security-community states are required to make joint decisions and take joint 
actions only in a limited range of subject matters. In a far wider range of problems they 
retain their autonomous decision-making authority within their own borders. 
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Let us recall once again the initial definition of a security-community. It is a group of 
people which has become integrated so that “real assurance that the members of that 
community will not fight each other physically, but will settle their disputed in some other 
way” exists (Deutsch 1957: 118). Interestingly, the word “real assurance” is used in this 
definition. How “real” are these assurances really? According to Deutsch, they are basically 
given by the set of social relations among the members of a security-community. No 
explicit legal commitments are necessary; common values, a sense of “we-ness”, and 
mutual predictability constitute sufficient conditions for a peaceful change. It should be 
mentioned that this assumption relies on idealistic believes about human nature. Peace is 
regarded as the highest value; states do not seek to maximize their power as in the anarchic, 
self-help world.  
 
The Deutsch‟s concept of security-communities, originating from 1950s, had not gained a 
lot of popularity among scholars of international relations for almost four decades. It was 
not until the end of Cold War when his teaching experienced its renaissance. The concept 
of security-communities has been further advanced mainly by constructivist approach 
(Acharya 2005: 752). One of the most important contributions to the study of security-
communities and their evolution is the work of Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett. They 
have proposed a three-tiered framework in which a security-community is built. At the 
third, highest stage, mutual trust and collective identity is formed. They account for 
dependable expectations of peaceful change (Adler / Barnett 1998: 38). International 
organizations are regarded as variables, which can contribute to the process of building 
mutual trust and even collective identity of its members. Adler and Barnett give lot of 
attention to the conditions, factors and the process of development of security communities. 
I will here focus primarily on the end product of this development: the security community. 
While still keeping in mind the “pluralistic” nature of security-community as defined by 
Deutsch, Adler and Barnett distinguish between two types of security communities: loosely 
and tightly-coupled. Both of them are based on mutual trust and shared identity and there is 
low or no probability of violent conflicts even though conflicting interests may arise. The 
loosely coupled type is to be understood as a minimalist version of a security-community. 
The sense of multilateralism prevails; decisions are taken in consensus with regard to 
interest of all members. A tightly coupled security-community goes further. It can even 
include elements of collective defense and / or collective security. States renounce their 
right to use force in international relations. Instead, they agree to shift this sovereign right 
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to a supranational authority. The use of force “becomes legitimate only against external 
threats or against community members that defect from the core norms of the community” 
(Adler / Barnett 1998: 56).  
 
Adler and Barnett do not make a distinction between collective security and collective 
defense. The model of security-communities includes elements of both. That is one reason 
more why I have located security-community in between of these two concepts. The 
underlying idea of security-community is drawn on some idealistic assumptions: conflicts 
among members will be settled in a peaceful way, states abandon their right to use force 
because their relations are based on mutual trust and collective identity which provide for 
peaceful change. Mutual aid in cases of armed attack becomes a matter of habit. Because of 
the integration, no formal security guarantees or any enforcement measures are necessary. 
An armed conflict among members of a security-community is simply unthinkable. 
Realistic notions of power balance, arms race or nuclear deterrence remain relevant only in 
terms of defense of the community as a whole. Within its structure, security-community 
overcomes the realist-based security dilemma.  
 
The concept of security-community can be understood also as a certain midpoint between 
cooperative and collective security. Cooperative security operates as a concert: major 
powers agree on a form of cooperation because they deem it is the best way to solve their 
security problems. States wish to cooperate, but they are not ready to accept any legal 
obligations. They only agree on some basic rules of cooperation. In a security-community, 
where war between its members became unthinkable, these basic rules are backed by values 
all major powers share. Mutual trust, collective identity, and renunciation on the resort to 
violence belong to the most important ones. Only if states agree on these common rules and 
values, if they can predict each others‟ behavior, and if they have real assurances of non-use 
of force, only then they can possibly agree on legally binding commitments characteristic 
for the ideal model of collective security. Collective security fails if states do not adhere to 
the rules and values they agreed on. As we will see on the next pages, states were so far not 
willing to create a real system of collective security. 
 
As an example in regard to current European security structures, I consider the European 
Union to portray a pluralistic security-community. It is often argued that within the EU the 
thesis of democratic peace, according to which democracies to not fight each other, proves 
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to be correct. Until the entry into force of the Lisbon treaty on December 1, 2009, there 
were no military security guarantees within the EU. Because of advanced integration a 
pluralistic security community evolved in the EU, where a war between its members 
became unthinkable.  
 
2.5. Collective Security  
 
While (neo-)realism and the principle of self-help lie at one end of the outlined security 
continuum, the more idealistic concept of collective security represents the opposite side of 
it. Advocates of the system of collective security argue that it can mitigate the rivalry and 
hostility of a self- help prone world. They believe collective security is better qualified to 
prevent wars and stop aggression than balancing mechanisms in an anarchic setting 
(Kupchan/Kupchan 1991: 118). Stability emerges through cooperation rather than 
competition. International rules and norms mitigate the realists‟ security dilemma. 
 
Generally, collective security is defined as a system of states, which pledge to collectively 
assist a state that has been a victim of an armed attack or a threat of an armed attack 
originating from any other member of the system. In such case, the assistance to the 
attacked state can also include military help (Gärtner 2008: 122 – 123).  
 
Collective security can take various institutional forms. They may differ in the number of 
participating states, in the geographic scope, and in the nature of the commitment to 
collective action. As Inis Claude suggested, an ideal collective security entails participation 
of all states of the world, covers all regions of the world, and involves a legally binding 
commitment of all members to respond to an aggression whenever and wherever it might 
occur (Kupchan/Kupchan 1991: 119). 
 
Collective security is based on the rule of law. Similarly to the models of cooperative 
security and security-communities, collective security rests upon some basic rules and 
commitments which determine mutual behavior of its members. Commonly accepted 
norms and standards shape the system and not the “law” of the strongest, as it is the case in 
an anarchic self-help world. All states enjoy equal security because all members of the 
system have equal rights but also obligations. Therefore, for a system of collective security 
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to work, everyone has to accept some basic rules. Adherence to these rules makes a 
peaceful co-existence between the members possible. 
  
The most fundamental rule, lying at the heart of the collective security model, is states‟ 
renunciation on the use or threat of use of force. The jus ad bellum is outlawed; states 
commit themselves to settle their international disputes by peaceful means. This is a major 
restrain on the tools states have at their disposal when acting under the realist principle of 
self-help (Hsiung 1997: 65). Force can be legally used only for the purpose of self-defense 
or as a sanction to punish those who violate the rules.  
 
As we have seen above, the commitment to the non-use of force is crucial also in the 
models of cooperative security and security-community. But contrary to the mechanism of 
an ideal collective security, neither the concept of cooperative security nor a pluralistic 
security-community entails any enforcement measures. Their norms and principles are only 
politically but not legally binding. In an ideal system of collective security, states accept a 
legal commitment to assist a state under attack and to confront the aggressor. 
 
The collective security model relies on the principle “all against one” for deterring and 
resisting aggression. Each member commits to join a coalition to confront any aggressor. 
An attack against one state is considered to be an attack against all. All states pledge to 
come to help the victim and to confront the aggressor. The system can therefore rely on a 
robust deterrence principle (Kupchan/Kupchan 1991: 118).  
 
Advocates of collective security recognize that there are several preconditions for an 
effective system of collective security. Kupchans name three basic conditions (Kupchans 
1991: 124 - 125): 
 
- No single state can be more powerful than an opposing coalition of states. All 
members of the system, including the most powerful states, have to be vulnerable to 
collective sanctions. Otherwise the strongest state would not need to fear retaliation 
when attacking one or more weaker states. Neither the principle of deterrence nor 
the sanction mechanism would work. 
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- Major powers must share fundamentally similar perceptions of what constitutes a 
stable and acceptable international order. There can be no revisionist power 
intending to overturn the international order for either ideological or power-related 
reasons. 
- Major powers have to show a minimum of morality and political solidarity. In the 
spirit of self-sacrifice, they have to acknowledge that it is in their long-term national 
interest to preserve the welfare and stability of the international community.  
Put in another words, major powers basically agree on the design of international order and 
agree on not to seek an unlawful change of the status quo. Nevertheless it may happen that 
a revisionist power occurs. To make collective security function in such case, other states 
have to be able and willing to intervene and help the state that is victim of the aggression. 
To be physically able to do so, no one in the system can be stronger (primarily in military 
means) than all of the other members taken together. The readiness to act is another crucial 
point. 
  
The basic difference between the concepts of collective security and collective defense is 
that collective security is aimed at a possible aggressor from within the system while 
collective defense assumes the aggression will originate from outside of the system 
(Gärtner 2008). Collective security is directed against an abstractly designed aggressor 
whoever it may be. In theory any state may become an aggressor and may be thus 
confronted with collective sanctions. Besides the inward or outward orientation of each 
system, another difference lies in the underlying principle which forms the respective 
security model. Collective defense has evolved from the realist school, according to which 
states pursue opportunistic, self-help policies in order to survive in the anarchic world. On 
the contrary, collective security is based on liberal beliefs in common norms, renunciation 
on the use of force and peaceful settlement of disputes. This difference between basic 
assumptions of states‟ behavior is the reason why the realistic principle of self-help and the 
liberal model of collective security are placed on opposing ends of the proposed security 
continuum. 
 
The relatively simple concept of collective security faces several difficulties when taking a 
closer look. The first problem starts with the question at which intensity of a conflict the 
mechanism of collective security should be activated (Gärtner 1992: 57). Even in the 
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academic debate there are several definitions of the terms conflict, armed conflict, 
aggression or threat, war etc. And real politics make it even harder to objectively define 
these terms.  
 
Moreover, each state has its own security interests. This implies that some states may be 
interested in preventing an aggression and helping a state, which has been attacked, while 
other may be not. States often tend to ignore conflicts where their own interests are not 
affected. Some states could even deem an armed conflict between other states as profitable. 
It could, for instance, increase certain state‟s political influence or bring about economic 
benefits. Consequently, some states may prefer to support a conflict – silently, publicly, or 
with material help – rather than to stop and punish the aggressor. The aggressor might be 
one‟s friend or close ally, and not an enemy. Additionally, in the real world, it is often 
difficult to recognize the aggressor from the victim. We can therefore conclude that there 
are two more conditions, which have to be fulfilled so that collective security can work. 
Besides the above-mentioned, it requires common definition of aggression and willingness 
to act whenever and wherever it occurs (Bennett/Lepgold 1993: 215).  
 
In a system of collective security states have to overcome their short-term individual 
interests for the sake of common, long-term welfare – which is peace and security. Higher 
norms prevail over shortsighted national gains. Public good of a collective security 
organization is to provide security by preventing or stopping aggression. Each state benefits 
from deterring or defeating aggression in form of subsequent peace.  
 
However, even supporters of collective security acknowledge there are some features, 
which make successful collective security difficult (Kupchan/Kupchan 1991: 138 – 140). 
States may fear a possible lost of their sovereignty as well as unnecessary wars they will be 
dragged into. Similarly as it is the case in collective defense systems, also the model of 
collective security faces the danger of escalation of smaller conflicts into large-scale 
hostilities. And this even to a much larger extend because collective security ideally 
operates on universal basis. 
 It is therefore easily comprehensible that a state, which is not party to a conflict, may ask a 
simple question: Why should it intervene? Intervention means both political and financial 
costs, possibly with losses in human lives. Why should a state get involved if its vital 
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interests are not at stake? As mentioned above, advocates of collective security believe that 
states have to conceive that the preservation of international peace and stability is also in 
their long-term national interest. All states finally profit form the strong deterrence. Only if 
the (future) aggressor knows that all other members of the system will turn against him, it 
will calculate this reaction and finally decide to give up his intention. In addition, the 
principle of mutual assistance suggests that next time it may be you who will need the help 
from others.  
 
The next question that follows is how to ensure that the system will really work. How to 
guarantee that states will actually come and collectively defend the attacked state? 
Considering a gentleman‟s word as an unsatisfactory promise, there is a need of a 
mechanism, which makes the system work. Gärtner suggests three theoretical alternatives 
(Gärtner 1992: 21):  
 
- States commit to cooperate. They simply pledge to help a state that has been 
attacked. This can include deployment of armed forces when necessary. However, 
states decide by themselves when they deem the deployment of armed forces to be 
necessary. 
- States assign parts of their national armed forces to an international organization. 
These multinational military units would serve the purposes of collective security.   
- The entire national armed forces of respective member states are allocated to 
multinational military units. International armed forces come into existence. They 
are under complete command of an international organ of collective security which 
decide on their deployment  
It is often argued that collective security works best when not needed (Rendall 2005: 94). 
The efficiency is to a high level dependent on the credibility of the collective action. The 
system bids to prevent wars by robust deterrence force. An aggressor will encounter a 
collective response that is overwhelming to its force. Here again, the actual readiness to 
honor the commitments and enforce the peace, irrespective of whether states‟ immediate 
interests are affected or not, has to be stressed.   
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The advocates of collective security see three main advantages of this security arrangement 
(Kupchan/Kupchan 1991: 125 – 137). First, they argue, collective security deters and 
resists aggression more effectively than balancing under anarchy. Even though collective 
security cannot secure a complete guarantee that states will collectively respond to an 
aggression and help the victim, the pre-existence of legally binding commitment to do so 
will increase the likelihood that a coalition, which is not of equal but of preponderant force, 
will confront the aggressor. This strengthens the deterrence principle significantly. Second, 
collective security organizations promote the cooperative behavior among states. This leads 
to the third advantage: collective security ameliorates the security dilemma present in the 
competitive, self-help world. When major powers basically agree on an acceptable 
international order, preservation of which represents their long-term national interests, 
collective security institutions not only promote further cooperation but also foster trust and 
confidence among states. This will result into increased willingness to practice self-restrain 
and mutual assistance. 
 
The theoretical concept of collective security might seem to be quite simple – namely to 
pledge automatic collective response to acts of aggression. Unfortunately, history has 
shown us how difficult it is to install this model into political reality. The following chapter 
will examine the previous attempts to create a system of collective security as well as 
previous Soviet / Russian proposals in this regard. All the five outlined security concepts as 
well as historical evidence from the 20
th
 century enable us to better understand the current 
Russian initiative to conclude a new treaty on European security. 
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3. Evolution of the Concept of Collective Security and Previous 
Proposals for New Security Arrangements in Europe 
 
In the pages that follow, I will briefly describe the previous attempts to introduce a system 
of collective security into political reality. So far both attempts fell have far too short from 
the ideal concept. As we have seen earlier, an ideal collective security system is universal in 
its membership, and it includes automatic and legally binding commitments of all members 
to assist the victim and stop the aggression. Besides this, collective security rests upon 
some basic norms and rules which govern relations between states. In the following 
analysis of the collective security system as envisaged by the League of Nations and later 
the United Nations Organization, I will concentrate on two major points: first, I will outline 
common goals, norms and rules embedded in the two organizations, and second, I will 
depict the mechanism of collective action supposed to prevent or stop aggression. In the 
second part of this chapter I will look at previous proposals for rearrangement of European 
security.  Special attention will be given to previous Russian / Soviet suggestions, since 
they enable us to better understand the current initiative of President Medvedev. I will 
describe major changes in the European security architecture and the shifts in the security 
models which have occurred during the last two decades. In order to explain the Russian 
proposal for the EST, we have to be aware of how the post-Cold War developments in the 
European security system have been perceived in Moscow.  
At the end of each major war since 1918, the idea to create a system of collective security 
emerged. The first attempt to its institutionalization was laid down in the concept of the 
League of Nations, which was later followed by more advanced but still flawed 
arrangement of United Nations. In the 1950s, the Soviet Union proposed the creation of an 
all-European system of collective security. This proposal was rejected by the Western 
powers which have opted for the foundation of a collective defense alliance. As a 
consequence, during the next four decades of East-West antagonism, the idea of collective 
security fell into oblivion. But then again, the end of Cold War, marked by the 
disappearance of bipolarity and subsequent search for new security order on both global 
and European level, revived the idea of collective security. 
 
 
46 
 
3.1. League of Nations  
 
After the collapse of the balance of power order of the 19
th
 century the winning powers of 
the World War I strived for an international system based on the principle of collective 
security (Gärtner 1992: 19). Following the concept of US President Woodrow Wilson it 
should had been institutionalized in the League of Nations.  
 
The Covenant of the League of Nations was an integral part of the Versailles Peace Treaty 
signed on June 28, 1919 as well as of some other treaties ending the World War I 
(Northedge 1986: 46). The League formally came into existence on January 10, 1920, when 
the Treaty of Versailles entered into force. The main driving force behind the League was 
the US President Woodrow Wilson who proposed its creation in his famous Fourteen 
Points speech in January 1918. The Covenant was then drafted by the winning Allied and 
Associated Powers and imposed on defeated Germany and its allies as part of the peace 
treaties (Northedge 1986: 1, 25 – 47). This close linkage between the Covenant and the 
peace treaties belonged to its most fundamental flaws. The newly established system lacked 
a “concert of interest” of the major powers, as defeated Germany, Japan and Italy obviously 
opposed the postwar status quo (Bennet / Lepgold 1993: 214). Another major power – 
Russia joined the League only in 1934 but was expelled form the organization five years 
later as a punishment for attacking Finland. And finally the United States, the most 
powerful state after the Great War and, ironically, the home country of the strongest 
advocate of the establishment of League – President Wilson, refused to join the 
organization at all. Some historians even argue that the failure of the League to prevent 
World War II was “more due to the absence of the United States from its peace-keeping 
arrangements than to any other cause” (Northedge 1986: 87).  
 
The institutional structure of the League, which was later applied in the framework of the 
UN as well, combined the old, exclusive arrangement of the Concert of Europe with the 
post-1918 theory that every nation-state, regardless its size or power, has a right to say in 
world affairs (Northedge 1986: 49). That is why the bicameral arrangement was adopted – 
in the Assembly, all the member states were represented, while the Council included only 
the major powers and some rotating, non-permanent members.  
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In order to promote international cooperation and to achieve international peace and 
security, the Covenant of the League of Nations created a set of rules and norms witch 
regulated relations between states. One could even say that it created a system of collective 
security, although a very imperfect one. I will now examine these both aspects of the 
League. 
 
Article 10 of the Covenant committed states “to respect and preserve, as against external 
aggression, the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of 
the League”. 17  However, this did not imply that states renounce on their right to wage a 
war.
18
 They only had to follow some rules and procedures before resorting to war. First of 
all, states were obliged to seek a peaceful settlement of their disputes. The contracting 
parties agreed to submit any dispute, which might arise among them, to arbitration or to 
judicial settlement (Article 12). 
 
What we find in the Article 16 of the Covenant of the League of Nations is the pioneering 
attempt at creating a system of collective security. If a member of the League violates the 
provisions of the treaty (Articles 12, 13 and 15) and resorts to war illegally, this will be 
considered as an “act of war against all other members of the League”. It was then the 
legal obligation of each state to isolate the law-breaking nation through an immediate and 
complete cut-off of all trade, financial and personal relations. As a next step the Council of 
the League was obliged to recommend to the member states which military contributions 
are to be made by them to protect the violated provisions of the Covenant. But the Council 
was not intended to take any action towards peace-enforcement or to punish the aggressor. 
This was the responsibility of each individual member state (Northedge 1986: 49). 
 
The system of collective security was activated when a state engaged into war unlawfully. 
In this case, states were obliged to automatically impose economic sanctions on the law-
breaking state. However, the decision, if the war violates the rules of the Covenants and 
thus if Article 16 is to be activated, was taken by each member state individually (Jaberg 
1998: 420). With regard to collective security this constituted a severe difficulty. Differing 
interpretations caused differing responses of states. An automatic and collective response to 
                                               
17 The text of the Covenant of the League of Nations is available under:  
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/leagcov.asp  
18 A general prohibition of recourse to war, as an instrument of national policy, was introduced by the Briand-
Kellogg-Pact in 1928.  
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an act of unlawful aggression was not secured. Moreover, the interpretative Resolutions, 
adopted by the Assembly of the League in 1921, state that each individual nation has to 
take the decision as to what measures it wants to take against the lawbreaker and in support 
of the victim. The Council had the obligation only to make recommendations in this regard, 
however these did not have any binding authority on individual member states (Morgenthau 
1985: 318). 
 
All decisions of the League – both in the Council and in the Assembly, were to be taken 
unanimously. Practically each member state had a veto right what made the decision 
process extremely complicated. Despite the unanimity rule, which was by no means 
absolute and excluded states who were parties to a dispute, the League – neither its 
Council, nor the Assembly, had any authority of enforcement. The Covenant did not 
envisage that members of the League would put their armed forces at the disposal of the 
Council (Northedge 1986: 49). They were allowed but not obliged to use military force 
against the aggressor. We can see that in the League, states retained their sovereignty in all 
essential decisions, including that of waging a war or responding to an unlawful aggression.   
 
Under the provisions of the Covenant, states were legally obliged to arms reductions. They 
had to reduce their “national armaments to the lowest point consistent with national 
safety”.19 In reality, however, all the efforts of the League to achieve either qualitative or 
quantitative disarmament failed (Webster 2005: 495). There was no mechanism to verify 
the compliance, most notably because United States and United Kingdom did not agree on 
inspections or any other verification measures (Grigorescu 2005: 30). Here again, the 
voluntary character of the Covenant and the principle of states‟ sovereignty have prevailed  
All this enabled Germany and others to rebuild their military power. 
 
We can conclude that the League of Nations introduced some pioneering provisions on 
collective security. It regarded an unlawful resort to aggression as an act of war against all 
the members. The latter ones pledged to automatically put in place economic sanctions 
against the state violating provisions of the Covenant. However, each individual state had 
the authority to decide, whether and by whom a war in breach of the Covenant was 
committed. This left open room for diverging interpretations and impeded the automatic 
                                               
19 Article 8 of the Covenant. 
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mechanism of collective security. There was no obligation under the Covenant to use 
military force against the aggressor or to execute the recommendations of the League‟s 
Council. And finally, the Council did not dispose over any enforcement powers to restore 
peace. 
 
Formally, the system of collective security put in place in the framework of the League of 
Nations was a very weak one. Besides stating that an act of aggression against one state is 
to be understood as an aggression against all, it did not create any automatic and legally 
binding commitments. Everything was left on individual states. Historians point out that the 
overall mood after 1918 was not favorable to the concept of collective security. After the 
experience of a devastating world war, the majority of states were so tired of fighting, that 
they were not willing to go to any other one, not even a League war with the aim to defend 
its Covenant (Northedge 1986: 2). This prevailing attitude suggested that the system of 
collective security would not work.  
 
As history has shown, the League of Nations failed as a system of collective security. It was 
not able to prevent, or deter World War II. Nevertheless, the idea of collective security had 
not been given up. On the contrary, the founders of the United Nations tried to learn a 
lesson from the shortcomings of the League and establish a new, more successful 
international organization based on the idea of collective security.   
 
3.2. United Nations 
 
By creating the United Nations, its founding fathers hoped to overcome the realistic-prone 
power politics. After attending the Moscow Conference in 1943, which laid the foundations 
for the United Nations, Cordell Hull, then U.S. Secretary of State, declared that the new 
international organization would bring an end of power politics and introduce a new era of 
international collaboration (Morgenthau 1985: 38). But the following decades of Cold War 
left these hopes unfulfilled.  
As we can read in the Preamble of the Charter of the United Nations, the organization was 
founded with the ultimate objective “to save succeeding generations from the scourge of 
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war”.20 Its main purposes are listed in Article 1: to maintain international peace and 
security, to develop friendly relations between nations and to achieve international 
cooperation in solving international problems. The founding nations of the United Nations, 
having the experience of a World War in fresh memory, favored international friendship 
and cooperation over antagonism and competition. They believed international problems 
can be solved through cooperation, and effective collective measures can prevent, remove, 
or suppress aggression.  
 
Towards this end, states agreed on a general prohibition of the use of force in their mutual 
relations. In Article 2, paragraph 4 they pledged to “refrain in their international relations 
from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of 
any state”. On the contrary, they committed themselves to settle their international disputes 
by peaceful means (as regulated in Chapter VI of the Charter). These include negotiation, 
enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies 
or arrangements, or other pacific means of states‟ preference.  
 
The primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, which is 
regarded as a common aim of all nations, was vested in the Security Council, the main 
executive body of the organization. In case of a dispute which is likely to endanger 
international peace and security, the Security Council is required to call upon the parties to 
settle their dispute peacefully (Art. 33). It may also recommend appropriate procedures or 
methods to achieve the settlement (Art. 36).  
Interestingly, the Charter does not provide any clear-cut definition of an “act of 
aggression”. It is the authority of the Security Council to decide when international peace is 
endangered or violated or if an aggression was carried out. Compared to the League of 
Nations, the UN Charter has a much broader definition of circumstances under which the 
system of collective security can be activated. While the Covenant mentioned only the term 
“aggression”, Art. 39 of the UN Charter, which opens the Chapter VII, identifies any threat 
to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of an aggression as relevant for the Security 
Council in order to take action. The authority of SC is not limited to a specific act of 
aggression. The Council can decide, in accordance with its decision making procedures, if a 
                                               
20 Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice (1945). Published by the 
United Nations Department of Public Information, July 2005. 
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threat to peace, its breach or an act of aggression exists or not. This authority allows the 
Council to act whenever it deems it is necessary to preserve international peace 
(Bennett/Lepgold 1993: 216). Consequently, the delicate question of definition of an 
aggression becomes obsolete. 
Once the Security Council determines the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the 
peace, or an act of aggression, it has to take further steps to restore international peace. In 
its famous Chapter VII, the Charter foresees two kinds of measures, which can be taken by 
the Council in order to restore international peace: measures that do or do not involve the 
deployment of armed forces. The former ones include partial or complete interruption of 
economic relations (economic sanctions), interruption of various means of communication, 
and the severance of diplomatic relations (Art. 41). If these non-military measures are 
proved to be inadequate to restore international peace and security, the Council may finally 
approve a military operation. Article 42 states that the Security Council “may take such 
action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international 
peace and security”. The member states of the UN are then asked to make their armed 
forces available, and assist the Security Council in a way necessary to maintain 
international peace.  
 
Here we can see that the UN Charter foresees also enforcement actions as an instrument of 
collective security. If the aspired peaceful settlement of international disputes fails and 
states do not follow Council‟s recommendations made under Chapter VI, the SC may 
decide to act under Chapter VII of the Charter in order to enforce its decisions and restore 
international peace and security. Enforcement can include political and economic sanctions 
but also the use of military force, if the SC deems it necessary. There are no automatic 
obligations of member states to take action against an aggressor or to assist the victim in 
any way. But the mechanism of collective security can be activated by the decision of the 
Security Council, which is, once reached, legally binding for all the members of the 
organization (Art. 25). 
 
Even though states are under legal obligation to participate in military or other enforcement 
actions decided by the Security Council, it can be argued that in reality, these obligations 
are voluntary. States may decide to withhold their agreement and not to participate in the 
collective security actions. There is no possibility to force individual member states to 
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comply with its obligation to participate in military operations mandated by the SC. 
Realists point out that states may refuse, in violation to their obligation under Art. 43 of the 
UN Charter, to make their armed forces and / or military facilities available to the Security 
Council (Morgenthau 1985: 322). If this happens, the Security Council is powerless to act – 
which means it cannot exercise its duty to restore international peace and security. 
 
Besides this possibility, there is one another and probably even more relevant flaw in the 
system of collective security created by the UN: the veto power granted to the permanent 
members of the Security Council. The SC is not a completely impartial authority. It is 
composed of 15 member states; each of them often pursuing its own national interests 
respectively those of a specific group of states. Every substantial decision of the Security 
Council requires nine votes of its members but no dissenting vote of any of the five 
permanent members
21
. This suggests that each of the “P5 states” holds a practical veto over 
every decision of the Security Council. Due to this provision, the system of collective 
security institutionalized in the United Nations Organization is not only far from perfect. In 
many cases it is not working at all. The veto right remains unchanged even if a P5 state is 
party to the conflict under consideration. Here we can find a major change in the decision-
making mechanism compared to the procedures of the League of Nations. In the League, 
some states enjoyed permanent membership in the Council as well, and this included the 
veto power as well. However, if they were party to a conflict under discussion, their vote 
was not taken into consideration. In this way, it was possible to pass resolutions against the 
will of a major state, when this was primarily concerned by the dispute (Grigorescu 2005: 
36). Even though the Council of the League could not adopt any legally binding decisions 
or mandate use of military force, some big powers interpreted this provision of the 
Covenant as a too heavy restrain on their national sovereignty and therefore decided not to 
join the Organization (the US belongs to the most famous examples of major states which 
opted for non-membership in the League).  
 
In order to ensure that also major powers join the new United Nations after the end of 
World War II, they were given the powerful veto right over all substantial decisions of the 
Security Council. Over the next decades, the veto power has lead to a large ineffectiveness 
of the Organization when dealing with issues of major political or security importance. The 
                                               
21 Five major powers at the end of World War II were given a permanent membership in the Security Council: 
China, France, Russia, United Kingdom and United States.  
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East-West confrontation made it impossible for the Security Council to function as 
envisaged because the competing major powers (United States and Soviet Union) widely 
blocked each others‟ proposals. One can conclude that during the Cold Was, the UN has 
failed as a system of collective security. 
 
At the end of Cold War, the idea of collective defense experienced a short period of revival. 
However, as the same time, the calls for reform of the organization soon became more and 
more loud. Nowadays, it is often argued that if the UN does not undergo any substantial 
reforms, there is a real danger that it will become as ineffective as its predecessor 
(Grigorescu 2005: 25). Despite its flaws, the UN is widely recognized as the universal 
international organization and its Charter as the basic of international law. Most 
international treaties include a reference on the UN Charter and reaffirm its core values, 
rules and principles.  
 
As outlined above, among the basic rules of the UN is the obligation of all member states to 
refrain from threat or use of force. The renunciation on the use of force belongs to the most 
fundamental principles which should secure international peace. However, one very 
significant exception to this rule exists, namely the right to self-defense. It can be found in 
Article 51 of the Charter. It reads: 
 
 “Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective 
self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security 
Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.” 
 
This provision is especially relevant in connection with the concepts of collective security 
and collective (self-) defense. It stipulates that every individual member state, if attacked, 
has the right of self-defense. Moreover, all other members are entitled to help this state to 
defend itself. However, the Charter does not specify which form the collective self-defense 
should take. The general interpretation therefore suggests that the help may also include the 
use of military force. Article 51 did not establish any obligation to defend an attacked 
member state. It simply recognized the right of any nation, no matter if directly attacked or 
not, to come to help to any other states under attack (Morgenthau 1985: 323).  
 
As discussed previously, the UN Charter does not provide a definition of an act of 
aggression. The decision, whether a particular act constitutes a threat or violation of 
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international peace, is left to the Security Council. But in Article 51 we find a different 
approach. Each individual member state has the right to decide by itself, when, and for how 
long the conditions exist to justify the exercise of the right of self-defense (Eekelen 1994: 
33). This right remains applicable as long as the Council does not take the necessary 
measures to restore international peace. But here again a very vague wording is used. It is 
up to each state to determine which measures were necessary and when these have been 
taken.  
 
In the chapter above, we have seen that collective-defense alliances like NATO or WTO 
refer to the principle of collective self-defense, which is embedded in Article 51 of the UN 
Charter, as the common point of reference. However, some scholars argue, collective action 
under Article 51 does not require to be formally agreed on in a collective-defense treaty or 
international organization (Eekelen 1994: 33). Article 51 already provides the legal basis to 
collective response to an armed attack if the Security Council fails to exercise its duty to 
restore peace or until it does so. By entering into collective-defense alliances, states seek 
security guarantees and mutual commitments to collective action. These are not given in 
the framework of the UN.  
In conclusion, I want to compare some basic principles enshrined in the League of Nations 
and the United Nations in regard to the concept of collective security. In the League, each 
state had the right to decide individually if a breach of the Covenant was committed or not. 
The UN gave this authority to the Security Council, whose decisions are binding upon all 
member states. Unlike the League‟s Council, the UN Security Council can take 
enforcement action which may even include use of military force. If, according to the SC, 
international peace is endangered or violated, the Council is required to make 
recommendations, or to decide what measures shall be taken in order to maintain or restore 
international peace and security. All member states are subsequently obliged to assist the 
SC and to make their armed forces available to the Council, even though no guarantee 
exists that states will actually fulfill this obligation. In the League, the decisions of the 
Council were not binding for the member states. Each of them could decide separately, 
which, if any, measures it will take to respond to an unlawful act of aggression. No 
enforcement action executed by the League was envisaged. 
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Another major difference between the League of Nations and the United Nations lies in 
their membership. Both international organizations were designed in the Euro-Atlantic 
region but included non-European countries as well. At its greatest extent in the mid-1930s, 
the League had 58 member states. However, the US never joined the organization, 
resurgent powers like Germany and Japan withdrew from it and another major power – the 
Soviet Union was expelled. Contrary to the exclusivity of the League, the UN enjoys 
nowadays practically universal membership. 192 states, including all major powers, are 
members of the UN today. 
 
An ideal collective security is characterized by participation of all states on the globe who 
pledge a legal commitment to automatically take collective action in response to violation 
of common rules and norms. In this chapter we have seen that even the two most advanced 
attempts to put the idea of collective security into practice – Article 16 of the Covenant of 
the League of Nations and Chapter VII of the Charter of United Nations – fall far short 
from this ideal. And further attempts to create a more perfect system of collective security 
have not been more successful. Due to the Cold War bipolarity, European security in the 
second half of 20
th
 century was dominated by the systems of collective defense rather than 
collective security.  
  
3.3. Molotov’s Proposal on Collective Security in Europe 
 
Even in times of strong Cold War antagonism between the West and the East, marked by 
creation of collective defense alliances, the model of collective security found some 
advocates. In the mid-1950s, Soviet Union put forward proposals for a rearrangement of the 
European security order. At the meeting of Foreign Ministers of the Four Powers (USSR, 
USA, France and United Kingdom), which took place in Berlin in February 1954, Soviet 
Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov presented to his counterparts draft of the General 
European Treaty on Collective Security in Europe. Following the creation of the very 
imperfect collective security system enshrined in the United Nations, this treaty, if accepted 
by the Western powers, would have created an almost ideal collective security regime in 
Europe. I will therefore examine more closely the basic provisions of this Soviet proposal 
and later explore some analogy to the current Russian initiative. 
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Molotov‟s proposal, as its Preamble says, is guided by the purposes and principles of the 
Charter of the United Nations.
22
 The major aim of the treaty was to safeguard peace and 
security through prevention of aggression. During the Cold War, states viewed the danger 
of interstate wars as the main threat to their security. The Soviet proposal aimed to 
eliminate this danger in an all-European system of collective security that would have 
strengthened international cooperation and overcome the logic of competing alliances. 
 
The proposed treaty reaffirms states‟ obligation to refrain from the threat or the use of force 
against each other, as provided for by the UN Charter, and to settle international disputes 
by peaceful means. Consultations among the parties to the treaty were envisaged whenever 
a danger of an armed attack in Europe emerged. If prevention in form of periodical and / or 
special consultations fails and an armed attack against one or more parties to the treaty 
occurs, it is to be considered as an attack against all the parties. In this case, all state parties 
are obliged to  
“assist the State or States which had been so attacked by all the means at its 
disposal, including the use of armed force, for the purpose of re-establishing and 
maintaining international peace and security in Europe”.23  
 
This article would have established an automatic commitment of all members to assist a 
state under attack with all means at its disposal, including military force. In this way states 
would have exercised their right of individual or collective self-defense as provided for by 
the Article 51 of the UN Charter. The clause is almost identical with the Article IV of the 
Brussels Treaty of 1948, from which the Western European Union (WEU) evolved in 1954. 
The Brussels Treaty created a system of collective defense among its five original 
members, which obliged to help an attacked state with “all the military and other aid and 
assistance in their power”.24 Unlike the collective defense concept of the Brussels Treaty, 
which was directed against an external aggressor (Soviet Union), the Molotov‟s proposal 
would have created a genuine, Europe-wide system of collective security, where the 
potential aggressor could arise from within the system. According to the Soviet proposal, 
membership in the treaty should have been open to all European states regardless of their 
social systems. The United States and the Chinese People‟s Republic, as permanent 
                                               
22 Draft general European treaty on collective security in Europe as submitted by Soviet Foreign Minister 
Molotov to the Berlin Conference on February 10th, 1954. Available in European NAvigator 
http://www.ena.lu/  
23 Ibid. Art. 4.  
24 Article IV of the Treaty of Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self-Defence. 
Brussels, March 17th, 1948.  
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members of the UN Security Council, were to be invited as observers. A permanent 
consultative political committee was also to be established. Its task would have been to 
draft recommendations for the state parties. Part of the Soviet proposal is devoted to 
provisions regarding the reunification of Germany, which was, at that time, still under 
occupation of the Four Powers. 
 
Article 7 of the draft of the general European treaty on collective security in Europe 
suggests that the parties must not enter any coalition, alliance or security arrangement 
which would be contradictory to the purposes of this treaty. It is not specified if a collective 
defense system, like the NATO or later the WEU, would have fell into this category. This, 
of course, leaves room open for interpretation. By proposing the new treaty, Soviet leaders 
might have tried to encourage East-West cooperation. Moscow hoped this development 
would have gone hand in hand with the dissolution of military alliances, first and foremost 
NATO. Through this initiative, Soviet elites probably sought to diminish the influence of 
the United States in European security affairs, too. 
 
The Soviet proposal for an all-European treaty on collective security had been rejected by 
Western European powers. French Government, after having consulted other NATO 
member states, explained the reasons for the refusal in a note to the Soviet Government 
dated May 7, 1954.
25
 France argued that the treaty proposed by Molotov would have not 
removed the root causes of tensions in Europe. It regarded the Soviet endeavor as an 
attempt to maintain Germany divided and to retain political, economical and military 
control of Soviet Union over Eastern Europe. In the French view, the treaty would have 
only preserved insecurity and division in Europe. Moreover, France objected that the treaty 
would have ruined the authority of the United Nations.  The best way to assure collective 
security in Europe would have been, according to France, if Soviet Union had allowed the 
UN to function properly.  
 
The security of NATO members was provided by the collective defense of the Alliance and 
not by a new collective security arrangement with the Eastern bloc. France argued that if 
Western powers accepted the Soviet proposal and admitted Soviet Union among 
themselves, the collective defense would have been destroyed. Soviet government would 
                                               
25 Note du gouvernement français en réponse à la note soviétique du 31 mars 1954 (7 mai 1954) is available in 
European NAvigator, under http://www.ena.lu/  
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have permanently vetoed the decisions of the Alliance, which were to be taken 
unanimously.  
 
Instead of accepting Molotov‟s proposal, Western powers offered their own vision about 
the best way to enhance European security. Unlike Soviets, who had promoted general 
principles of the collective security arrangement, the West was more concerned with 
concrete security issues in Europe. A new security structure, so the French government, 
would not lead to any durable solutions, if the fundamental divisions behind this new 
façade remained the same. In order to decrease international tensions, France, together with 
other Western powers, suggested the Soviet site to show its willingness and cooperate, 
among others, in the question of German reunification and Austrian sovereignty. Another 
concrete issue was disarmament. The West had endorsed its commitment to negotiate and 
conclude a treaty on conventional and nuclear disarmament under the auspices of the 
United Nations.  
 
Due to the circumstances of the Cold War, the Soviet proposal to convene a conference of 
European States, where the general European treaty on collective security in Europe could 
have been concluded, was rejected by Western powers. Shortly afterwards, in October 
1954, eight Western nations -  United Kingdom, France, Belgium, Netherlands, 
Luxemburg, together with Italy and also the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), amended 
the Brussels Treaty and founded the WEU. Following year, in May 1955, Western 
Germany acceded to the North Atlantic Alliance as well. Soviet Union responded to these 
developments by initiating the Warsaw Pact – a military alliance of the communist bloc 
(Holden 1989: 6). Its founding document, officially named Treaty of Friendship, Co-
operation and Mutual Assistance was signed in the Polish capital Warsaw on May 1, 1955 
by following countries: Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, 
Hungary, Poland, Rumania and of course the Soviet Union. The Warsaw Pact, also called 
Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) had been since then the Eastern counterpart to NATO. 
Similarly to Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty, WTO provided “soft” security 
guarantees to its members. In the event of an armed attack on any of the signatories, other 
states were committed to render assistance as they considered necessary.
26
 There was no 
                                               
26 Article IV of the Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance states that in an event of an 
armed attack on a state party to the treaty, each state will provide immediate assistance „by all the means it 
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obligation to help with military means as it would have been the case in the collective 
security treaty proposed by Molotov. The Warsaw treaty also committed its members to 
settle international disputes by peaceful means and, unlike NATO, to work towards 
disarmament and to strive for a prohibition of weapons of mass destruction.
27
 Interestingly, 
the signatories of the Warsaw Treaty still committed themselves to seek a general European 
treaty on collective security. If this was concluded, the Warsaw Treaty would become 
ineffective.
28
 This provision in the Warsaw Treaty can be understood as a proof of Soviet 
Union‟s commitment to the all-European collective security arrangement. USSR would 
automatically dissolve the Warsaw Pact if a collective security treaty, as proposed by 
Molotov in 1954, was accepted by the Western powers.  
 
The Warsaw Pact created a system of collective defense. In this sense, it shared many 
similarities with the North Atlantic Alliance – including the commitment to peaceful 
settlement of international disputes, consultations, defense cooperation and of course the 
security guarantees in case of an armed attack (Holden 1989: 10). But there was one 
fundamental difference between the two blocs. NATO is an Alliance of free and democratic 
nations which voluntarily decided to join a system of collective defense against a common 
threat. The WTO, on the other hand, was much more a tool for Soviet Union to control 
political and social developments in the Communist bloc. Eastern European countries were 
forced to accede to the Warsaw Pact; and its forces had been used even against its own 
members, when Soviet leaders felt discomfort with internal developments in their 
“satellite” countries. A well known example is the invasion of Warsaw Pact forces into 
Czechoslovakia in 1968, where the reformist attempts were halted by force. Article VIII of 
the Warsaw Treaty commits states to respect the principles of sovereignty and non-
interference into internal affairs. Accordingly, the document could not provide any legal 
foundations for this military intervention (Holden 1989: 11). Even though NATO troops 
were never used against any of its members, it has been also often argued that one of the 
substantial raison d‟être of the Alliance was to exercise American influence over political 
and military affairs in (Western) Europe. Here we find an analogy to the WTO. 
 
                                                                                                                                               
may consider necessary, including the use of armed force“. The text of the Treaty is available under 
http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/1955warsawpact.html  
27 Articles I and II.  
28 Article II.  
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Until the end of the Cold War, Europe remained divided into two competing military 
alliances. The Soviet proposal to create an all-European system of collective security, 
which would overcome the existing military-bloc structure, has never been seriously taken 
into consideration. However, in times of thaw in the tensions between the rival alliances, 
some form of dialogue and even cooperation took place. 
 
3.4. Emerge of Cooperative Security Model 
 
In the early 1970s, the relations between the West and the East began to improve. During 
this time, the model of cooperative security – institutionalized in the framework of CSCE 
has emerged. As an alternative to Cold War hostilities, the CSCE process promoted 
cooperation among all states in Euro-Atlantic region, including the US, Canada and Soviet 
Union, as well as the neutral and non-aligned countries. The West and the East pursued 
clearly opposing interests in the CSCE negotiation process. Soviet Union sought a 
legitimization of the post-war status quo in Europe, while the West hoped to bring about 
political change in Eastern Europe. In other words, one side favored continuity and the 
other was interested in change (Seidelmann 1989: 115). Finally, a compromise was found – 
the Helsinki Decalogue. The document accommodated interests of all parties involved. In 
the ten principles, states reaffirmed their commitment to the non-use of force in their 
mutual relations. They also expressed respect for national sovereignty, territorial integrity, 
and non-intervention into domestic affairs favored by the USSR; as well as the commitment 
to human rights and fundamental freedoms promoted by the West. 
 
The successful adoption of the Helsinki Final Act was not followed by a period of 
intensified East-West cooperation or friendship. On the contrary, the years between 1975 
and 1984/85 are described as a “stagnation” phase of the CSCE process, marked by 
confrontation over the implementation of Helsinki commitments (Seidelmann 1989: 116). 
This was mainly due to the deterioration of the US – Soviet relations. The CSCE could not 
prevent renewed East-West antagonism. However, it could at least limit the extent and 
intensity of the hostilities (Ibid: 120). 
 
The CSCE and its review conferences favored the spirit of pan-European cooperation. They 
worked towards promotion of human rights, fundamental freedoms and economic 
development throughout Europe. During the last 15 years of the Cold War bipolarity, the 
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Conference served as a multilateral forum for dialogue between the East and the West and 
in this way helped to bring the Cold War to its end.  
 
3.5. Changes in European Security Architecture after the End of 
Cold War 
 
The end of the Cold War brought about tremendous changes to political realities, on both – 
global and European level. A debate about new security arrangements followed 
immediately.   Although the end of bipolarity has not generated a new system of collective 
security, the idea experienced its renewal.  
 
On the global level, there have been hopes that the end of confrontation between the two 
superpowers, which were at the same time permanent members of the UN Security 
Council, would finally make the UN collective security mechanism viable. Another 
incentive to discuss the effectiveness of the „newly reinvented‟ system of collective security 
in the early 1990s was undoubtedly the Iraq‟s invasion of Kuwait. This aggression was a 
clear violation of commitments under the UN Charter. The Security Council finally 
authorized a response of the international community with “all necessary means”, including 
the use of force, in order to evict Iraq from Kuwait. Advocates of liberalism and 
institutionalism have argued that this case revealed the potential of the post-cold war 
collective security. But there are also less successful examples. If we take the Yugoslav 
civil war as a test of the great powers‟ willingness to act in the case of breach of the peace 
where their vital interests are not concerned, it failed (Bannett 1993: 231). And so did the 
UN and its system of collective security. With regard to the Balkan conflicts the same can 
be said about the system of cooperative security. It was not able to prevent the wars from 
happening, either. Nevertheless, or maybe exactly because of this and other failures, states 
made different proposals to new security arrangements in Europe. 
 
The debate about the new security order unfolded on academic level as well. Realists, who 
emphasize the anarchic structure of international system and states‟ desire to maximize 
power, saw the move from bipolarity towards multipolarity as a destabilizing factor in 
international politics. They argued that the disappearance of the balance of power structure 
will automatically lead to increased possibility of wars and conflicts (Mearsheimer 1990). 
On the other hand, liberal institutionalists welcomed the change and pledged for a new 
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system of collective security. Some have even proposed a security system where both 
principles – realism and collective security would be united. Kupchans put forward a new 
concept: “concert-based collective security organization for Europe” (Kupchan/Kupchan 
1990: 116). It should rely on a small group of major powers to guide a region-wide security 
structure. The proposal suggested that great powers primarily deal with classical military-
security issues, while the full body handles the non-military aspects of security (Ibid. 153). 
This idea takes advantages of a collective security system while, at the same time, 
reflecting distribution of power among major states. But this option has never been 
realized. In the mid-1990s, the German Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at 
the University of Hamburg (IFSH) argued the security in Europe is weak and fragmented, 
and it faces many tensions with potential to escalate into wars. In order to remove the zones 
of unequal security in Europe and to ensure peaceful resolution of conflicts, it suggested 
creation of the European Security Community (ESC) based on the principle of collective 
security. The new organization should evolve from the OSCE into a full regional collective 
security arrangement under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. It should include security 
guarantees for all states in the Euro-Atlantic area. Through a legally binding treaty, all 
members would be obliged not only to respect human rights and the rights of minorities, 
but also to automatically help a victim of an aggression (IFSH 1996: 135). According to its 
advocates, the ESC would work as the UN was supposed to work at the time of its 
foundation – namely as a system of collective security. But the real political developments 
in the Euro-Atlantic region moved towards different direction – that of cooperative security. 
 
After the end of Cold War, it became clear that the European security architecture has to be 
reformed. There were new realities: the disappearance of Soviet Union and the Warsaw 
Treaty Organization created a unipolar world with the United States taking lead as the only 
superpower; NATO lost its major enemy but nevertheless continued to exist and even 
enlarge; countries of central and Eastern Europe began their way of transformation and 
integration to the Western structures, and the integration within the European Communities, 
later European Union, developed further. 
 
The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe seemed to be the right place to 
discuss the future arrangement of European security system. 15 years after the adoption of 
the Helsinki Final Act, the CSCE experienced a short period of revival as a primary place 
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for a continent-wide dialogue on European security. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, there 
was a general consensus across Europe that the CSCE structures should be strengthened 
and further evolved. Its inclusive membership stretching form Vancouver to Vladivostok 
combined with a variety of norms adopted by all members, were deemed as the main 
reasons for putting the CSCE at the heart of the new security order in post-Cold War 
Europe. However, an ideal collective security arrangement was not under active 
consideration (Möttölä 1993: 16). It was perceived that a new collective security 
organization would mean the replacement or, at least, diminished influence of existing 
military alliances, NATO in particular. Many Western European states felt discomfort 
about a potential scale down of NATO. So instead of negotiating a new collective security 
treaty in Europe, only revisions or modifications of existing structures have been suggested 
and / or put into practice. 
 
As early as in 1990, the Heads of States or Governments of then 34 participating states of 
the CSCE, among them George Bush Sr., Mikhail Gorbachev and François Mitterrand, 
signed the Charter of Paris for a New Europe.
29
 This political document, which is 
sometimes referred to as an official end of the Cold War, set basic tenets of the post-Cold 
War security cooperation in Europe. The Charter, among others, reaffirmed the obligation 
under UN Charter to restrain from threat and use of force as well as the commitment to the 
Ten Principles of Helsinki Final Act. Moreover, participating states expressed their 
“steadfast commitment to democracy based on human rights and fundamental freedoms; 
prosperity through economic liberty and social justice; and equal security for all 
countries”.  I want to especially highlight the notion of equal security. Although it is to be 
understood only as a political declaration, without any closer definition, the principle of 
equal security is a new approach which has not been included in the Final Act of Helsinki. 
It is relevant especially in respect to many Russian documents and statements which stress 
this principle as well as in regard to the current initiative of President Medvedev to 
conclude the European Security Treaty.
30
 
 
The short period of “CSCE euphoria”, which accompanied the adoption of Paris Charter 
and the successful negotiation and ratification of the CFE treaty, evaporated quickly (Cotty 
                                               
29 Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe: Charter of Paris for a New Europe. Paris 1990.  
http://www.osce.org/documents/mcs/1990/11/4045_en.pdf   
30 See for example: The Foreign Policy Concept of Russian Federation, July 12, 2008. http://www.mid.ru/ns-
osndoc.nsf/0e9272befa34209743256c630042d1aa/cef95560654d4ca5c32574960036cddb?OpenDocumente 
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2001: 46). During the crises in the Baltic states and in Yugoslavia in 1990 – 1991, the 
USSR blocked the CSCE decision-making mechanism which required a consensus of all 
participants. Through the de facto veto of the USSR, the CSCE was rendered inactive and 
powerless. Cooperative approach based on consensus decision-making seemed to fail. 
Western dominated institutions, namely NATO and EC/EU took the lead in resolution of 
the conflicts. The Baltic as well as the Central European states did not believe that the 
CSCE was able to guarantee their independence. They favored collective defense over 
cooperative security and have therefore sought integration into NATO. 
 
In the early 1990s, France proposed a project concerning a pan-European security treaty, 
where existing CSCE norms along with new provisions about European security would 
have been codified. The idea was rejected by United States and other NATO members who 
feared this may curtail the primacy of the Alliance. Finally, a politically binding document 
– Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security, which became part of the 
Budapest Declaration
31
 in 1994, was agreed on (Ghebali 1996: 6). As we will see in 
Chapter 4, many provisions of the current Russians proposal for a European Security Treaty 
are already included in this legally non-binding Code, especially the clause on indivisibility 
of security. Besides this, some articles
32
 of this document suggest a future possibility of 
gradual development of the OSCE from a purely cooperative security institution, without 
any enforcement competences or other legally binding provisions, towards a system of 
collective security (Vetschera 1996: 124).  
 
There has been another similar move on the imaginary security continuum: namely the 
gradual transformation of NATO. The organization has transformed from a purely 
collective defense alliance towards a more cooperative security organization. NATO has 
nowadays partners all over the globe, including its former enemies. Shortly after the Paris 
Charter was adopted, also the NATO member states recognized the need for new security 
architecture in Europe. In the Rome Declaration, the Alliance recognized that it cannot deal 
with all the new security challenges alone. Instead, cooperation with other security 
organizations is desirable. Heads of State and Government of NATO countries – called for 
                                               
31 Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe: Towards a Genuine Partnership in a New Era. 
Budapest Summit 1994. http://www.osce.org/documents/mcs/1994/12/4050_en.pdf  
32 For instance, Article 5 of the Code states that participating states are determined to act in solidarity if CSCE 
norms and commitments are violated and to facilitate collective responses to security challenges, (…) they 
will consult promptly, (…) consider jointly the nature of the threat and actions that might be required in 
defense of their common values (emphasis added). 
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a “framework of interlocking institutions tying together the countries of Europe and North 
America“ and a “new European security architecture in which NATO, the CSCE, the 
European Community, the WEU and the Council of Europe complement each other” 
(emphasis added).
33
 NATO‟s cooperation – not only with other international organizations 
in Europe, but also with numerous non-NATO countries, evolved quickly. In December 
1991, the so-called North Atlantic Cooperation Council was founded. It later led to the 
creation of the “Partnership of Peace” program, launched in October 1993. And despite 
strong Russian opposition, NATO started to expand and move closer to Russian borders. In 
1999, Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland joined the Alliance. They were followed by 
seven Central and Eastern European countries in 2004.
34
  Most recently, NATO 
enlargement took place in the Balkans, when Albania and Croatia joined in 2009. 
Currently, the Alliance has 28 member states and cooperates with 22 partner countries 
within the Partnership for Peace Program.
35
 In the changed security environment, Alliance 
decided to pursue the policy of enlargement; to strengthen cooperation with partners from 
all over the world; and to take over new tasks reaching beyond its geographical scope as 
well as beyond its traditional collective defense mission. All these developments account 
for the shift of NATO towards more cooperative security approach.  
 
There have been diverging views on the enlargement of NATO and its impact on regional 
stability and security. But what we can see is that the “new European security architecture” 
– when defined as a framework of interlocking institutions which complement each other, 
to use the words of the Rome Declaration, was and still is strongly shaped by the Euro-
Atlantic pattern. It evolved around Western security institutions (especially NATO) with 
only limited involvement of Russia. Even though a formal cooperation between NATO and 
Russia has been established in 1997 and further strengthened in 2002, the OSCE remains 
the only place, where Russia meets its European partners on an equal footing. But many 
Western European states regard the OSCE only as a tool to enhance democracy and human 
rights in the post-communist region. Neither Western Europe nor the US has been paying 
adequate political attention to this organization.
36
 
                                               
33 North Atlantic Council: Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation. Rome, November 8,1991. 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_23846.htm?selectedLocale=en  
34 These were: Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. 
35 For a list of NATO‟s partner countries, see: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/51288.htm Accessed on 
February 18, 2010.  
36 See, for example, a comparison of the frequency of OSCE Summits with the NATO, NATO-Russia or EU-
Russia Summits. OSCE high level meetings are extremely rare. The last OSCE Summit was held more than 
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3.6. Russian Proposals in the 1990s 
 
Since the end of the Cold War, also Russia has repeatedly called for a rearrangement of 
European security architecture. These calls have become especially loud when the 
traditional enemy of Soviet Union – NATO and its military infrastructure moved closer to 
Russian borders. Until today, the eastward expansion of NATO continues to be one of the 
most troublesome issues in the relations between Russia and the West.  
 
In the early 1990s, Russia pursued a very Western-oriented foreign policy, aiming at strong 
cooperation with the West. Russia did not want to be left out from European security 
affairs. It did not challenge the status quo but it sought an active participation in it 
(Shearman 1995: 100). Andrei Kozyrev, the Foreign Minister of Russia under President 
Yeltsin, has even admitted the possibility that one day Russia may become a member of 
NATO. But this would require a fundamental transformation of the Alliance. He argued 
that through an intensified cooperation with Russia, backed up by joint decision-making 
mechanisms, NATO could evolve into a pan-European security organization (Kozyrev 
1994: 12-13).  
 
Ideas of pan-European partnership and cooperation were not new in Russian foreign policy 
thinking. It was already in the late stage of the Cold War, when the President of Soviet 
Union Mihkail Gorbachev put forward the idea of a “common European home”. In an 
address to the Council of Europe dating from July 1989, Gorbachev called for unification 
of Europe, where all European states – large, medium and small ones take part. This new 
Europe would be based on common values of humanism, equality, justice and democracy. 
Traditional balance of forces would be replaced by balance of interest.
37
 In the spirit of 
Soviet perestroika, he did not regard the existence of two different “social systems” to be 
an obstacle in creating a unified Europe. Gorbachev idealistically believed that Europe can 
unite in its diversity (Gorbachev 1995). In the security sphere, Gorbachev called for 
substantial reductions of armaments in Europe, advocating the ultimate objective of 
complete elimination of nuclear weapons by the end of the century. He expressed his wish 
to dissolve military blocs and to launch an intensive political dialogue with all European 
                                                                                                                                               
10 years ago, in 1999 in Helsinki, while the other mentioned formats meet much more frequently. This can be 
interpreted as lack of high level political interest in the OSCE.  
37 Gorbachev, Mikhail: Address to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. Strasbourg, 6 July 
1989. Available in European Navigator, under www.ena.lu  
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states as well as with the US and Canada, which would create an atmosphere of mutual 
trust and cooperation. Gorbachev‟s concept of common European home was not limited to 
security issues. He also called for intensified cooperation in the economic sphere, in 
environmental questions, as well as in legal and cultural affairs. Gorbachev promoted a new 
pan-European security order, similar to the model of Deutsch‟s security-community. 
Gorbachev did not draw many details of his plan. He simply called for recasting of political 
relationships between all European nations. It was a new way of Soviet thinking about 
Europe and international politics, which contributed to the end of the Cold War. But his 
wish to unite Europe in the spirit of common values, trust and cooperation among all 
European nations, including Russia, remains unfulfilled even twenty years later. 
Gorbachev‟s vision of unified Europe was very idealistic and far ahead of his times.  
 
The strong Russian orientation towards the West and its structures in the early 1990s has 
changed when the new Foreign Minister of Russia, Yevgeny Primakov was appointed. Both 
Primakov and his predecessor Andrei Kozyrev sought to avoid international isolation of 
Russia. But the two Foreign Ministers followed different strategies in pursuing the same 
goal – to secure Russia‟s place in the post-Cold War world. Kozyrev sought to reintegrate 
Russia into European affairs through rapprochement with NATO which would transform 
and include Russia in joint decision-making mechanisms. Russian hopes for an inclusion 
into Western structures remained unfulfilled. On the contrary, the idea of NATO‟s 
expansion towards Russian borders became more and more popular on both sides of the 
Atlantic. And the Alliance‟s relationship with Russian Federation remained unaccounted 
for. Russia therefore continued to challenge the prevailing security architecture in Europe 
as well as on global level. Russian foreign policy under FM Primakov was characterized by 
realist balance of power logic. Primakov was a strong advocate of the concept of 
multipolarity. In order to counterbalance the unipolar world dominated by the US, 
Primakov sought a new multipolar international structure, in which Russia, along with 
China, United Nations, Islamic states and in some instances even with Western European 
states, form independent poles (Lo 2003: 77). Primakov applied the logic of multipolarity 
also on European security system. He focused on the OSCE, the only organization where 
Russia, as well as United States and all European states enjoy equal membership. In his 
address to the OSCE Council in 1994, Primakov called for a new security arrangement in 
Europe. The OSCE, as the only organization of all European states, should lie at its heart. 
In line with his concept of multipolarity, he stressed that all international organizations, 
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which are active in the security sphere – meaning United Nations, OSCE, Council of 
Europe, NATO, EU and CIS have to be involved in this process (Primakov 2001: 227). As 
I will discuss in Chapter 4 this demand has been repeated in current Russian proposal for 
the European Security Treaty.  
 
Despite the Russian desire to strengthen the OSCE and to be accepted as an equal player in 
European security affairs, it was the North Atlantic Alliance who took the leading role in 
post-Cold War European security order. Russia, struggling with its internal transformation, 
was too weak to defend its foreign policy goals. And so it found itself in the position of an 
“outsider” of European security. Kremlin elites have never accepted this NATO-centered 
structure where no place was left for Russia. Since the collapse of the USSR, Russia has 
been seeking to reestablish its position as one of the pillars of European security (Duleba 
2009). 
 
Regarding the NATO enlargement, Moscow has not seen the inclusion of Central and 
Eastern European countries into NATO as a real military threat to Russian security. 
However, Russian leaders perceive NATO expansion into the region of former Soviet 
influence as a sign of Russia‟s weakness and diminished political relevance in European 
affairs (Mangott 2001: 411). That is why they oppose the enlargement and further 
strengthening of the Alliance and seek the rearrangement of European security system.  
 
 
3.7. Conclusion 
 
Theory as well as history offers us an indispensable tool on how to think about possible 
security arrangements in Europe of 21
st
 century. But real politics does not happen in a 
vacuum where the most suitable arrangement could be easily put into practice. The history 
shows us, that even though “ideal” forms of some outlined models have been proposed, 
they have not been fully implemented in political reality. Especially since the end of Cold 
War we have witnessed some shifts on the security continuum. Today‟s international 
organizations cannot be strictly attributed to one security model anymore, but comprise 
elements of more models. When dealing with these “hybrid” forms of security systems it is 
interesting to analyze which concept prevails. 
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Far from representing an ideal model of collective security, the United Nations, at least in 
theory, retains the role of an overall guarantor of peace and security and legitimizer of 
collective actions in case of its breach also on European level. We have seen that the 
proposal of Soviet FM Molotov originating from the mid-1950s would create an almost 
perfect system of collective security. However, this endeavor did not find any supporters in 
the West. It aimed at diminishing the influence of Western collective defense alliances – 
first and foremost NATO. Later Russian proposals on rearrangement of the European 
security structure, such as Gorbachev‟s vision of the common European home, or the 
striving of FM Primakov for a multipolar order, were not put into practice either. Instead, 
the post-Cold War European security architecture has evolved around Western institutions 
without adequate involvement of Russia. 
 
The current European security “order” is characterized by an array of international 
institutions. They differ in membership, structure, aims and available means to achieve 
their goals. NATO did not dissolve, but it still continues its transformation; the EU 
gradually strengthens its foreign policy capabilities; the OSCE continues to exist as the 
only all-European security institution even though with limited political weight; and then 
the Eastern groupings – CIS and CSTO are here, however only with marginal impact on 
security affairs. None of them can claim to be the European security organization where 
security concerns of all European nations could be effectively dealt with. There is no clear 
division of labor between all these organizations, even though we face a sufficient amount 
threats to tackle. Instead of mutually reinforcing each other, international organizations 
sometimes compete for survival, for their “place” in European security architecture and for 
the interest and resources of individual states. Does it suggest that we need a modernization 
of the current structure? Would the European Security Treaty, as proposed by Moscow, 
offer the right solution? 
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4. Medvedev Initiative 
 
On June 5, 2008, during a speech to German political, parliamentary and civic leaders in 
Berlin, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev put forward the idea to review the current 
European security architecture. He called for a new legally binding pan-European treaty, 
which would, among others, codify the principle of indivisibility of security. On November 
29, 2009, Kremlin released the draft of the European Security Treaty on the official web 
page of Russian President.
38
 The public release of the draft followed more than a year of 
vague statements from various Russian leaders regarding the proposal of President 
Medvedev to rearrange the current European security architecture, which has become also 
known as the “Medvedev initiative”. Subsequent to previous two chapters dealing with 
theoretical and historical aspects of (European) security system, I will now examine the 
provisions of the released draft, explore the rules, principles and mechanisms it puts 
forwards, and look at the possible implications which could follow if the Russian proposal 
was accepted. Finally, I will try to locate the treaty and the security system that would be 
created by it on the security continuum outlined in Chapter one.  
 
4.1. Draft of the European Security Treaty 
 
The draft of the EST, which was published on the Official Web Page of Russian President 
and according to this source sent to heads of relevant states and to chief executives of 
international organizations operating in the Euro-Atlantic area, has a Preamble and 14 
Articles. They can be roughly divided into three thematic areas: Articles 1 – 3 deal with the 
proposed principle of indivisibility of security; Articles 4 – 8 establish a new mechanism on 
conflict resolution and also include a special clause on collective action in case of an armed 
attack; and the final Articles 9 – 14 handle the entry into force of the treaty and some more 
rights and obligations that would result form the treaty. 
 
The European Security Treaty, according to its initial drafters, is guided by the principles 
enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations. In the preamble of the Treaty, state parties 
reaffirm the prohibition of the use or threat of force as set forth in the Article 2, Paragraph 4 
                                               
38 The draft of the European Security Treaty, as published on the Official Web Portal of Russian President on 
November 29, 2009, can be found in the Annex of this paper.  
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of the UN Charter. They also reaffirm the central role of UN Security Council as the main 
responsible organ for international peace and security.  
 
Besides the UN Charter, the preamble of the draft recalls also some legally non-binding 
international declarations. These include: the Declaration on Principles of International Law 
concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States dating from 1970; the 
Helsinki Final Act of 1975; as well as the Manila Declaration on the Peaceful Settlement of 
International Disputes from 1982 and the Charter for European Security adopted by the 
OSCE Istanbul Summit in 1999. 
 
A closer look at the preamble already reveals some of the Russian reasoning when 
proposing the new treaty. Russia declares its commitment to the principles of the UN 
Charter and especially seeks to strengthen the role of the Security Council. This is easily 
comprehensible, since Russia enjoys the privileges of a permanent member in this 
exclusive international body. A reference to some other international declarations is made 
as well. Instead of analyzing them, I would like to point out that one fundamental 
document, namely the 1990 Paris Charter, is missing. This suggests that Moscow is not 
completely happy with it and it aims at rearrangement of the current European security 
system. 
 
Let us now have a closer look at the treaty itself. Article 1 of the draft EST establishes the 
principle of indivisibility of security, for which Russia has been calling intensively. It 
reads: 
 “(…) the Parties shall cooperate with each other on the basis of the principles of 
indivisible, equal and undiminished security. Any security measures taken by a Party to the 
Treaty individually or together with other Parties, including in the framework of any 
international organization, military alliance or coalition, shall be implemented with due 
regard to security interests of all other Parties.” 
 
According to this Article, states‟ cooperation has to be based on the principle of indivisible, 
equal and undiminished security. It means that any security measure taken by one or more 
state parties has to take into account the security interests of all other state parties as well. 
This provision creates an obligation of all state parties to consider security interests of all 
other members when taking any security-related measure.  
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The principle of indivisibility of security is further elaborated in Article 2. It states: 
 
 “A Party to the Treaty shall not undertake, participate in or support any actions or 
activities affecting significantly security of any other Party or Parties to the Treaty.” 
 
In other words, the treaty would prohibit all its signatories to take any action which 
diminishes the security of any other state party. This is how Russia defines indivisibility of 
security. States would be not allowed to strengthen their security at the expense of any 
other state. The same principle would apply to international organizations and alliances. 
The treaty would create an obligation for all the state parties to ensure that military 
alliances, coalitions or organizations they are members of observe the principle of 
indivisibility of security as well as all other rules and principles set for the in the UN 
Charter, Helsinki Final Act, Charter for European Security and other documents adopted by 
the OSCE. It would not matter if a state is acting individually or in a framework of an 
alliance or another grouping. These articles would simply prohibit taking any action which 
could significantly affect security of other member states. Besides reaffirming the 
inadmissibility of use or threat of force, the treaty also explicitly commits states not to 
allow any other state to use its territory or to use the territory of others with the aim of a) 
preparing or caring out and armed attack against any other state-party, or b) taking any 
action which would significantly affect security of any other member (Art. 2, Para. 2). 
  
In the framework of the European Security Treaty, Russia is also proposing creation of a 
new dispute settlement mechanism. It should address differences that might arise in 
connection with the interpretation or implementation of the treaty. The new instrument 
would consist of three stages:  
1. Consultations among the Parties; 
2. Conference of the Parties; 
3. Extraordinary Conference of the Parties. 
 
To begin with, each state party to the EST would be entitled to request information from 
any other party regarding “any significant legislative, administrative or organizational 
measures taken by that other Party” (Art. 3) which, in the opinion of the requesting party, 
might affect its security. Exchange of this kind of information could go either through 
diplomatic channels or through the Depositary.  
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If a state party conceives that there exists a “violation or a threat of violation of the Treaty” 
(Art. 5) or if it simply wishes to raise any issue related to the essence of the treaty in order 
to consider it together with other parties, it can request consultations on this issue. The 
Depositary has to inform all other parties about the requests of this kind so that the 
consultations can be held as soon as possible, or in an agreed time frame. All state parties, 
including the non-invited ones, would be entitled to take part in the consultations on their 
own initiative.  
 
As a second step, any state, which has participated in the previous round of consultations, 
would be entitled to request the gathering of the Conference of the Parties. If at least two 
parties were in favor of the convocation, it would be the duty of the Depositary to convene 
the Conference. Its main purpose would be to consider the issue, which was dealt with 
during the consultations. When attended by at least two thirds of all members, the 
Conference would be able to take decisions. All decisions would have to be taken by 
consensus and they would have binding force. 
 
Articles 7 and 8 of the proposed draft deal with the case of an armed attack against a party 
to the treaty or a threat of such attack. An armed attack or its threat would activate the last 
stage of the conflict-resolution mechanism. In this case, the Depositary would be required 
to immediately convene the Extraordinary Conference of the Parties, where the 
necessary collective measures could be decided on. If attended by at leas four fifths of the 
parties, the Extraordinary Conference could take binding decisions by a unanimous vote. 
However, if the aggressing state, or the state the threat of the attack is coming from, were a 
party to the treaty, its vote would be excluded when adopting the decision. The consensus-
minus-one-principle would be applied.  
 
In regard to the collective security mechanism created by the EST, Article 7, Para. 2 of the 
draft is of crucial significance. It stipulates: 
 “(…) every Party shall be entitled to consider an armed attack against any other 
Party an armed attack against itself. In exercising its right of self-defense under Article51 
of the Charter of the United Nations, it shall be entitled to render the attacked Party, 
subject to its consent, the necessary assistance, including the military one, until the UN 
Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and 
security”. 
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With reference to the right of individual or collective self-defense as laid down in the 
Article 51 of the UN Charter, this clause gives each state the explicit right to consider an 
armed attack against any party to be an armed attack against itself.  
 
Article 9 of the draft points out that nothing in the treaty is to be interpreted as diminishing 
the role of UN SC, which is the primary organ responsible for maintenance of international 
peace and security. The EST should in no way affect states‟ rights and obligations set forth 
in the UN Charter. The treaty also commits states not to assume any international 
obligations, which were incompatible with the provisions of the EST, while it retains states‟ 
right to neutrality.  
   
The EST, as proposed by Moscow, should be open for signature to all states from 
Vancouver to Vladivostok – meaning to all 56 current member states of the OSCE. At the 
same time, not only individual states, but also following five international organizations 
active in the Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian space could adhere to the treaty
39
: the European 
Union, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Collective Security 
Organization, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Community of Independent 
States.  
 
As any other international treaty, the EST is subject to ratification by its signatory states. It 
is also to be adopted by the signatory international organizations listed above. In the 
Russian proposal, the minimum of twenty-five ratifications or adoptions / approvals of 
international organizations are needed for the treaty in order to enter into force. Further 
states may then accede to the treaty. In case of extraordinary circumstances, which 
endanger states‟ supreme interests, state parties are free to withdraw from the treaty.  
 
4.2. Implications of the EST 
 
If the European Security Treaty was accepted by all OSCE member states in the form of the 
current draft released by Kremlin, it would overhaul the existing European security 
architecture.
40
 The treaty would not only codify some of the established norms and rules, 
                                               
39 Named in the order as in the EST Draft. 
40 As we will see in the following chapters, this possibility seems to be quite improbable at the moment. 
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but also create new, legally binding principles, which would decisively restrain states‟ 
behavior in the area of foreign and security policy. 
 
Probably most importantly, the treaty would codify Russian interpretation of the principle 
of indivisibility of security, which has been until now only politically binding. This would 
mean that neither individual states nor international organizations would be allowed to take 
any action, which significantly affects the security of any other member state. In order to 
imagine the impact of this clause, I regard it useful to recall the current institutional 
structure of European security system. In the broad European region a number of 
international organizations are active in the area of security. Besides the global UN, these 
include the OSCE, NATO, EU, CIS and CSTO. These institutions vary in their structure, 
membership, political relevance, available resources and so on. They exist side-by-side, 
without any hierarchical structure or clear division of labor among them. Very simplified, 
we could visualize the structure in Picture 1. 
 
 
 
Picture 1: Current European Security Structure 
 
We can see that the institutions are not hierarchically structured. Only the United Nations – 
as the global guarantor of international peace and security, as well as all principles 
enshrined in its Charter, can be regarded as standing “above” them. Even though these 
organizations have not formally signed or adopted the UN Charter, all of their individual 
member states did so.  
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If the EST entered into force, a new “layer” in the European security system would be 
established. As Russian leaders often point out, no new international organization would be 
created, nor would any of the existing organizations dissolve. But a new principle, binding 
for both individual member states as well as the international organizations as such, would 
be created. We could imagine it with help of Picture 2. 
 
 
 
Picture 2: European Security Structure after the entry into force of the EST 
 
If the EST entered into force, all its signatories – security institutions acting in the Euro-
Atlantic region as well as all their individual member states, would be constrained by the 
legally binding principle of indivisibility of security. It is worthy noticing that no particular 
state or international organization is to play a central role in European security affairs, not 
even the pan-European OSCE. They should all have an equal role. The only instance 
standing above all states and institutions is the UN Charter. Also the EST, as declared in its 
Preamble, is guided by the principles set forth in the Charter. It acknowledges the primary 
responsibility of UN SC for maintaining international peace and security and is therefore to 
be located hierarchically under the UN Charter. 
 
At a first sight, the clause on indivisibility of security proposed by the EST might seem 
quite reasonable – it would codify the principle that no state or international organization 
can take action which threatens security of its partners. However, a closer examination 
reveals some hidden problems. First and foremost, the treaty does not specify what exactly 
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is meant by the expression “affecting significantly”. A more precise definition is missing 
and therefore, each party would be entitled to claim that an action of a state or group of 
states significantly affects its security while of course the other side can view the issue 
differently. The treaty does not suggest any closer indications of what shall be considered a 
legitimate security interest. It does not foresee any criteria, commonly agreed on by all 
participants, upon which states could claim the activation of this clause, nor does it 
establish an independent authority which could determine if some legitimate security 
interests of a party are to be affected by a particular states‟ action or not. In case any state 
party fears violation of the treaty, it would be entitled to request consultation on this matter 
and later on also the convocation of the Conference of the Parties. This mechanism is 
supposed to settle disputes in connection with the interpretation of the treaty. However, all 
decisions of the Conference have to be taken by consensus. If two sides disagree about 
what action significantly affects someone‟s security, solution taken by consensus is 
unlikely. We can therefore conclude that the absence of a clear-cut definition or of a 
recognized authority entitled to take final decisions would most probably lead to diverging 
interpretations of this clause and ultimately cause more difficulties than solutions.  
 
As described above, the treaty would also create a new mechanism on conflict resolution. It 
would consist of three layers – consultations, Conference and an Extraordinary Conference. 
The last one would be convened in case of a threat of armed attack or of actual outbreak of 
armed violence. An effective conflict resolution mechanism is of course needed in Europe. 
Here again, it makes sense to review the current mechanisms, which are already in place.  
 
First of all we should not forget about the global collective security mechanism, dealt with 
in Chapters 2 and 3 of this paper, which is applicable to Europe as well. It is also important 
to recall that under the UN Charter all states are obliged to settle their disputes peacefully. 
They may choose from an array of means designed to bring about a peaceful resolution of 
conflicts. In Europe, a variety of multilateral forums exists where states can held both 
political and expert-level consultations and in this way prevent or resolve their conflicts. 
The OSCE and the NRC belong to the most relevant forums in regard to security relations 
between Russia and the West. The OSCE hold weekly meeting the Ambassadorial level; 
Foreign Ministers meet annually at the Ministerial Council and occasionally, high-level 
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summits are organized.
41
 Additionally, consultations among 28 NATO Allies and Russia 
are held at various levels in the framework of the NATO-Russia Council. Moreover, 
Foreign Ministers as well as Heads of State or Governments have numerous occasions to 
meet on bilateral basis and discuss pressing issues of international security. Nevertheless, 
political consultations at all these forums seem insufficient to resolve conflicts peacefully 
and to prevent certain crisis from escalating. It is therefore doubtful that the first level of the 
new EST mechanism consisting of consultations among state parties would bring about any 
remarkable progress.  
 
The second and third layers of the mechanism require closer examination. If attended by at 
least two thirds of the states, the Conference of the Parties could act as a decision-making 
body. All decisions would have to be taken by consensus and would be binding. This is an 
important novelty since the most documents adopted in the framework of international 
institutions are only politically binding. The binding character of these decisions is linked 
to a number of further questions: What kind of decisions would the Conference entitled to 
adopt? Would they include the possibility of sanctions? And would the decisions be 
binding for all state parties or only for those states which participated in the Conference? 
Even if the decisions were of a substantial basis (including sanctions) and if they had 
legally binding character on all members, this level of the mechanism would probably 
remain rather ineffective. It is quite unlikely that any decisions would be adopted at this 
stage. We can assume that the party the future sanctions are directed against would take 
part in the Conference and block the required consensus. Exactly because of this 
possibility, the third and last stage becomes relevant. 
 
The Extraordinary Conference, when attended by at least four fifths of the states, could 
adopt decisions on the consensus-minus-one principle. This implies that the vote of the 
state party, which has carried out an armed attack or threatened to do so, would not be 
considered when adopting the decision. In this case, legally binding decision could be taken 
also against the will of the law-breaking state. Acceptance of this principle would be 
undoubtedly a major step forward in advancing collective response against the aggressor. 
However, it might be difficult to translate the principle into political reality. It would be 
                                               
41 However, it should be noted that the last OSCE Summit was held more than a decade ago – namely in late 
1999 in Istanbul. 
79 
 
only possible to apply the proposed consensus-minus-one principle when a clear and 
obvious act of violence is carried out by one of the state parties. 
 
In most international conflicts, however, states argue over the question who has committed 
the first act of violence. The draft does not specify who would be the authority to rule 
which conflict party is to be classified as the aggressor. If this decision-making stays in the 
authority of individual member states, diverging views may cause disagreement over whose 
vote is to be excluded from the voting. A possible solution would be to exclude all states 
militarily involved in the given conflict. This option would indeed imply that states agree in 
advance that if they become party to a conflict where the aggressor is disputed, decisions on 
this matter will be taken without them, even if they claim to be the victim.  
 
The acceptance of the consensus-minus-one principle in political reality is questionable also 
in regard to the fact that this possibility was already envisaged in the framework of OSCE. 
As I have elaborated when describing the theoretical concept of cooperative security, in 
clear cases of gross and uncorrected violations of OSCE commitments it is possible to take 
decisions on a consensus-minus-one or consensus-minus-two principle. However, this 
voting method has not become a generally accepted rule in the decision making process. 
The suspension of Yugoslavia‟s membership from the CSCE in 1992 remains the only case 
where this rule was applied. 
 
Russia is often arguing that the August 2008 conflict in Georgia has revealed the need for a 
new conflict resolution mechanism. It justifies the proposal for a new treaty with the fact 
that all the available formats have failed to prevent the conflict from happening. I will 
therefore briefly apply the EST mechanism proposed by Moscow to this particular case. 
Regarding the first stage of the new mechanism – consultations, this would probably not 
achieve any different outcomes to those we have witnessed. As described in previous 
paragraphs, states have various opportunities to address their security concerns in several 
multilateral forums. The second stage – conference, would probably not lead to any 
relevant outcomes either, as consensus of al participants is needed to take a decision. And 
finally, the third stage would most probably fail to act as envisaged because of the disputed 
question who started the fire and is therefore to be excluded from the voting. As a result, 
we can conclude that the proposed mechanism would not contribute to the resolution of this 
(or any similar) conflict in a significant way. 
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When examining the theoretical implications of the EST treaty, special attention is to be 
given to Article 7 of the draft. It deals with cases of armed attack or a threat of such attack 
against a party to the treaty. If this occurred, every state party would be “entitled to 
consider an armed attack against any other Party an armed attack against itself” and to 
“render the attacked Party, subject to its consent, the necessary assistance, including the 
military one”. We have already encountered parts of the wording used in this clause in 
articles establishing the systems of collective (self-) defense or collective security. 
However, Article 7 of the EST draft is formulated in a very unusual way. It establishes 
right to solidarity and not an obligation. An armed attack on one state would not be 
automatically considered as an armed attack on all the others, as it is the case in the 
collective defense systems. No obligation to come to help to the attacked state would be 
created. Instead, states would gain right to do so, namely under the condition that the 
attacked state agrees with the help. In this case, the assistance to the victim could include 
also military means. 
 
Here we can see that the treaty does not establish any security guarantees, or a mechanism 
of automatic collective response. If the armed attack originates from a state party to the 
treaty, no automatic sanctions, either of military or non-military nature, are foreseen. All 
action is to be decided ad hoc in the framework of the Extraordinary Conference which has 
to be convened immediately. This body would be entitled to adopt binding decisions on 
collective measures. But the draft does not specify what kind of decisions are to be taken by 
the new consensus-minus-one mechanism. It restricts itself on stating that the Extraordinary 
Conference has to decide on “necessary collective measures” (Art. 8, Para. 1).  
 
Besides this new mechanism on possible collective response, the already existing tools of 
the UN Security Council, which can be found primarily in Chapters VI and VII of the UN 
Charter, remain applicable. However, the hierarchy in respect to the UN Charter is not 
sufficiently defined. Article 9 of the draft EST says that nothing in the treaty shall affect 
“the primary responsibility of the UN Security Council for maintaining international peace 
and security, as well as rights and obligations of the Parties under the Charter of the 
United Nations”. But what if a permanent member of the UN Security Council carried out 
an armed attack on a state party to the EST? Could then the Extraordinary Conference, 
which is entitled to take decisions by the consensus-minus-one principle, decide against the 
will of a permanent member of the UN SC and in this way “overrule” the authority of the 
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Council to maintain and restore international peace and security? This question is of course 
interesting only from the legal point of view. In the political reality it is quite improbable 
that all states attending the Extraordinary Conference would turn against any of the 
permanent members of the SC. This brings us again to the question of “added-value” of the 
European Security Treaty as currently proposed by Moscow.  
 
Last but not least I would like to stress that the EST draft lacks one very significant 
element, namely an enforcement mechanism. According to the Russian proposal, the treaty 
should become a legally binding part of international law. Even though it deals with cases 
of armed attacks or of threats of such, it does not consider the possibility that states will 
violate the treaty. And (alleged) violations are to be expected with high probability, 
especially in regard to the principle of indivisibility of security introduced by the treaty. 
Each state party would be entitled to request information on any significant measures, 
which might affect its security. Moreover, they would be entitled to request consultations 
and later on the Conference dealing with any issue related to the substance of the treaty. 
However, if these two instances fail to achieve a commonly accepted solution and a state or 
group of states violate the treaty, no enforcement or sanction mechanism is envisaged. The 
Extraordinary Conference with its poor consensus-minus-one principle is to take decisions 
only in cases of armed attack or of threats of such. States may, however, consider any 
measures taken by the others – including non-violent action – as significantly affecting 
their security and therefore unlawful under the EST. If a state or group of states 
nevertheless takes such an action and thus violates the principle of indivisibility of security, 
the “victim” state has no possibility to seek enforcement of the treaty. No collective action 
is anticipated – weather automatic or ad hoc. The implementation of the treaty would be 
totally dependent on the goodwill of its members to adhere to the commitments. 
 
4.3. Conclusion: EST as a System of Collective Security? 
 
Even though Russia is openly calling for a pan-European collective security system,
42
 I 
argue that the draft of the European Security Treaty proposed by Kremlin would not create 
a genuine system of collective security. In the figure below, I compare the most relevant 
features of an ideal collective system, together with its currently most advanced realization 
                                               
42 See for instance Lavrov, Sergey: Euro-Atlantic: Equal Security for All. Written for Revue Defense 
National, May 2010. 
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– United Nations Organization; the previous Soviet proposals form the 1950s; and the 
currently proposed EST. To recapitulate, ideal collective security is primarily characterized 
by legally binding commitment to respond to aggression and assist the victim. Neither 
United Nations nor the EST includes such an automatic and clear commitment in their 
provisions, although some other features are similar or even identical with the ideal form of 
a collective security system.  
 
Figure 2: Overview of Collective Security Models 
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The major flaws of the Russian EST proposal in regard to establishment of a genuine 
collective security system lie in the provisions that are NOT included in the draft. The 
European Security Treaty only endorses the principle that an armed attack against one party 
can be considered an attack against any other party. Other states are entitled to render the 
attacked party necessary assistance, including military help, if the victim state consents to 
it. This clause only reaffirms the right to collective self-defense, already established by Art. 
51 of the UN Charter. Most importantly, no obligation to assist the victim is enshrined in 
the EST. There are no security guarantees that, in case of an armed attack, other members 
of the system will confront the aggressor and restore peace. Not to speak about automatic 
commitments to collective action attributed to ideal systems of collective security. The 
absence of security guarantees means that the deterrence principle, which is crucial in the 
logic of collective security, is not working either. 
 
A relevant provision of the EST concerns the proposed decision-making mechanism. In 
cases of armed attack, the Extraordinary Conference can take binding decisions on the basis 
of consensus-minus-one principle. As pointed out in the previous paragraphs, it requires 
that states agree on who is the aggressor. And this might not be an easy task. Moreover, all 
other states participating in the conference would have to consent to the decision, and not 
only an exclusive body as it is the case in UN SC where five major powers enjoy special 
rights. This suggests that the Conference cannot take any decision against the will of a state 
participating in the Conference which is not the aggressor. Each state would have a “veto 
right” because each one can inhibit the necessary consensus. 
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Compared to the UN, the EST collective mechanism could be activated in a more limited 
scope of events. Unlike the UN, where also threats to the peace and breaches of the peace 
are regarded as relevant reasons for activation of collective action, the Extraordinary 
Conference of EST is to be convened only in cases of armed attack. Other violations of the 
treaty – especially of its indivisibility of security principle, are not considered to be causes 
for collective enforcement actions.  
 
After studying the concept of collective security and examining provisions of the EST draft, 
we can conclude that the treaty would not create a new system of collective security in 
Europe. I suggest that the EST and its mechanism of collective response is even more 
remote to the concept of ideal collective security than the UN because it does not create any 
concrete obligations to take action (either of military nature or not) in cases of armed 
attack. The proposal of Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov is completely different in this 
regard. It would have created legal obligation to assist any state under attack, no matter 
where the attack is originating from. Moreover, states would have been obliged to assist 
with all means necessary to restore international peace and security. This would create a 
real system of collective security. No binding decisions of any international body would be 
necessary because states would be obliged to act automatically when the armed attack 
occurs. In the UN, no such obligation is automatic but depends on the decisions of the 
Security Council. Its decisions are binding for all members of the Organization; even 
without their consent to it. Under the UN Charter, states are obliged to assist the SC in 
restoring international peace and security if the Council decides so. Even though there is no 
guarantee that states actually commit to their obligations, the EST does not create any 
similar obligations on restoring peace and security. That is why I conclude that the system 
of collective security established by the EST would be even weaker than the current UN 
structure. It should be stressed that the EST creates a very new obligation – namely not to 
take any action which significantly affects security of other members. A mechanism which 
could enforce this obligation is, however, missing.  
 
So is any other of the outlined security concepts more suitable to explain the Russian 
proposal? I suggest that the self-help model would not do. The proposed EST draft would 
significantly restrain states‟ sovereignty, especially in regard to the principle of 
indivisibility of security. According to realism, when securing their survival in an anarchic 
world, states want to have all options at their disposal. The EST commits states to take due 
85 
 
regard to security interests of all parties and to avoid any action which significantly affects 
security of other states. These principles clearly contradict the idea of self-help policies. 
Realism therefore does not offer a suitable explanation. 
 
The EST would not establish a system of collective defense either. I see two main reasons 
for it. First, the EST collective mechanism is directed against possible attack originating 
from both within and outside of the system. The proposed consensus-minus-one principle is 
to be applied in case of an armed attack from within the system. Collective defense 
alliances do not anticipate this possibility. Second, the EST includes no security guarantees 
for the case of armed attack, whether soft or hard ones. Security guarantees are among the 
main incentives for states to enter a collective defense alliance. If these are missing, the 
logic of securing survival and / or maximizing power by entering into defense alliances is 
not applicable.  
 
Similarly, the model of Deutsch‟s security-communities does not offer an adequate 
explanation of the Russian proposal. There is no integration taking place among the (future) 
members of EST, and the draft does not have a solid foundation in common values. The 
possibility of an armed attack lies at the heart of the treaty. It proposes a conflict resolution 
mechanism and endorses collective (self-) defense because an armed conflict among the 
parties is thinkable. The treaty also includes provisions on enforcement (consensus-minus-
one principle) which again do not suit the logic of Deutsch‟s security-communities.  
 
In my opinion the most suitable security model to explain the draft EST is the concept of 
cooperative security. The treaty is strongly shaped by the pattern of cooperative security, 
even though it suggests a legally binding document – something rather untypical for the 
cooperative security model. The EST is based on the principles of non-use of force, 
peaceful settlement of conflicts and mutual cooperation. The treaty endorses international 
law and even codifies a new principle – indivisibility of security. No enforcement for this 
rule is proposed. Its implementation would be decentralized; there would be no authority to 
determine which activities are significantly affecting security of other states. It would 
depend only on the goodwill of the members to honor they commitment not to strengthen 
their security at the expense of other members. These are all typical features of cooperative 
security. 
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However, some important elements of the draft are to be attributed rather to the collective 
security system than to cooperative security. It is mainly the consensus-minus-one principle 
decision-making which can be applied in cases of armed attack. We have seen that the 
model of cooperative security does not include an enforcement mechanism; it is totally 
dependant on willingness of the participants to cooperate. And yet the EST creates the 
possibility to take binding decisions against the will of the aggressor. Furthermore, states 
would be entitled to consider an armed attack against a party an armed attack against itself. 
The EST endorsed the right to solidarity, but no obligations to assist the victim. 
 
We can conclude that the EST would create a new, hybrid security system. The new 
structure would combine two basic security concepts: cooperative security and collective 
security. In my opinion the model of cooperative security prevails because the most 
prevalent part of the treaty – the indivisibility-of-security-clause does not include an 
enforcement mechanism. Moreover, it lacks the obligation to collectively assist the state 
under attack and restore peace. Nevertheless, the consensus-minus-one principle can be 
applied under certain conditions. 
 
This conclusion is drawn upon theoretical and legal analysis of the proposed draft of the 
European Security Treaty. We can assume Russia believes it can better achieve its foreign 
policy goals through cooperation than competition or even confrontation with its partners. 
Unlike the realist self-help logic, Russia favors common rules and norms which constrain 
states‟ behavior and in this way enhance Russia‟s security. The second part of this study 
will be devoted to empirical evidence of these findings.  
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5. Background Analysis 
 
 
One of my essential research questions is why has Russia proposed a new treaty on 
European security. The following chapter will be devoted to the analysis of the context of 
Russian foreign and security policy and Russia‟s relations with the West. I assume that to a 
large extend they both indicate the possible reasons for Moscow to propose the treaty. 
Besides examining the overall trends of Russian foreign policy, I will focus on the state of 
affairs as we witnessed especially in year 2008. I regard it for a crucial year at least for two 
reasons. It was in 2008 when President Medvedev put forward his idea to negotiate a 
legally binding treaty on European security for the first time. Moreover, the year 2008 was 
marked by a deep political crisis between Russia and the West which lead, among others, to 
the suspension of the NRC. The Georgia crisis, which was followed by a period of mistrust 
and sometimes even Cold War-like rhetoric, has had significant impact on the initial 
reactions of many Western states on the Russian proposal.  
 
5.1. Prevailing trends in Russian foreign policy 
 
When looking at the official arguments of Moscow in favor of the EST Treaty it is helpful 
to understand the logic of Russian foreign policy thinking over the last two decades. In 
Chapter 3, I have already briefly described some basic goals of Russian foreign policy in 
the 1990s. They were characterized by early Russian attempts to integrate into the Western 
European community (under Foreign Minister Kozyrev) and later by attempts to create 
a multipolar world order which would counterbalance the US primacy and restore Russia‟s 
status of a great power (under Foreign Minister Primakov). None of these endeavors have 
been successful; Russia became an “outsider” of European security affairs – a fact which 
was most clearly manifested during the Kosovo war in 1999 (Duleba 2009: 5). When 
Vladimir Putin became Russian President in year 2000, Kremlin changed the tactics while 
still pursuing the same strategy – namely to reintegrate into the European security system. 
After 9/11, an unprecedented improvement of bilateral relations between Russia and the US 
emerged which, among others, led to the foundation of the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) 
in 2002. But the situation changed again in 2003 when the close Russian partnership with 
the US was replaced by a new Paris-Berlin-Moscow-axis, uniting three major European 
countries in opposition to the US-led invasion of Iraq. Through the new partnership with 
Germany and France, Russia hoped to strengthen its position in Europe. However, Putin 
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lost its major European allies when Gerhard Schröder and Jacques Chirac left their offices 
in 2005 / 2007. They were replaced by Angela Merkel and Nicolas Sarkozy who both took 
a more critical stance towards Russia than their predecessors.  
Both Russian attempts to strengthen cooperation with the West – either with the US in 
support of the fight against terrorism or with France and Germany in opposition to the Iraq 
war – have failed. What followed was a period of more assertive Russian foreign policy. Its 
peak was probably reached during the summer of 2008 when an all-out war between Russia 
and Georgia interrupted the more or less peaceful transition of the post-Soviet region. Both 
international media and some commentators were quickly to conclude that the conflict 
might lead to a “new Cold War”.43 Fortunately, this did not happen and the relations 
between Russia and the West have been slowly but steadily improving since then. 
The speech of Russian President Vladimir Putin at the Munich Conference on Security 
Policy held in early 2007 is often described as a turning point in Russian foreign policy. 
Until then, Russia has primarily sought cooperation and partnership with the West. In 
Munich Putin chose to present very frankly Russian perceptions of and its positions 
towards current political developments.  
In the Munich speech President Putin strongly opposed the unipolar world model that, as he 
argued, was being introduced into international affairs. This development went hand in 
hand with unilateral and often unlawful actions which involved excessive use of military 
force. Moreover, these unilateral actions were not able to resolve today‟s problems but only 
caused more tensions and led to increased disdain for international law. Russian President 
emphasized that the UN, and not the EU or NATO, as some Western countries suggested, 
was the only international authority which could legitimate the use of military force. As an 
advocate of multilateral diplomacy Putin called for a new architecture of global security 
based on a “reasonable balance between the interests of all participants in the 
international dialogue” (emphasis added).44  This desire reflects Russian perception that its 
                                               
43 See for example Blomfield, Adrian /McElroy, Damien: Russia “ready for a new Cold War” over Georgia. 
August 27, 2008 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/georgia/2629981/Russia-ready-for-
new-Cold-War-over-Georgia.html Or Linn, Johannes: War in Georgia – End of an Era, Beginning a New 
Cold War? August 12, 2008 http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2008/0812_georgia_linn.aspx   
44 Putin, Vladimir: Speech at the 43rd Munich Conference on Security Policy, February 10, 2007. 
http://www.securityconference.de/archive/konferenzen/rede.php?menu_2007=&menu_konferenzen=&id=179
&sprache=en&  
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security interests are neglected by the Western countries and that the UN SC, where Russia 
has the veto right, is being put aside.  
 
Touching on concrete issues of European security, Putin expressed clear opposition to the 
US plans to place parts of its anti-missile defense system in Europe. According to the 
Russian leader, the installation of this system would inevitably lead to a renewed arms race. 
Putin described NATO enlargement as a “serious provocation” and recalled guarantees of 
NATO leaders given to Russia / Soviet Union in the early 1990s that the Alliance would 
not place its military outside of German territory. These pledges seemed to be forgotten 
now; NATO expansion only imposed new dividing lines on Europe, Putin concluded. 
 
Besides voicing his dissatisfaction with the current state of affairs of international and 
especially European security politics, Russian President also stressed Moscow‟s openness 
to cooperation on various issues including disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation, 
strengthening of the CFE Treaty, as well as in the areas of economy and energy.  
 
With his Munich speech, Putin laid foundations of Russian foreign and security policy for 
the next years. These basic tenets remained unchanged also after Dmitry Medvedev took 
the office of President in May 2008. In the review of the Foreign Policy Concept of the 
Russian Federation, approved by Medvedev shortly thereafter, Moscow repeated some of 
the views of the now-Prime Minister Putin. In this document, Russia regards itself to be 
ready to take a full-fledged role in global affairs. Among the priorities of the country is the 
formation of a “stable system of international relations based on the principles of equality, 
mutual respect and mutually beneficial cooperation as well as the norms of international 
law”.45 I would like to especially highlight the words equality and mutually beneficial 
cooperation. Throughout the document as well as in many other speeches of Russian 
officials, Moscow persistently advocates the principle of equality; not only in the sphere of 
security (it calls for equal security for all members of the international community) but also 
in all other political, military, economic, information and humanitarian areas. According to 
the Russian Foreign Policy concept multilateral diplomacy should serve as the main tool to 
achieve this goal.   
 
                                               
45 The Foreign Policy Concept of Russian Federation. Approved by Dmitry A. Medvedev on July 12, 2008.  
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We can conclude that Russia is not willing to play the role of a “junior brother”. On the 
contrary, it seeks an equal status in cooperation with its (Western) partners. It is also 
opposed to the unipolar world order and the unilateral action taken by certain states 
(namely the US/NATO). That is why Russia favors multilateral diplomacy and calls for 
strengthening of the international law, while especially emphasizing the role of the UN. 
Through advanced multilateralism Moscow hopes to gain more say in international affairs. 
Russia also believes that more international legal norms could constrain the behavior of its 
partners.  
 
Russia often points out its readiness to cooperate in various areas of international security, 
including non-proliferation of WMD, both nuclear and conventional arms control and 
disarmament, confidence-building measures in military sphere, fight against terrorism and 
other forms of international organized crime or peaceful settlement of regional conflicts, to 
name few. However, one has to keep in mind that all foreign policy objectives of Russian 
Federation, as probably of any other country, are primarily determined by national 
interests. So what are Russian national interests? 
 
The Russia-Georgia war marks an important milestone in Russian post-Soviet history and 
has also major impact on Russia‟s foreign policy. In an interview to Television Channels 
Channel One, Rossia and NTV, given shortly after the end of hostilities between Russia and 
Georgia in August 2008, Russian President Medvedev formulated quite clearly five 
principles which will serve as guidelines for Russian foreign policy. They include:
46
  
 
1. Primacy of international law 
2. Emergence of multipolar world 
3. Support of friendly relations with all countries  
4. Protection of lives and dignity of Russian citizens 
5. Particular attention for the region of Russia‟s privileged interests. 
                                               
46 Medvedev, Dmitry: Interview given to Television Channels Channel One, Rossia, NTV. August 31, 2008. 
http://kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2008/08/31/1850_type82912type82916_206003.shtml 
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These five principles and / or priorities of Russian foreign policy reflected some 
fundamental national interests of Russia at the time when the relations between Moscow 
and its Western partners experienced the profound crisis. They were articulated only some 
weeks after Medvedev has launched the initiative on the EST. In the following paragraphs I 
will therefore examine them more closely.  
 
Regarding the first point – the rule of international law, the problem is not that Russia 
would have denied its validity. On the contrary, Moscow has been calling for more respect 
of international law for a long time. However, disputes emerge when it comes to the 
question of interpretation and application of many already existing international norms. The 
Georgian crisis serves as a good example of different argumentation regarding violations of 
international law.  
 
In the Russia-Georgia war of August 2008 Russia argued that it was Georgia who violated 
the UN Charter and other obligations under international law and unleashed an armed 
conflict when it chose to use military force against civilians as well as Russian 
peacekeepers in South Ossetia and Abkhazia
47
. According to Moscow, Russian answer was 
fully in line with international law, including the right of self-defense under Art. 51 of the 
UN Charter, and it did not violate the principles of moderateness or proportionality.
48
 As 
we have seen earlier Russia generally opposes use of military force other than mandated by 
the UN SC. This time it decided to act differently. Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs 
Sergey Lavrov pleaded that all action taken by Moscow was aimed exclusively at stopping 
Georgian aggression and restoring security on the ground
49
.  Russia maintains that also the 
recognition of independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia is defendable under 
international legal norms.  
 
On the other side we have the position of Georgia supported by many Western states. 
Georgia claims that it was Russia who triggered the war by attacking Georgian civilians 
and peacekeepers. Georgia argues that Russia violated Georgian sovereignty and describes 
                                               
47 Statement by President of Russia Dmitry Medvedev. August 26, 2008.  
http://www.mil.ru/eng/1866/12078/details/index.shtml?id=49756 Accessed October 29, 2008. 
48 Lavrov, Sergey: Russian Foreign Policy and a New Quality of the Geopolitical Situation. Article for 
Diplomatic Yearbook 2008. December 29, 2008. 
http://www.mid.ru/Brp_4.nsf/arh/BC2150E49DAD6A04C325752E0036E93F?OpenDocument  
49 Ibid. 
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Russian military action as an invasion.
50
 It points out that Russian action violated 
international law and was therefore illegal. According to Georgia Russian forces crossed 
Georgian borders illegally and their presence in Georgia is unlawful as well. And finally, 
Georgia emphasizes that the recognition of independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia by 
Russia was illegal, too because it contradicts the universally accepted principles of 
sovereignty and territorial integrity. Practically all European states (with the exception of 
Russia) as well as many international organizations (EU, NATO, OSCE) and of course the 
US have condemned the Russian decision to recognize independence of these two Georgian 
regions. They support the Georgian position that the recognition of independence of South 
Ossetia and Abkhazia violates Georgia‟s right to territorial integrity.51  
 
To conclude, Russia openly favors rule of international law and argues that all its action is 
based on international legal norms. However, this short example of the Georgia-Russia 
conflict in which both parties claimed to have international law on their side only serves as 
an up-to-date evidence of the well known fact that international law is usually very vaguely 
formulated and thus leaves too much room for free interpretation by the states. Moreover, 
some international legal norms even contradict each other; the inconsistency of the right to 
self-determination and the right to territorial integrity belongs to the most famous 
examples. Because of these weaknesses it would be desirable to strengthen the international 
legal regime to be able to avoid similar disputes in the future. The EST draft, in its current 
form, unfortunately does not offer an adequate solution to this problem.  
 
Support for a multipolar world (in which Russia enjoys the status of a great power) is the 
second principle of Russian foreign policy articulated by President Medvedev. As we could 
have seen earlier, this is not a new objective of Russian foreign policy. The Former Russian 
Foreign Minister Primakov favored this idea vigorously. He, as well as all forthcoming 
Russian leaders, opposed a unipolar world led by the United States. Therefore Russia aims 
to weaken the position of the US and create a multipolar world which is, according to 
Moscow, more balanced and therefore more stable and secure. 
 
                                               
50 See for example: Ministry of Foregin Affairs of Georgia: Georgia‟s Reaction to the Independent 
International Fact-Finding Mission Report on War, September 30, 2009  
http://www.mfa.gov.ge/index.php?lang_id=ENG&sec_id=59&info_id=11003 
51 Service of the Government of Georgia: World deplores Russia‟s Illegal Attempt to Recognize the 
“Independence” of Georgia‟s Territories of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Georgia Update, September 6, 2008. 
http://georgiaupdate.gov.ge/en/doc/10003544/GEORGIA_UPDATE_World_Reaction[1]6.08.htm  
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Third principle expressed by Medvedev is the rejection of confrontation with other 
countries. Instead, Russia claims to favor cooperation and to seek friendly relations with 
Europe, US as well as all other countries. Most importantly, Russia does not want to be 
isolated. But, as pointed out earlier, Russia is interested in cooperation which it perceives as 
being equal and mutually beneficial for all parties involved.  
 
The fourth principle – readiness to protect Russian citizens both within and outside of 
Russian borders has to be seen in direct connection to the Russia-Georgia war when Russia 
justified its military action with the obligation to protect civilians (including Russian 
citizens) in Georgia. Even though Russia seeks cooperation and friendly relations with all 
countries, Medvedev straightforwardly declares Russia‟s readiness to respond to any 
aggressive act committed against the country and / or its citizens. This statement suggests 
growing self-confidence of Moscow. Russia now feels to be able to defend its territory and 
citizens, to ensure security and to protect its national interests. Medvedev did not specify 
what he considers an “aggressive act” or in which way Russia would respond to it. But the 
Georgian conflict has revealed that alleged attacks on Russian passport holders are seen in 
Moscow as sufficient justification for unilateral use of military force in the territory of a 
neighboring state.  
 
The last priority voiced by Medvedev is probably the most controversial one. In the 
interview Russian President described the countries which Russia shares “special historical 
relations” with (meaning primarily former members of the USSR) as the region of Russia‟s 
“privileged interests”. He specified that Russia will seek to build friendly relations with the 
countries in Russia‟s geographical neighborhood. This statement reinforced by the recent 
experience of military confrontation between Russia and Georgia unleashed a wave of fear 
in many Western and mainly Central and Eastern European countries.
52
 They suspected 
Russia of claiming its post-Soviet sphere of influence and even being ready to militarily 
intervene in neighboring countries with major Russian minorities.  
 
The frequently quoted Russian scholar Dmitri Trenin points out in this regard that a 
distinction should be made between the terms “sphere of interest” and “sphere of 
                                               
52 See for example: An Open Letter to the Obama Administration from Central and Eastern Europe. July 15, 
2009. 
http://wyborcza.pl/1,76842,6825987,An_Open_Letter_to_the_Obama_Administration_from_Central.html  
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influence”. Russian political, economical as well as cultural influence over its neighbors is 
limited and by no means reaches the level Kremlin would like it to (Trenin 2009: 18). The 
fact that none of Russian allies in the CSTO has recognized the independence of South 
Ossetia and Abkhazia serves as a good example. Although Moscow‟s political influence is 
restricted, its interests remain present throughout the entire post-Soviet region, so the 
conclusion of Trenin.  
 
I will not try to answer the question if a “sphere of interest” is a legitimate foreign policy 
objective or not. I restrict myself on saying that this statement of President Medvedev 
caused significant discomfort in many European capitals and certainly has not helped to 
overcome the spirit of growing mistrust between Russia and its partners. 
 
After having discussed basic principles of Russian foreign policy I will take a closer look at 
the major hard security issues burdening the relations between Russia and the West. 
President Medvedev proposed the idea of a new legally binding pact on European security 
for the first time in summer 2008. Around this time, the most disputed issues included: (1) 
continuing Russian opposition to NATO enlargement; (2) US plans to install parts of its 
global ballistic missile defense system in Central Europe; (3) stalemate in the issue of 
conventional arms control in Europe as well as (4) regional conflicts in the post-Soviet 
area.   
 
5.2. State of Hard Security Relations with the West 
5.2.1. NATO Enlargement 
 
Practically since the end of Cold War, Russia has been very critical towards the 
enlargement of the North Atlantic Alliance. With the dissolution of Warsaw Pact, NATO 
lost its major enemy. Moscow therefore argued that it should cease to exist as well. Both 
Yeltsin and Putin, still influenced by the Cold War logic of zero-sum game, were convicted 
that the eastward enlargement of the Alliance was directed against Russia (Lo 2003: 75). 
With each round of enlargement, NATO military infrastructure has moved closer to 
Russian borders. According to the Foreign Policy Concept of Russian Federation, this 
95 
 
“violates the principle of equal security”.53 Russia perceives that through the enlargement 
its (former) enemy gains strength at the expense of Moscow. It points out that NATO 
expansion not only continues to preserve the old lines that divided Europe into zones with 
different levels of security but also moves these lines eastward.
54
    
 
Before the first round of NATO eastward enlargement, a deal with Russia had been reached 
in order to ease Moscow‟s discomfort over the enlarged Alliance. In 1997, the two partners 
signed the Russia-NATO Founding Act. It was supposed to provide the basis for 
consultations in a number of security issues and in this way create closer cooperation 
among the two sides. However, even this step did not decisively improve the relationship 
between Russia and the Alliance. Latest by the Kosovo war of 1999, Russia has again 
started to regard NATO as a threat (Lukyanov 2009: 57).  
 
In 2004, seven countries – former members of the WTO or even of the USSR, joined the 
Alliance despite the enduring Russian opposition. And it seemed that the enlarged NATO 
has not reached its final stage yet. The Bush administration pushed strongly for Ukraine 
and Georgia to become members of the Alliance as well. Even though NATO did not invite 
the two countries to join its Membership Action Plan at the 2008 Summit in Bucharest, the 
Heads of State and Government declared that “these countries will become members of 
NATO”.55 But they restrained from giving any details regarding a time frame. Some 
Western and even Russian commentators suggest that the ongoing NATO expansion had 
been the root cause of the Russia-Georgia war (Trenin 2009: 14). Moscow will of course 
never acknowledge that there is a direct link between Tbilisi‟s desire to join NATO and 
Russian military intervention in Georgia. However, there are hints coming from Russian 
leaders which support this assumption. In April 2008, Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov 
said: “We have never concealed our opposition to the NATO enlargement, regarding it as a 
very serious negative factor which may affect the geopolitical situation and strategic 
stability. And I am honestly saying that we will do everything to prevent a development of 
                                               
53 The Foreign Policy Concept of Russian Federation. Approved by Dmitry A. Medvedev on July 12, 2008.  
54 Lavrov, Sergey: Euro-Atlantic: Equal Security for All. Written for Revue Defense National, May 2010. 
http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/The_Euro-Atlantic_Region:_Equal_Security_for_All-14888   
55 North Atlantic Council: Bucharest Summit Declaration. April 3, 2008. 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_8443.htm  
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events which would worsen our relations with NATO and our neighbors“.56 Two months 
before that, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced that Russia would be forced to 
target its missiles at Ukraine if the country joined the NATO and deployed elements of US 
missile shield on its soil.
57
 This harsh Russian rhetoric only supports the thesis that there is 
a linkage between NATO enlargement and the conflicts in Russian neighborhood.  
5.2.2. Georgia War and other Regional Conflicts 
 
The Russia-Georgia war in summer 2008 has seriously troubled the relations between 
Russia and the West over the last two years. According to Russia, the conflict has only 
proved the necessity to reform the existing European security order.
58
 None of the existing 
international organizations or formats of cooperation in the Euro-Atlantic area was able to 
resolve the conflict peacefully and prevent the aggression on the ground.
59
 Instead of 
describing the details of the clashes, which are anyway disputed, I will rather concentrate 
on the consequences of the war. Russia has unilaterally redrawn borders of a sovereign, 
neighboring state. This decision has been unanimously rejected by the whole Euro-Atlantic 
community. Nevertheless, the issue of Georgia and the independence of South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia remains unresolved and at the moment there seems to be no mutually accepted 
solution in sight. 
 
It is interesting to see that Russia is using practically the same arguments as the West did to 
justify the use of force against Serbia in 1999 and later to recognize the independence of 
Kosovo. In both cases, a breakaway region declared independence after an outside power 
intervened with military force in order to protect an ethnic minority. Depending on political 
needs, each side once chose to favor the principle of state sovereignty over the principle 
humanitarian intervention and the right to self-determination and vice versa (Mezhuyev 
2009: 69). 
 
                                               
56 Remarks and Replies to Media Questions by Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov at Joint 
Press Conference After Meeting with UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon, Moscow, April 10, 2008. 
http://www.mid.ru/Brp_4.nsf/arh/91DEB1C66CECC457C325742800389F93?OpenDocument  
57 Putin: Russia may target Ukraine if it joins NATO. Reuters, February 12, 2008. 
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSL1285270620080212 Accessed August 7, 2010.  
58 See for example: Lavrov, Sergey: Speech at the 46th Munich Security Conference. February 6, 2010. 
http://www.securityconference.de/Lavrov-Sergey.463.0.html Accessed 7 August 2010.  
59 See for example: Medvedev, Dmitry: Speech at the World Policy Conference. Evian, France, October 8, 
2008. http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2008/10/08/2159_type82912type82914_207457.shtml  
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NATO‟s action in Kosovo created a precedent in international law and international politics 
which is now being used against the interest of the West. Already before the Russia-
Georgia war, Russia pointed out that there is no difference between the case of Kosovo and 
other disputed territorial questions like South Ossetia, Abkhazia or Trans-Dniester.
60
  More 
than 10 years after the military campaign of NATO and three years after Kosovo declared 
its independence, positions of Belgrade and Pristina, as well as those of Moscow and the 
West, remain unchanged.
61
 The advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice 
issued in July 2010 has not brought the sides any closer to mutual agreement either. The 
Court determined that the unilateral declaration of independence by Kosovo did not violate 
international law.
62
 Despite the ruling, the chances of Russia recognizing Kosovo seem to 
remain as low as those of the EU or US recognizing independence of South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia.  
 
The wars in Kosovo and a decade later in Georgia / South Ossetia and Abkhazia mark 
important dates in post-Cod War history of Europe. Both conflicts have had significant 
impact on the relations between Russia and the West. These two cases belong to the most 
visible border disputes but are by far not the only ones. Other co-called “frozen” or 
“protracted” conflicts in the post-Soviet space include the Transdniestrian problem in 
Moldova or the dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the region of Nagorny 
Karabakh. 
 
5.2.3. US Missile Defense System in Central Europe and its 
Impact on Nuclear Arms Control 
 
Another sign of American primacy in the region of former Soviet influence and therefore a 
source of serious tensions with Moscow were the plans of Washington to install parts of its 
ballistic missile defense (BMD) system in Central Europe. The Bush administration pushed 
very vigorously for the program. Washington justified its plans with the need to protect the 
US and its allies against the threat of long-range missiles that could be launched from the 
                                               
60 Putin, Vladimir: Interview with Newspaper Journalists from G8 Member Countries. June 4, 2007. 
http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2007/06/04/2149_type82916_132716.shtml 
61 It is remarkable that five EU member states– namely Greece, Cyprus, Spain, Slovakia and Romania have 
not recognized the independence of Kosovo either. This clearly demonstrates the inability of the EU to speak 
with one voice when it comes to major political issues.  
62 UN News Centre: Kosovo‟s declaration of independence did not violate international law – UN Court. July 
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co called “rogue states” – especially Iran and North Korea. The former US administration 
planed to set up a radar system in Czech Republic, accompanied by ten interceptor missiles 
installed in Poland.
63
  
 
When Washington unilaterally withdrew from the 1972 ABM Treaty in 2002, Russian 
reaction was quite modest. Putin called the decision a “mistake” because it would 
undermine global arms control and not because it would threaten Russian security. But the 
situation has changed since then. In 2002, bilateral relations between Russia and the US 
flourished, notably in light of Moscow‟s support of US led efforts to fight international 
terrorism. Moreover, in the late 1990s / early 2000s, Russia was struggling with many 
internal difficulties. The country was still recovering from the 1998 financial default and 
the war in Chechnya (Trenin 2009: 9). As the oil prices begun to rise, Russia gained more 
and more self-confidence on international scene. Despite the growing economic strength of 
Moscow, the West continued to largely ignore the country and its security interests (NATO 
enlargement continued, Allies refused to ratify the Adapted CFE Treaty and the installation 
BMD in Europe seemed to become real). 
 
Since 2002, Kremlin‟s foreign policy rhetoric has changed fundamentally. Moscow started 
to perceive the deployment the US BMD system in Poland and Czech Republic as a threat 
to its national security. In an interview given to Western media in 2007, President Putin 
warned that he would be forced to take appropriate retaliatory measures if the US 
materialized the plans to build the BMD close to Russian borders. Putin added that new 
Russian targets in Europe will be among the retaliatory measures.
64
 At the peak of the 
confrontational rhetoric – in summer and fall of 2008, the threat of Russian retaliation 
looked even more real. In an Address to the Federal Assembly of Russian Federation, 
President Medvedev expressed the readiness to install the “Iskander” missiles in the 
Kaliningrad enclave located only miles away from the borders to NATO members Poland 
and Lithuania.
65
 
 
                                               
63 For background information on plans of Bush administration to install the BMD in Europe see for example: 
Hildreth, Steven / Ek, Carl: Long-Range Ballistic Missile Defense in Europe. CRS Report to Congress, 
September 2009. 
64 Putin, Vladimir: Interview with Newspaper Journalists from G8 Member Countries. June 4, 2007. 
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One of the underlying reasons for the strong opposition to the US missile defense is 
Russia‟s fear to lose nuclear arms parity with the US. Deployment of the system would 
weaken Moscow‟s nuclear deterrent capacity (Mankoff 2009). Russia regards nuclear 
forces as one of the most important aspects of its politico-military strength. Thanks to the 
strategic nuclear arms, which account for the only remaining area where Russia enjoys 
equal standing with the US, Moscow can claim the status of a world power.  
 
Opposing to the US argumentation, Russia refused the link between the anti-missile shield 
in Europe and the Iranian nuclear program. Russia does not see any need to develop a 
defense system against Iran because Iran does not possess any long-range missiles. In 
Moscow‟s view, the US interceptors which were to be deployed in Poland do not have any 
target other than Russian intercontinental ballistic missiles.
66
 Installment of the missile 
defense site in Central Europe would not only bring the US strategic potential closer to 
Russian borders. Moscow also points out that the US system could be further expanded and 
modernized.
 
According to Kremlin, the missile defense would destroy the strategic balance 
of nuclear forces, jeopardize international stability and security and finally lead to renewed 
arms race in Europe and even beyond.  
 
Here we come to speak about the connection between the deployment of the US missile 
defense system in Europe and one of the basic issues of hard security, namely arms control. 
We can find linkage between the BMD shield and both nuclear and, as I will discuss later, 
also conventional arms control.  
 
Nuclear balance remains a strategic element of Russian national security. Russian nuclear 
potential is one of the few remaining assets accounting for its status as a world power. That 
is why Moscow is so worried about losing its nuclear deterrence potential. Russian leaders 
do not hesitate to link the question of the BMD in Europe with future of nuclear arms 
agreements. Even though this is primarily a bilateral deal between Russia and the US, 
nuclear disarmament has nevertheless impact on the global security environment and the 
overall state of relations between Russia and the West. I will therefore briefly describe the 
background of this problem.  
                                               
66 Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Information and Press Department Commentary in Connection with 
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The cornerstone of the US-Russian nuclear arms control regime is the Strategic Arms 
Reduction Treaty (START I) signed by George H.W. Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev in 
1991. The treaty required its signatories to reduce their nuclear arsenals, including the 
delivery vehicles– intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles 
and so-called heavy bombers. Besides setting the limitations, the treaty also provided for an 
extensive mechanism of inspections. The START I Treaty entered into force in 1994 and 
was about to expire 15 years later - on December 5, 2009. It was generally expected that 
Russia and US would conclude a new treaty on nuclear arms reduction before that date. 
 
In 2002 former Presidents Bush and Putin signed the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty 
(SORT), also called the Moscow Treaty. It committed the two parties to certain limits of 
their nuclear forces to be met at the end of 2012. However, this document was not legally 
binding and it did not include any provisions on mutual inspections. If no new agreement 
was met after the expiration of START, there would be no mechanism of inspections nor 
any legally binding limits on nuclear arms of the US and Russia. 
 
The plans to deploy components of the US BMD in Central Europe constituted the main 
hurdle in negotiations of the new nuclear arms reduction treaty.
67
 According to Moscow, 
offensive and defensive weapons are closely interrelated issues. Russia therefore did not 
want to agree on reductions of its offensive nuclear arms while the US kept on its plans to 
build a global missile defense system.  
 
To make things worse Russia started to question the validity of the INF Treaty 
(Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty). In his Munich speech in February 2007, 
Vladimir Putin suggested that Russia might rethink its membership in this treaty, first and 
foremost because the document does not have universal character. The INF Treaty is a 
bilateral agreement between the US and Russia, signed in 1987 by Ronal Regan and 
Mikhail Gorbachev. In the treaty, both parties committed themselves to destroy a whole 
range of small- and medium range missiles. Other countries – including DPRK, Iran, Israel, 
Pakistan or India possess this type of missiles. Under these conditions, Putin continued, 
Russia has to think about ensuring its own security.
68
 
                                               
67 See for example: Prime Minister Vladimir Putin talks with journalists about the outcomes of his visit to the 
Primorye Territory. December 29, 2009. http://premier.gov.ru/eng/visits/ru/8759/events/8815/  
68 Putin, Vladimir: Speech at the 43rd Munich Conference on Security Policy, 10 February 2007. 
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In the following months, debates among Russian experts whether Moscow should withdraw 
from the INF Treaty became heated. Some high-ranking Russian army officials spoke in 
favor of Russian withdrawal from the treaty if Washington deploys parts of its MD system 
in Central Europe.
69
 If Russia withdrew from the INF Treaty, this would dramatically 
worsen not only the relations between Russia and the US but also significantly deteriorate 
the security situation on European continent. Russian intermediate missiles could be used to 
menace targets in European NATO countries. Fortunately, this scenario has not come 
about. The nuclear arms control regime has not experienced a collapse similar to that of the 
conventional arms control in Europe. 
5.2.4. Conventional Arms Control in Europe  
 
Another disputed issue between Russia and the West has been the question of conventional 
arms control in Europe and the future of the CFE Treaty (Treaty on Conventional Armed 
Forces in Europe). The current deadlock of the CFE Treaty is interconnected with 
practically all the above mentioned problems: frozen conflicts in the post-Soviet area, US 
installation of BMD in Europe as well as NATO enlargement in the 1990s and 2000s. 
 
The CFE Treaty was signed in Paris in November 1990 by two “groups of States Parties” –
the then member states of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and of the Warsaw Treaty 
Organization. Until now, the treaty stays the only legally binding document between Russia 
and major Western countries dealing with hard security issues. Experts often even praise it 
as the “cornerstone of European security and military stability” (Lachowski 2002: 3). 
 
In order to ensure military balance between the two blocs, the treaty created equal ceilings 
on certain types of conventional forces of both NATO and WTO. In the designed area of 
application, reaching from Atlantic Ocean to Ural Mountains, the two parties agreed on the 
limits in five categories of conventional armaments and equipment. Besides that, a 
verification regime with on-site inspections was established. Exchanges of information and 
notifications were also put in place in order to further enhance transparency. An emphasis 
was given to host-nation consent to the stationing of foreign forces on its territory. In 
general, the treaty was able to provide hard security stability in the post-Cold War Europe.  
 
                                               
69 Khorunzhiy, Nikolai: Should Russia quit the treaty on medium- and short-range missiles? RIA Novosti, 
April 11, 2007. http://en.rian.ru/analysis/20070411/63460805.html  
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The political changes brought about by the end of Cold War bipolarity have had critical 
impact also on the CFE Treaty and its application. Shortly after signing the treaty, one of 
the two groups of States Parties – Warsaw Pact ceased to exist. When NATO started to 
enlarge towards the East and shifts from one original group of states (WTO) to another one 
(NATO) took place, the CFE Treaty had to be adjusted to the new realities.  The adaptation 
of the treaty was agreed on in 1999, the same year when NATO underwent its first round of 
eastern enlargement. In 2004, no such adaptation was negotiated. 
 
The Agreement on Adaptation of the CFE Treaty was signed at the OSCE Summit held in 
November 1999 in Istanbul. The Adapted CFE Treaty took a different approach to the 
control of conventional arms in Europe. Instead of setting limits on two hostile military 
blocs, it created obligations for individual countries and established two types of ceilings: 
national and territorial ones (Lachowski 2002: 6). It also introduced an accession clause 
(which was not included in the original CFE) so that individual countries, especially the 
Baltic States, could accede to the Treaty.  However, the Adapted CFE Treaty has so far not 
entered into force. Only four states – Russia, Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan have ratified 
the Adapted Treaty. All the Western states link their ratification to the so-called Istanbul 
Commitments. They are a series of unilateral and bilateral statements included in the OSCE 
1999 Istanbul Summit Declaration. Political commitments of Russia to withdraw its 
military presence from Georgia and Moldova were among them. Even though some 
progress has been made and Russia pulled out some of its military from the two countries, 
NATO still regards these commitments as unfulfilled. NATO countries continue to 
emphasize the link between the ratification of the Adapted CFE Treaty and the resolution of 
all outstanding issues of Russian withdrawal from Georgia and Moldova.
70
 
 
Despite NATO‟s refusal to ratify the Adapted CFE Treaty until Russia completely fulfills 
its Istanbul commitments, Russia had implemented the Adapted Treaty. According to 
former President Putin, Moscow removed all of its heavy weapons from European part of 
the country and stationed it behind the Urals. Russia also reduced its Armed Forces by 
300,000 and took several other steps required by the Adapted CFE Treaty.
71
 What Russia 
regarded to be the Western response to Moscow‟s unilateral disarmament was the delivery 
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of new weapons for Eastern Europe, installation of new military bases in Bulgaria and 
Romania as well as deployment of the US missile system in Poland and Czech Republic. 
 
Russia‟s failure to deliver on its Istanbul Commitments and NATO‟s refusal to ratify the 
Adapted CFE Treaty were not the only problems facing the CFE regime. Among the others 
are Russian non-compliance with its obligations under the Flank Agreement; the “legal 
gap” in the Baltic States which were not included in the CFE Treaty and thus created a legal 
option for NATO to deploy excessive forces close to Russian borders; the issue of Russian 
unaccounted-for equipment present in the separatist regions of Nagorno-Karabakh, 
Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Trans-Dniester; and of course continuing NATO enlargement 
(Lachowski 2009: 3).  
 
After more than a year of Russian warnings that it would withdraw from the treaty if the 
Adapted CFE did not enter into force, President Putin signed a unilateral decree on 
“suspension” of the Treaty. It became valid in December 2007 and from that date on, 
Russia has not been implementing the Treaty. Moscow has stopped to provide information 
to its partners and to receive or conduct inspections. Russia even declared that during the 
suspension it will not be bound by any limits on conventional arms.
72
 Even though a 
number of talks were held between Russia and NATO countries and different proposals 
were made in order to revive the Treaty, so far no substantial progress has been reached.  
 
Since 1999, NATO linked the future of conventional arms control in Europe to the solution 
of two “frozen” conflicts in the post-Soviet area: Georgia and Moldova. The recent Russia-
Georgia war further complicated the entire issue. After Russian recognition of 
independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, a complete withdrawal of all Russian forces 
from what the West considers to be territory of Georgia seems now far more unlikely than 
before 2008. In the meantime, the whole CFE regime continues to face a serious crisis. 
Experts predict that a regional arms race, especially in the South Caucasus region, is likely 
to follow (Lachowski 2009: 6). 
 
We have seen that all these issues are very complex and interdependent. The clear-cut 
division between conventional and nuclear arms is shading away. There seems to be a link 
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between NATO enlargement and conflicts in Russian neighborhood. Also the pact on 
conventional arms control is being linked to Russian involvement in post-Soviet space. 
Moscow insists on the link between offensive and defensive weapons. For a long time it 
prevented the negotiations of the post-START treaty from succeeding because of the US 
plans to build a missile defense system close to Russian borders. This complexness makes 
resolving of the problems difficult. What is more, the Bush administration took similar 
stance on unnecessary linkages. After the Russia-Georgia conflict, the US together with 
many European countries refused to return to “business as usual” as long as Russia 
occupies parts of Georgia. This Cold War strategy of artificial linkages can be dangerous 
because also other pressing international issues involving Russia are at stake.
73
  
 
So far, this chapter was devoted to the analysis of prevailing trends of Russian foreign 
policy and the review of the most disputed hard security issues that burden the relations 
between Russia and its Western partners. In the following, I will try to explore some 
parallels between the two previous chapters and the Russian EST initiative.  
 
5.3. Analogies to the EST 
 
We could already see that one of the basic characteristic of Russian foreign policy is the 
endorsement of emergence of multipolar world and opposition to US unilateralism. So can 
Moscow achieve this objective through advocating the EST? 
 
Yes, to a certain level it can. The EST and its principle of indivisibility of security would 
restrain Washington‟s freedom of action. It would halt unilateral action of both US and 
NATO which Moscow considers as threatening to its security. This decreased room of 
maneuver could weaken the role of the US in both global and European affairs and 
therefore contribute to the appearance of a multipolar world. Moreover, the treaty would 
force its signatories to more reliance on multilateral diplomacy. Solutions which none of 
the participants regards as threatening to its security would need to be searched for. In this 
way Russia of course hopes to gain more say in international affairs. 
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When President Medvedev first presented his idea to establish a new pan-European security 
arrangement at the meeting with German political, parliamentary and civic leaders in June 
2008 in Berlin, he described Russia, European Union and the United States as “three 
branches of European civilization”.74 This is how Moscow views the new Euro-Atlantic 
security space reaching from Vancouver to Vladivostok: it should be rooted in “genuinely 
equal cooperation” between Russia, EU and the US.75 Three “poles” of the new European 
security architecture – Russia being one of them – would substitute the currently prevailing 
primacy of NATO. This would not only create a multipolar European security order but 
also give Russia an equal status with the EU and US. 
 
If we look further at the five above discussed principles of Russian foreign policy 
formulated by President Medvedev and his initiative to conclude a new treaty on European 
security, we can also trace a number of parallels between them.  
 
First of all, it is the primacy of international law. Moscow is suggesting a legally binding 
document which would become part of international law. It would create new norms and 
obligations and thus strengthen the rule of international law. However, as we will see 
further below, the treaty does not offer an adequate solution to the problem of diverging 
interpretation of many legal norms already in place. Vague formulations prevail also in the 
text of the draft circulated by Kremlin. Moreover, the treaty does not deal with many issues 
of international security, where current legal norms seem insufficient, at all.  
 
The second principle – support for multilateral world order has been just discussed. Also 
the third principle presented by Medvedev is to some extend reflected in the EST initiative. 
Russia claims it does not seek confrontation with any other countries. Call for a new 
mechanism on peaceful dispute resolution seems to go in line with this objective. Similarly, 
Russia does not want to isolate itself. It therefore seeks a place where its security concerns 
could be voiced and also heard by its partners. The new EST mechanism could create such 
a place. Furthermore, Moscow claims to seek friendly relations with its partners. Even 
though this is more an optimistic hypothesis than a fact, it is sometimes argued that already 
the process of negotiation of a new treaty could help to overcome the currently prevailing 
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mood of mistrust between Russia and many of its Western partners. An open dialogue on 
mutual security concerns could help to establish a more cooperative and even friendly 
atmosphere.  
 
By promoting the EST, Russia can hardly seek the fulfillment of the last two principles, 
namely the protection of Russian citizens abroad and the advancement of Russia‟s 
privileged interests in the post-Soviet region. The treaty does not give its signatories any 
new rights to respond to acts of aggression. The already existing principle of individual or 
collective self-defense enshrined in Art. 51 of UN Charter would remain the only 
applicable rule. The treaty would not authorize Russia, nor any other Party, to claim its own 
zone of special or privileged interests. Russian Foreign Minister explicitly rejected the 
attempts of some Western states to call the „historically conditioned mutually privileged 
relations” between Russia and the post-Soviet countries a “sphere of influence“.76 Russia 
even requested that the already existing provision of the Charter for European Security that 
no single State or international organization can have exclusive rights to maintain peace and 
stability in the Euro-Atlantic area would become legally binding.
77
 This demand reflects 
once again Moscow‟s opposition to the current NATO-centric European security structure. 
But we should not forget that if adopted, the same principle would apply to Russia 
respectively to CIS or CSTO as well. They would not be allowed claim a special zone of 
influence or interests either. It is interesting to notice that despite Russian wish to make this 
rule legally binding, no Article of the proposed draft EST is devoted to this principle.  
 
To sum up, Russia has proposed adoption of a new security treaty because it believes this 
would help to strengthen the rule of international law and to create a multipolar European 
security system. At the same time, Moscow deems that the treaty would weaken the 
position of the US and NATO in Europe. In addition, the EST would support friendly 
relations among its signatories, avoid isolation of Russia on international scene and help to 
prevent confrontation with other signatories. However, the treaty would not offer a pretext 
for Russia to protect lives of its citizens abroad, nor would it justify Russia‟s claim for a 
sphere of privileged interests in its neighborhood. 
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Next, let us have a look at the analogies between the EST and the aforementioned hard 
security problems in Europe. The issue of further NATO enlargement would be definitely 
affected by the treaty. The Russian Foreign Policy Concept stated clearly that NATO 
enlargement violates the principle of equal security. Russia proposed to make this principle 
legally binding and included it into Article 1 of the draft EST. Since there is no clear-cut 
definition of the actions which could significantly affect security of other states, 
interpretation of this clause remains in authority of the individual member states. Russia, as 
well as any other state, could claim violation of this clause practically all the times. 
Intensified diplomatic efforts and mainly strengthened cooperation would be necessary in 
order to avoid this. As long as Russia perceives NATO enlargement as significantly 
affecting its security, it would not be possible, under the provisions of the EST, to further 
expand the Alliance. 
 
The same principle applies to the deployment of American BMD in Central and Eastern 
Europe. Here again, Moscow argues the system is directed against Russia and regards the 
US plans as threatening its security. If the EST entered into force, either the Alliance as a 
whole or the US alone would not be allowed to install the BMD when any other signatory 
regards this as threatening. Solution which all parties agree on would be asked for.  
 
Regarding the regional conflicts, the EST would most probably not contribute in a major 
way to their settlement. The territorial disputes in Kosovo, Georgia, Moldova and other 
regions require more than a new forum for talks. Above of all, political will of all included 
players is inevitable. Unequivocal “rules of the game” which could be applied to these 
territorial conflicts are missing in the treaty.  
 
Last but not least: arms control. In his June 2008 speech in Berlin, where Medvedev first 
proposed to sign a new pact on European security, the Russian President argued this could 
achieve a comprehensive resolution of arms control issues in Europe.
78
 However, since this 
initial proposal the issue of arms control faded away from the Russian initiative. There is no 
specific clause on arms control included in the draft EST released by Moscow. In an article 
written for the French journal Revue Defense National, Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov 
explained why. He argued that it was not possible to address specific issues as arms control 
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without solving the “systemic problem” first – namely the issue of indivisibility of 
security.
79
 Only the codification of this so far only politically binding principle will enable 
appearance of new level of mutual trust so that concrete aspects of hard security in Europe 
can be dealt with, Lavrov added. 
 
This Russian argument leads us to next part of this chapter. It describes the limits of the 
EST. Throughout the thesis there have been detached hints on questions and problems 
which are not being dealt with in the proposed EST. At this place I will try to provide a 
more comprehensive account of the most relevant hard security issues in Europe which 
would not be solved if the EST, in the form of the draft released by Kremlin in November 
2009, entered in force. Of course I am full aware of the fact that it is hardly possible to offer 
a complete list of limits of the treaty. Some states define the term “European security” very 
comprehensively and according to this the list could be further expanded. I will therefore 
relate the treaty‟s limits primarily to the aforementioned hard-security disputes between 
Russia and the West.   
 
5.4. Limits of the EST  
 
Let us start with the legal terms of the EST. According to official Russian statements, 
Russia proposes to strengthen international law by a “legally binding confirmation and 
consistent interpretation of the basic principles of security of states and of the relations 
between them”.80 The major principle Moscow wants to make legally binding is that of 
indivisibility of security. However, as pointed out earlier, the treaty does not contain an 
unambiguous definition of this principle. It does not specify which (type of) action could 
significantly affect security of a State party and would be therefore prohibited by the treaty. 
Diverging interpretations are to be envisaged. 
  
The inadmissibility of the use of force is another principle that requires consistent 
interpretation. Despite the fact that the non-use of force is deeply rooted in international 
law, especially in the UN Charter, this basic principle is often being put into question. 
Humanitarian intervention or the so-called Responsibility to Protect are often used by some 
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states as arguments to justify the use of force. In its basic foreign policy documents Russia 
points out that the use of force has to be in line with the UN Charter. This means the use of 
force has either to be mandated by the SC or be invoked as the right to self-defense under 
Art. 51 of the Charter. But the political reality can be different. The conflicts in Kosovo or 
Georgia only demonstrate the serious need of more concrete definition and / or generally 
accepted interpretation of this principle. Unfortunately, the EST does not contribute to the 
solution of this problem. No provisions of the treaty are aimed at more coherent 
interpretation of the principle of inadmissibility of the use of force. The contradiction 
between the right of nations to sovereignty (and to non-interference into internal affairs of 
states) and the right (or responsibility) to humanitarian intervention is not being dealt with 
by the EST. 
 
Before the draft of the EST was officially published, Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov said 
that it should include “guarantees to ensure equal security”.81 He did not define this term 
any closer. Besides lacking an indisputable definition of indivisibility of security, the 
released draft does not propose any enforcement measures which could be taken in case of 
violation of the treaty. It is therefore hardly imaginable what kind of guarantees Lavrov 
might have wished in addition to the formal and legally binding pledge of the signatories 
not to ensure their security at the expense of the security of other states.  
 
There are some more examples of Russian as well as Western requests which are not 
included in the EST draft proposed by Moscow. One of them is the rejection of claims by 
certain states or groups of states to an exclusive or preeminent right to maintain peace and 
security in the Euro-Atlantic region. Despite Russian calls for strengthening of this 
principle, which is enshrined in the politically binding 1999 Charter on European Security, 
the EST does not include a specific clause on this matter. It is also worth noting that the 
treaty does not say anything on states‟ claims to spheres of influence in parts of the 
proposed area of application of the EST (OSCE space). Similarly, the draft does not 
reaffirm the right of each state to freely choose or change its security arrangements, such as 
entering a military alliance. This principle would probably contradict the Russian 
perception of equal and indivisible security since Russia interprets NATO expansion as a 
security threat and is therefore left out. We can observe that instead of confirming the right 
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of states to freely choose its security arrangements and possibly join military alliances, the 
EST would establish the right of states to oppose the expansion of security groupings which 
some states might perceive as threatening their national security.  
 
Regarding the issue of conflict settlement, the treaty does not present a set of uniform 
principles which could be applied universally to all territorial disputes in the Euro-Atlantic 
area. This regards mainly the well known contradiction between the principle of territorial 
integrity and the right of nations to self-determination. This two legal principles lie at the 
core of some most disputed territorial conflicts in Europe including the self-proclaimed 
independence of Kosovo or the territorial integrity of Georgia and the status of South 
Ossetia and Abkhazia. It would be highly desirable to agree on uniform principles on the 
settlement of these and similar conflicts. The decisions of the new Conference or 
Extraordinary Conference which are to be created by the EST would have to be taken by a 
unanimous vote. Only if an armed attack was carried out, the peace-breaking state would be 
excluded from the voting. A peaceful conflict resolution would still require consensus of all 
parties involved. However, no new or more precise rules on conflict settlement are 
proposed by the EST. In this regard, the EST does not offer any substantial added value 
compared to the existing negotiating structures (especially the OSCE). Under which 
conditions can a territory proclaim independence? When does the right of self-
determination prevail over the principle of territorial integrity? The new treaty on European 
security would ideally offer a detailed answer to these questions. 
 
On the political level, the EST does not offer an adequate solution to the disputed hard-
security issues in Europe. This is mainly due to the fact that the above mentioned 
contradictions in international law are not addressed and that the indivisibility of security 
clause is insufficiently defined. Would NATO enlargement be halted by the treaty? Would 
the deployment of US BMD in Central Europe violate the treaty? Russian answer is yes. 
Ultimately, these questions would most probably remain disputed because of diverging 
interpretations among member states.  
 
The treaty does not contain any proposals on specific steps to overcome the ongoing crisis 
in the area of conventional arms control regime in Europe. A decisive break-through in the 
stalemate of the CFE Treaty is therefore not to be expected after the adoption of the EST. 
Modernization of the 1999 Vienna Document on confidence- and security building 
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measures is not proposed in the draft EST either. The issues of countering the proliferation 
of WMD, terrorism, drug trafficking or other emerging security threats are not included in 
the document at all.  
 
And finally, there is no reference to any common values that should be honored in the 
Euro-Atlantic space. Commitment to democracy, human rights or rule of law is not 
mentioned even in the draft‟s Preamble.  
 
We can conclude that even though there are several parallels between major Russian 
foreign policy goals and the EST as well as between the disputed hard security issues and 
the proposed treaty, the EST draft does not address specific hard security problems in the 
Euro-Atlantic space. It much more creates general rules of behavior which would, 
according to Moscow, gradually lead to solution of specific issues. This approach has 
hardly met with understanding in other Western capitals. However, it should be emphasized 
that the analyzed document is only a draft of a proposed treaty. It presents a possible point 
of departure for further negotiations. And the aforementioned flaws of the draft – as for 
instance insufficient definition of certain principles, could be removed in the course of 
further discussions.  
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6. Dialogue on European Security 
 
 
The final chapter of this thesis will be dedicated to the response of the West to the 
Medvedev initiative and to the dialogue on European security which is emerging as a result 
of Moscow‟s endeavor to rearrange the European security landscape.  
 
During the meeting of OSCE Ministerial Council in Helsinki in December 2008, Russian 
Foreign Minister Lavrov said: „There is no false bottom or hidden agenda in our idea of 
a treaty on European security. (...) No one can have anything to lose from this and 
everyone will be a winner“.82 In this chapter I will try to find out if the major addressees of 
Moscow‟s proposal share a view similar to that of Mr. Lavrov. Are Russian partners in the 
West ready to talk about rearrangement of the European security structure? What are the 
prospects of the European Security Treaty to succeed? 
 
6.1. Position of Russian Partners 
 
Both American and European reactions to the proposal of President Medvedev on drafting 
a new legally binding treaty on European security have been quite modest from the outset. 
The main reason is to be seen in the Georgia-Russia war which broke out shortly after the 
launch of the Medvedev initiative. It caused to dramatic deterioration of the political 
relations between Russia and the West. Moreover, in November 2008, United States elected 
a new President. The whole world was waiting what the change in US leadership will bring 
about.   
 
6.1.1. United States 
 
The overall mood in relations between Russia and West has changed significantly over the 
last two years. This is particularly due to the new US leadership. United States play 
a crucial role in European security affairs. As a most powerful NATO Ally, Washington is 
directly involved in practically all of the above mentioned security issues in Europe. Also 
the EU emphasizes the strong trans-Atlantic link. According the EU leaders, the US has to 
take part in any discussions on the future of European security.
83
 Moreover, the bilateral 
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relations between Russia and the US impact overall security situation on European 
continent. That is why I will now briefly describe the changes in foreign policy behavior of 
the US which we have witnessed since Barack Obama assumed the office of US President 
in January 2009. 
 
Already in his inaugural address President Obama demonstrated his readiness to renew 
America‟s leadership in the world. He declared: “America is a friend of each nation and 
every man, woman and child who seeks a future of peace and dignity, and we are ready to 
lead once more“.84 Obama made a strong commitment to cooperation with all nations of 
the globe. His pledge to extend a hand to all who are willing to unclench their fists became 
a famous saying which is still characteristic of US foreign policy behavior. Experts say that 
the engagement with US adversaries belongs to the priorities of the new administration‟s 
foreign policy (Kupchan 2010a). Contrary to his predecessor who often chose unilateral 
action in his foreign policy, President Obama is an advocate of multilateralism and 
strengthened cooperation with nations from all over the world: including long-standing 
partners as well as (former) enemies. The US seeks cooperation based on mutual interest 
and mutual respect. However, the new administration has not entirely excluded the option 
of unilateral action. According to Vice-President Biden, the US will work in partnerships 
whenever it can, and alone only when it must.
85
 The foreign policy of the new 
administration will be based on strong partnerships to meet common challenges. 
 
Soon after taking over the office of US President, Obama started to implement his strategy 
of engagement. Russia was among the first ones the US has “reached its hand to”. At the 
Munich Security Conference, held only couple of weeks after the inauguration of the new 
administration, Vice-President Joe Biden announced American willingness to “press a 
reset button” in the US-Russian relations.86 He stated that disagreement over certain issues, 
as for instance the territorial integrity of Georgia, should not prevent the two countries from 
cooperation in areas where their interests coincide. These include security and stability of 
Afghanistan; prevention of spread of nuclear weapons and materials; and a new agreement 
on deeper cuts in nuclear arsenals. Regarding the probably most divisive issue of US-
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Russian relationship – the plans of Bush administration to locate elements of the US missile 
defense system in Czech Republic and Poland, Biden said that the US will continue to 
develop the system. But he added two conditions: the MD technology has to be proven to 
work and be cost effective. He pledged to work on the system in consultation with NATO 
partners as well as with Russia.  
 
More concrete steps followed soon. In April 2009, Presidents Obama and Medvedev 
expressed their commitment to the ultimate goal of a world free of nuclear weapons.
87
 They 
also agreed on negotiating a new legally binding treaty that would replace the soon-to-
expire START I Treaty. In his Prague speech, President Obama attracted the attention of 
international public to the vision of a world without nuclear weapons and he succeeded in 
bringing the nuclear arms control back on the international agenda. In addition to this, in 
September 2009, after a period of review, President Obama announced a new approach to 
the issue of MD in Europe. He decided to cancel the initial plans of Bush administration to 
install parts of the American MD in Poland and Czech Republic. Instead, Obama opted for 
what he called a “phased, adaptive approach” to the MD in Europe.88 The US would 
deploy a regional, transportable ballistic missile defense capability that could be deployed 
around the world on a relatively short notice (Hildreth/Ek 2009). Obama administration 
argues that the new system could be deployed more quickly and effectively than the one 
originally proposed by President Bush. Similarly to the previous administration, President 
Obama maintains that the American MD is aimed at protection of the US and its Allies 
against the growing threat posed by Iran‟s short- and medium-range ballistic missiles. 
Washington denied that Russia was a factor in this move.
89
 Notwithstanding, Moscow has 
welcomed the decision of President Obama to abandon the original MD plans. President 
Medvedev called it a “constructive step in right direction” and reiterated Russian readiness 
to discuss the US-Russian cooperation on this issue.
90
 What is more, the two countries 
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strengthened their cooperation on other issues, including Afghanistan and Iran.
91
 The 
creation of the US-Russian Bilateral Presidential Commission, which should enhance 
bilateral cooperation in a broad array of issues, serves as another example of the positive 
change. Finally, in April 2010, the two Presidents signed the new START Treaty. The 
current challenge will be to secure the ratification of the treaty in both US and Russia. 
Nevertheless, a dramatic change in the bilateral relations is noticeable. Obama‟s 
engagement strategy accompanied by series of concrete actions has succeeded to reverse 
the deterioration in relations between Russia and the United States. So how will this 
amelioration of mutual relations impact Russian initiative on the European Security Treaty? 
  
So far, the US has been rather skeptical about the Medvedev initiative. Indeed, Secretary of 
State Hillary Clinton admitted that the institutions that guarded European and Euro-Atlantic 
security during the 20
th
 century were not designed to tackle security threats of the 21
st
 
century, such as global terrorism, transnational organized crime, proliferation of WMD, or 
energy security and climate change.
92
 This may suggest that she endorses a reform of the 
European security architecture. However, the main tool for the US to engage into European 
security affairs has been and still is the North Atlantic Alliance. Therefore, in the US point 
of view, it is the Alliance that primarily needs to be reformed and adapted to new security 
challenges and not the whole institutional structure of European security. NATO is 
currently revising its Strategic Concept which will decisively shape the nature of the 
Alliance in the forthcoming years. NATO‟s relations with Russia represent an essential 
element of this exercise in many aspects. The Strategic Concept will need to find a right 
balance between reassurances of Art. V and the reset in NATO-Russia relations.
93
 Moscow 
is a relevant factor also in other issues of European and global security which are to be 
addressed by the new Concept. These include further enlargement of the Alliance; arms 
control; possible cooperation with Moscow on the MD in Europe; as well as NATO-Russia 
cooperation on Afghanistan and other emerging security threats.  
 
Deliberately or not, the US, together with some other Western states and international 
organizations, have adopted parts of Russian rhetoric closely related to the EST. Clinton 
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endorsed that security in Europe should be indivisible. Yet, the US interpretation of this 
principle differs to that of Russia. The US reads this principle as the rejection of the zero-
sum game. Washington believes that security of all nations is intertwined. All have to work 
together to enhance each other‟s security, in part by engaging with each other on new ideas 
and approaches.
94
 Contrary to Russia, the US does not say anything about states‟ obligation 
to implement their security measures with due regard to security interests of the others.  
 
The US declares that it is committed to the principle of indivisibility of security. It also 
supports other proposals put forward by Russia which reaffirm principles of the Helsinki 
Final Act and the NATO-Russia Founding Act. However, the US does not see any need to 
negotiate new treaties. According to Secretary of State Clinton, all these common goals, 
such as indivisibility of security, can be best advanced in the framework of the existing 
institutions, especially the OSCE and the NRC. 
 
In regard to the Medvedev initiative, Russia and the US disagree on two basic questions. 
First and most fundamental is the US rejection of the need to conclude a new legally 
binding treaty. Second, Clinton has expressed support for all Russian proposals which 
simply reaffirm the Helsinki Final Act and the NATO-Russia Founding Act. On the other 
side, Russia strives to upgrade the whole Helsinki Decalogue. The new EST should 
constitute something what FM Lavrov referred to as “Helsinki-2”.95 Moscow also seeks to 
turn other, until now only politically binding commitments such as the indivisibility of 
security, into a legally binding treaty.  
 
The reluctance of the US to enter negotiations on a legally binding treaty is quite 
understandable. If the draft of the EST released by Moscow entered into force, it would 
imply new obligations and restrictions on Washington. Even if Russia denies this argument, 
the EST would certainly weaken the NATO, because it would limit the Alliance‟s freedom 
of action. That is why the US is so cautious about the Russian proposal. If the US openly 
rejected the idea to make the principle of indivisibility of security legally binding, it would 
suggest that Washington is not ready to comply with this politically binding commitment. 
The same logic applies also to other addressees of the Medvedev initiative.  
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6.1.2. European Union 
 
According to Russian President Medvedev, the European Union marks one of the three 
cornerstones of the European civilization. The EU would therefore constitute one of the 
“poles” of the new Euro-Atlantic security system, too. The EU is still a relatively weak 
foreign policy actor, often unable to speak with one voice. It lacks relevant competences on 
hard security matters. The intergovernmental principle of the CFSP, based on the consensus 
of all member states, has remained unchanged also after the entry into force of the Lisbon 
Treaty (Major 2010: 3). This makes the standpoints of individual members even more 
relevant. Due to limited space, I will restrain here on detailed description of all the 
positions of EU member states in regard to the EST. Instead, I will concentrate on the 
opinions of some leading European nations, especially France and Germany. If available, I 
will refer to official EU statements which reflect the common position of all 27 members. 
At this place it might be interesting to recall that Moscow has proposed both individual 
member states as well as the EU as an international organization should join the EST. 
 
The relations between Russia and the EU are very multifaceted. They include significant 
economic ties; mutual dependency on energy imports and exports; the issue of common 
neighborhood; visa regime; both internal and external aspects of security; the issue of 
human rights and much more. Despite this complexity I will limit the scope of my interest 
on EU‟s position to the new European security order proposed by Moscow.  
 
In general, the EU seems to be ready to enter a dialogue with Russia on the future of 
European security. Even though it regards the security inside Europe to be largely 
“completed”, the Union is well aware that Russia is uncomfortable with the current 
European security order. According to then High Representative for the EU Common 
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) Javier Solana, it is in the interest of the Union to 
analyze why and “see what can be done”.96 The EU has not entirely dismissed the Russian 
proposal on the EST. But while analyzing the reasons for Russian discomfort with 
European security order and possible changes in it, the main feature of Europe‟s security 
has to be retained: its comprehensive character. The EU stressed that not only hard security, 
but also economics and human rights constitute integral parts of European security. 
Furthermore, the EU has defined some non-negotiable principles which have to be honored. 
                                               
96 Solana, Javier: Speech at the 45th Munich Security Conference. February 7, 2009.  
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They include the involvement of the US in any talks about the future of European security, 
the right of any country to freely choose their alliance, and the rejection of any spheres of 
influence on European continent.
97
 
 
Positions of EU‟s major member states are alike to those expressed by the High 
Representative. On the eve of the historic NATO Summit marking the 60
th
 anniversary of 
the Alliance which was co-hosted by France and Germany in April 2009, the leaders of 
these two countries wrote a joint article for the French newspaper Le Monde. Nicolas 
Sarkozy and Angela Merkel outlined here their views on the future of European security. 
They expressed their firm commitment to both transatlantic partnership with the US and 
other NATO members as well as to strengthened cooperation with EU countries in the 
framework of the CFSP. In times when the NRC was still suspended, the two leaders called 
for reaching out to Russia and reviving the cooperation. Regarding the Medvedev initiative, 
they expressed readiness to discuss these issues with Russia and other European partners. 
At the same time they emphasized they expect Russia to honor the rules set by the Helsinki 
Final Act and the 1990 Paris Charter, first and foremost the principle of territorial integrity. 
They also stressed that France and Germany will continue to support the open door policy 
of NATO if more European democracies wish to join the Alliance.
98
  
 
All these statements of European leaders might appear quite general. They do not indicate 
many details on a new European security treaty. The main reason behind it is to be seen in 
the nature of initial proposals of Moscow. Until the end of November 2009, only little was 
known about the Russian vision of the new pan-European security pact. However, the 
European standpoint has not changed significantly since the release of the EST draft. In 
February 2010, two months after the publication of the draft, the new EU High 
Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Catherine Ashton repeated the 
Union‟s positions towards the Medvedev initiative.99 They can be summarized under the 
following points:  
 
                                               
97 Ibid. 
98 Merkel, Angela / Sarkozy, Nicolas: Security, our joint mission. Published in Le Monde newspaper. 
February 4, 2009. http://www.ambafrance-uk.org/Security-our-joint-mission.html  
99 Ashton, Catherine: Speech at the 46th Munich Security Conference. February 6, 2010. 
http://www.securityconference.de/Ashton-Catherine.567.0.html?&L=1  
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1. The EU is open to discuss all ideas that could enhance European security, including 
the Russian proposal on EST.  
2. The primary place for these discussions should be the OSCE. The OSCE has an 
inclusive membership which ensures participation of trans-Atlantic partners (and 
NATO Allies) US and Canada; and it is loyal to the comprehensive approach to 
security. 
3. Commitment to comprehensive approach to security. For the EU, the human 
dimension, along with the economical and environmental basket, constitute 
essential part of European security. Therefore, discussions about the future of 
European security have to include respect for human rights, too.  
4. In the area of hard security, the EU remains committed to the non-use of violence in 
settlement of political disputes and to the principle that states are free to join the 
security alliance they wish. 
After examining the perspective of the major Russian partners – the United States and the 
European Union, I will now try to describe the major outcomes of Medvedev initiative as 
we have witnessed them until now.  
 
6.2. Dialogue on European Security 
 
 
So far, no official negotiations on the European Security Treaty have been launched. 
Nevertheless, Russian representatives continue to raise this issue on various occasions. 
Some aspects of the EST found their places on the agenda of both multilateral and bilateral 
discussion formats. The aim of this concluding chapter is to trace the places where the 
Russian proposals, respectively certain features of EST and / or some of the underlying 
(hard) security issues that lie behind the Medvedev initiative (as outlined in Chapter 5) are 
being discussed. Has the attempt of Moscow to create new European security order led to 
any tangible results? 
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6.2.1. Corfu Process 
 
Probably the most visible outcome of the Russian initiative on a new pan-European security 
treaty has been the so-called Corfu Process established in the framework of the OSCE. 
Even though Moscow might not regard the Corfu Process as ultimate result of the 
Medvedev initiative, the Corfu Process has emerged, at least partly, as a consequence of the 
Russian proposal (Zagorski 2010: 3). 
 
The Corfu Process was launched under the Greek Chairmanship of the OSCE. In June 2009 
Foreign Ministers of the OSCE participating states gathered on the Greek island of Corfu 
for informal talks about European security. This high-level meeting was proceeded by and 
subsequently followed by a series of discussions about the future of European security held 
in Vienna at the level of permanent representatives. Throughout the year 2009, Russian 
representatives constantly called for a new treaty that would deal with structural 
inadequacies of Euro-Atlantic security. However, until late 2009, Moscow did not put 
forward any detailed proposals. Russian desire to create a new form of cooperation in the 
area from Vancouver to Vladivostok combined with the Western emphasis on 
comprehensive nature of security finally led to inauguration of the Corfu Process. It 
evolved into a wide-ranging dialogue on key issues of European security and cooperation. 
In the words of then OSCE Chairperson-in-Office Greek Foreign Minister Dora 
Bakoyannis, the aim of the Corfu Process is to discuss the current challenges as well as 
future perspectives of the common, indivisible, comprehensive and cooperative security in 
post-Cold War Europe.
100
 In December 2009, in a first political declaration of the OSCE 
Ministerial Council since 2002, Foreign Ministers formally endorsed the Corfu Process. 
They acknowledged that deficits in Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian security exist. The Foreign 
Ministers finally expressed their commitment to „reconfirm, review and reinvigorate 
security and cooperation form Vancouver to Vladivostok“.101  
 
Even though the Corfu Process might have initially evolved as a reaction to the Medvedev 
initiative, the draft EST released by Moscow is not an item of the Corfu discussions. The 
Interim Report prepared by the Kazakh Chairmanship of the OSCE in mid-2010 did not 
                                               
100 Concluding Statement by OSCE Chairperson-in-Office. Corfu, June 26, 2009. 
http://www.osce.org/documents/cio/2009/06/38505_en.pdf  
101 OSCE: Ministerial Declaration on the OSCE Corfu Process: Reconfirm-Review-Reinvigorate Security and 
Co-operation form Vancouver to Vladivostok. Athens, December 2, 2009. 
http://www.osce.org/documents/cio/2009/12/41848_en.pdf  
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include the European Security Treaty among the ten major topics for focused discussions in 
the framework of the Corfu Process.
102
 
103
 Only two of the ten thematic blocs have more or 
less direct link to the EST – Implementation of all OSCE Norms, Principles and 
Commitments, and the dialogue on General Questions of Euro-Atlantic Security. However, 
these two topics are rather broad and general. Some experts point out that Russia does not 
want the discussions about the EST to be held within the theme General Questions on Euro-
Atlantic Security, even though this would be thematically appropriate (Zagorski 2010: 9). 
Instead, Russia prefers creation of an entirely new platform which would discuss the EST.  
 
The remaining eight topics of Corfu Process relate to different aspects of the OSCE‟s 
comprehensive concept of security or to the work and functioning of the Organization. 
Russia and the West support the concept of comprehensive security for two different 
reasons. For long time, Moscow has been critical of the disproportional attention of OSCE 
given to the humanitarian dimension where 80% of its work is concentrated. It also blamed 
the Organization for its geographical focus “east of Vienna”. Russia backs up the increased 
interest in comprehensive security within the OSCE because it aspires a more adequate 
attention to the politico-military dimension, especially to various hard security issues.
104
 On 
the other hand, the EU favors the comprehensive approach because of its commitment to 
the human dimension of the OSCE.   
 
From the perspective of the draft EST, the implementation of one particular OSCE 
principle is of special interest. It is the indivisibility of security. Russia constantly calls for 
legal consolidation of this core principle. However, the Corfu Process is not aimed at 
drafting a new legally binding document. The central theme of the EST – Russian 
perception of the principle of indivisibility of security is not included among the ten topics 
for focused discussions either. 
                                               
102 OSCE Chairmanship in Office: Interim Report. Summarizing the Proposals Put Forward Within the Corfu 
Process. July 2, 2010. 
103 The ten themes of dialogue include: 1. Implementation of all OSCE norms, principles and commitments; 2. 
Role of the OSCE in early warning, conflict prevention and resolution, crisis management and post-conflict 
rehabilitation; 3. Role of the arms control and confidence- and security-building regimes in building trust, in 
the evolving security environment; 4. Transnational and multidimensional threats and challenges; 5. 
Economic and environmental challenges; 6. Human rights and fundamental freedoms, as well as democracy 
and the rule of law; 7. Enhancing the OSCE‟s effectiveness; 8. Interaction with other organizations and 
institutions, on the basis of the 1999 Platform for Co-operative Security; 9. Cross-dimensional approach to 
security; 10. General questions of Euro-Atlantic Security.  
104 See for example: Lavrov, Sergey: Transcript of Remarks and Response to Media Questions After Meeting 
of Russia-NATO Council in Brussels, December 4, 2009. 
http://www.mid.ru/Brp_4.nsf/arh/EEF045A4F6FADD66C32576850044D72C?OpenDocument  
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We can say that the link between the EST and the Corfu Process is rather weak. Contrary to 
Russian proposal on the EST, other international and regional organizations operating in 
the Euro-Atlantic area do not participate in the Corfu dialogue. This is the case in spite of 
the fact that both EU and NATO see the OSCE as the primary place for discussions about 
the Russian proposal on the European Security Treaty. Russia does not regard the Corfu 
Process as a substitute for negotiations on the indivisibility of security. According to 
Moscow, the primary outcome of the Corfu Process should be creation of a legal 
foundation for the OSCE. All the practical matters connected with the politico-military 
dimension of security, such as arms control, confidence-building measures and peaceful 
conflict resolution, are to be included in this process.
105
 As we will see further below, 
Moscow pushes for discussions about the EST and the indivisibility of security also in other 
multilateral and bilateral formats. 
 
Neither the EST nor the indivisibility of security belongs to the ten major items of the 
dialogue held in the OSCE. Nevertheless, the Corfu Process constitutes a unique 
opportunity for all participating states, including Russia, to voice their concerns over 
various aspects of European security and to search for solutions together with other 
partners.  
 
According to the Interim Report on Corfu Process, the OSCE participating states expressed 
their common objective to create a “security community” in the Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian 
area. In the security community, free of dividing lines and zones of different levels of 
security, the use of force would become unthinkable and common interest would prevail. 
The main objectives of the security community would be to ensure:
106
  
 
- Combination of “hard” and “soft” security; 
- Compatibility between the indivisibility of security and the existence of security 
alliances;  
- Compatibility between the right of all countries to enter alliances of their own 
choice and the principle that no participating states should enhance its security at 
the expense of another state.  
                                               
105 Lavrov, Sergey: Speech at the 46th Munich Security Conference, February 6, 2010. 
http://www.securityconference.de/Lavrov-Sergey.573.0.html  
106 OSCE Chairmanship in Office: Interim Report. Summarizing the Proposals Put Forward Within the Corfu 
Process. July 2, 2010.  
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At this point we can briefly recapitulate the positions of Russia and its Western partners. 
The draft EST is focused on hard security issues, whereas the EU and the US put emphasis 
on comprehensive approach to security – including issues of human rights, fundamental 
freedoms and democracy. The Medvedev initiative is based on the principle of indivisibility 
of security. This is perceived by many Western states as Russian attempt to undermine 
existing security structures, especially NATO. The West is opposed to any changes that 
would decrease the relevance of currently existing security alliances. Russia declares that 
NATO enlargement jeopardizes its security and therefore violates the Russian interpretation 
of the principle of indivisibility of security. On the other hand, both EU and the US remain 
committed to the right of all nations to freely choose their security arrangements, meaning 
to further expand the North Atlantic Alliance.  
 
The objective of further dialogue on European security would to be to accommodate these 
seemingly opposing positions of Russia and the West. This exercise could contribute to 
creation of a security community in the Euro-Atlantic space. At the same time, consensus 
on some other central questions of European security, such as uniform principles on 
peaceful settlement of territorial disputes, should be searched for.   
 
6.2.2. Revived NATO-Russia Council 
 
While the Corfu Process is being focused on general questions of European security, such 
as the implementation of the principles enshrined in the Helsinki Decalogue, discussions 
about some of the most relevant concrete issues of European security, as perceived in 
Moscow, take place also in other formats. The NATO-Russia Council assumes a central 
role in this regard. Even though the NRC has so far not played any significant role in 
negotiations of the EST, it is especially relevant in addressing some of the issues which lie 
behind the Medvedev initiative. These include the MD, arms control, as well as future 
NATO enlargement. 
  
Since the suspension of the NRC in summer 2008, the relations between Russia and the 
Alliance have significantly improved. At the last meeting of the NRC on the level of 
Foreign Ministers in September 2010 in New York, the overall mood was totally different 
to that of two years ago. Some media described the new atmosphere as “climate change” in 
the NATO-Russia relations.  Obama‟s policy of engagement and the “reset” of US-Russia 
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relations have so to say spread to the NRC. We can see this when looking at the statements 
of NATO officials. On his first visit to Moscow in the position of NATO Chief in 
December 2009, Secretary General Rasmussen announced that “transforming NATO-
Russia relations into a true strategic partnership” belongs to his priorities.107 After more 
than a year of suspension which followed the Georgia-Russia, the NRC officially 
reassumed its work at the meeting of Foreign Ministers in December 2009. Despite the fact 
that significant differences persist, especially over the issue of Georgia, the will to move 
ahead and strengthen cooperation between NATO and Russia has prevailed. 
 
In March 2010, Rasmussen presented his vision of new Euro-Atlantic security architecture. 
It should be rooted in practical NATO-Russia cooperation on concrete security issues. 
What Rasmussen has proposed is rapprochement between NATO and Russia based on the 
cooperation on the controversial missile defense system in Europe. Common missile 
defense would create a “security roof” that would unite people from Vancouver to 
Vladivostok into one community. According to NATO SG, who also serves in the capacity 
of NRC Chairman, the common project would not only offer protection against 
unpredictable regimes, but also bring the Euro-Atlantic community together.
108
  Instead of a 
legally binding treaty, as argued by Moscow, the new Euro-Atlantic security architecture 
should be based on the missile defense system that includes all NATO countries as well as 
Russia. 
  
Couple of months later, NATO SG revealed his concept of further NATO-Russia 
reconciliation. If an inclusive MD system was realized, it would be likely to generate 
progress in other critical areas, such as conventional arms control in Europe and later even 
the more controversial issue of Georgian territorial integrity. Rasmussen argued that 
practical cooperation on MD, which includes sharing of intelligence, would build the much 
needed trust between NATO and Russia and finally “make our European home safer”.109 
 
                                               
107 Rasmussen, Fogh: NATO and Russia, partners for the future. Speech at the Moscow State Institute for 
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The inclusion of Russia into the NATO BMD system advocated by Rasmussen represents 
quite an ambitious plan which will surely face opposition.
110
  Yet, Rasmussen‟s plan to 
bring NATO and Russia closer together does not address one fundamental point: creation 
of a common security space based on a legally binding treaty. The Secretary General 
declared that NATO Allies are open to discuss the Russian proposal on the European 
Security Treaty. However, he added that the primary place for these talks should be the 
OSCE.
111
 As we have seen earlier, this is not happening. The EST has not become integral 
part of the Corfu Process.  
 
The ongoing debate about the future of the Alliance offers another opportunity to think and 
talk about the NATO-Russia relations. The Alliance is currently reviewing its outdated 
Strategic Concept. The new document, which is to be adopted at the upcoming NATO 
Summit held in November 2010 in Lisbon, will impact the character of NATO itself as well 
as its relations with Moscow in the coming years.  
 
It remains to be seen if the new Strategic Concept will put forward at least a vision of one 
security space in the whole Euro-Atlantic area which would include Russian Federation 
too. One option would be to enter into negotiations on a pan-European security treaty as 
proposed by Moscow. Another possibility would be to offer Russia the prospect of future 
NATO membership. Already now we can here calls from the academia as well as from 
security experts and former politicians to integrate Russia into the Alliance.
112
 Even in such 
traditionally Russia-critical countries as Poland, there are supporters of Russian 
membership in NATO if the country meets all the necessary entry requirements.
113
 It is 
obvious that if Russia joined the Alliance, NATO would change fundamentally. Ultimately, 
it could even evolve into a true system of collective security. 
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At the moment, this option seems rather remote. Nevertheless, NATO should get serious 
about Russian inclusion into the post-Cold War European security system. The discussions 
about the new Strategic Concept present an excellent window of opportunity to address 
Moscow‟s discontent with current European security architecture. The Alliance could either 
take up the Medvedev initiative or offer an alternative to the Russian proposals. Prospect of 
Russian membership in NATO would be one of the options. 
 
6.2.3. Other Forums 
 
Bilateral relations to key European partners play an important role for Russia in pursuing its 
foreign policy goals and the EST is no exception. Last June offered another evidence of this 
well known fact. Less than a week after the EU-Russia Summit, President Medvedev 
travelled to Germany to participate in a bilateral German-Russian Summit. In this meeting, 
President Medvedev and Chancellor Merkel discussed not only bilateral matters but also 
the issue of European security and cooperation between Russia and the EU. They agreed on 
the initiative to establish an EU-Russia committee on foreign policy and security at the 
level of Foreign Ministers. It could involve regular meetings between the EU High 
Representative for Foreign Affairs Catherine Ashton and her Russian counterpart Sergey 
Lavrov. Chancellor Merkel suggested she would put forward this idea in Brussels.
114
 Two 
major conclusions can be made from this endeavor. One regards Russian foreign policy 
behavior. It was not at the EU-Russia Summit but at the German-Russian Summit where 
the proposal on creation a new multilateral body was articulated. The same can be said 
about the launch of the Medvedev initiative which war first introduced during President 
Medvedev‟s bilateral visit to Germany. We can conclude that for Russia, the way to 
Brussels leads through Berlin. More than that, this initiative made it clear that two leaders 
recognize the need to set up a viable forum to held discussions on foreign policy and 
security among the EU and Russia. 
  
Russia is well aware of the fact that the Medvedev initiative needs clear support of 
Washington. As pointed out earlier, the US is not very enthusiastic about a new treaty on 
European security. Russia therefore seeks to take advantage of the new mood in bilateral 
ties between Russia and the US in order to promote the Medvedev initiative. The US-
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Russian relations have improved considerably since President Obama assumed the office. 
The emphasis is now being put at issues of common interests rather than at disputed 
questions. Yet again, the disagreement concerns primarily the disputed issue of Georgian 
territorial integrity. But instead of emphasizing the differences, the two countries 
concentrate on the cooperation in areas where they share common interests. At the press 
conference following a recent US-Russian summit held in June 2010 in Washington D.C. 
the two Presidents emphasized their commitment to the ratification of the New START 
treaty and further strengthening of the global non-proliferation regime. Obama did not 
explicitly mention European security. This issue is evidently not high on the agenda in 
Washington. On the other side, Russia continues to raise this topic. According to President 
Medvedev, Russia and the US “share a common view that Europe should have a security 
system”.115 Without providing any further details, this statement suggests that Russia is 
pushing for the rearrangement of current European security order also at the highest 
political level. And that the US response remains reserved. It is evident that for the 
Medvedev initiative to succeed, it will not be enough to “agree to disagree”.  
 
The most recent developments provide more evidence to support this thesis. In October 
2010, France hosted a trilateral meeting of French, Russian and German leaders. Nicolas 
Sarkozy, Dmitry Medvedev and Angela Merkel talked, among other issues, about European 
security. According to Moscow, they focused in particular on the European Security 
Treaty.
116
 However, the EST was not mentioned in the final declaration of the three leaders. 
Sarkozy, Medvedev and Merkel simply reaffirmed that security of all states in Euro-
Atlantic community is indivisible and declared their commitment to ongoing joint work in 
this field. They called for strengthened cooperation between Russia and the EU as well as 
in the NATO-Russia Council.
117
 The statesmen stressed that the three countries agree on 
many issues of common interest and that they are willing to address the concerns of the 
other sides, including Russia. Yet, they seem not to be ready to enter into negotiations on a 
new pan-European security treaty proposed by Moscow. 
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7. Conclusion 
 
 
When listening to the current statements Russian, European and North American leaders 
give after their summits and other meetings, one could easily forget that only two years ago 
the relations between Russia and the West experienced the probably most serious crisis in 
the post-Cold War history. Everything now seems to return to business as usual. Or even 
move beyond it. After more than a decade, the OSCE will convene a Summit in December 
2010. Russia has accepted the invitation of the Allies to participate in the NATO Lisbon 
Summit in November 2010. And even though some fundamental differences between 
Russia and its Western partners have not vanished, the will to strengthen mutual 
cooperation seems to overshadow them. 
 
In these times, it is especially relevant to understand the concerns and posit ions of all sides. 
The aim of this thesis was to contribute to exactly this task: to provide an analysis of the 
Russian proposals for the European Security Treaty. This so-called Medvedev initiative has 
become one of the major foreign policy goals of Russia towards Europe and North 
America. My research was focused on three central questions:  
 
- What is Russia proposing? 
- Why does Moscow seek the new treaty? 
- Which outcomes of this initiative can we observe? 
 
In order to categorize the Russian proposals, I outlined a security continuum of five 
theoretical concepts of security. These are: the realist principle of self-help; the system of 
collective defense; cooperative security; security-community and collective security. 
Detailed analysis of the draft EST released by Moscow at the end of 2009 allowed us to 
conclude that the treaty would not create a system of collective security as Russian 
representatives sometimes claim. The most significant features of the treaty include the 
principle of indivisibility of security. According to this principle states would not be 
allowed to take any action that significantly affects security of other states. Russia is 
proposing that not only individual states but also international organizations operating in 
the Euro-Atlantic area would become parties to the treaty. As a result, they would be also 
bound to principle of indivisibility of security. Furthermore, the EST would create a new 
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mechanism of consultations and peaceful conflict resolution. The aim of this new three-step 
instrument would be to address disputes that might arise in connection with interpretation 
and implementation of the treaty. All decisions would be taken unanimously. An exception 
is proposed for the Extraordinary Conference which should decide on collective measures 
as reaction to an armed attack. In this case, the vote of the aggressor would not be taken 
into consideration. The draft also comprises explicit right of all parties to consider an armed 
attack against any party to be an armed attack against itself. States would have a right, but 
not an obligation, to render the attacked party all necessary assistance, including military 
help. The victim state would have to consent to all kind of support. 
 
In terms of the outlined security systems, the EST cannot be unequivocally attributed to any 
of the five concepts. The draft treaty reconfirms the principle of non-use of force but it does 
not include any legally binding commitments to respond to illegal acts of aggression and 
assist the victim. There are no security guarantees proposed in the draft. Therefore no real 
system of collective security would be created. On the other hand, the Medvedev initiative 
does not reflect the realistic self-help policy either. The treaty seeks to enhance security and 
cooperation in the Euro-Atlantic space by imposing new rules and obligation on the parties. 
The prohibition of threat or use of force and the principle of indivisibility of security would 
significantly restrain states‟ freedom of behavior.  
 
The model that comes the closest to explain the Russian endeavor is the concept of 
cooperative security. The treaty is based on the principles of peaceful settlement of 
conflicts and mutual cooperation. It endorses international law and even codifies a new 
principle – indivisibility of security. However, the treaty does not propose any mechanism 
that could enforce this rule. Its implementation would be decentralized; there would be no 
authority to determine which activities are significantly affecting security of other states. It 
would depend only on the goodwill of the members to honor they commitment not to 
strengthen their security at the expense of other members. These are all typical features of 
cooperative security. At the same time, some important elements of the draft can be 
attributed also to the concept of collective security. This concerns especially the consensus-
minus-one principle of decision-making which can be applied in cases of armed attack. 
States might decide to take collective action against the will of the aggressor but they are 
not obliged to do so. We have seen that neither the League of Nations nor the United 
Nations Organization was able to create a real system of collective security. The same 
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would apply to the EST. If the treaty entered into force, it would create a new, hybrid 
security system; combining the elements of cooperative and collective security models.  
 
Closer look at the Russian foreign and security policy goals over the last two decades and 
a review of current hard security relations with the West have enabled us to understand 
Moscow‟s objectives behind the Medvedev initiative. Russia has proposed a new security 
pact because it believes this would help to strengthen the rule of international law and to 
create a multipolar European security system. Probably even more importantly, Moscow 
deems that the treaty would weaken the position of the US and NATO in Europe. Russian 
discomfort with the NATO/US primacy in European security affairs lies at the heart of the 
Medvedev initiative. The principle of indivisibility of security would definitely constrain 
the behavior of Russian partners in the West. It would halt unilateral action of both US and 
NATO which Russia considers as jeopardizing its security. On the other hand, the EST 
could strengthen multilateral diplomacy. All partners would have to search for solutions 
which no one regards threatening.  
 
Historical evidence of previous Russian attempts to rearrange European security landscape 
endorses these findings. Proposals of Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov to create a genuine 
system of collective security in Europe pursued the objective to overcome the collective 
defense alliances unfriendly to Moscow (namely NATO) and in this way diminish the US 
influence in Europe. The current Russian bid for the EST seeks similar effects.  
 
The Medvedev initiative also reflects Russian desire for a steady place in European security 
affairs. Moscow seeks a place where its security concerns could be not only voiced, but also 
adequately taken into account by the West. The principle of indivisibility of security would 
force the signatories to consider concerns of all sides when implementing any security 
measures.  
 
When applied to concrete hard security policies, we can see unmistakable analogies 
between Russian opposition to further NATO enlargement, the US plans to deploy the 
BMD in Central Europe and the EST initiative. As long as Russia perceives NATO 
enlargement as significantly affecting its security, it would impossible, under the provisions 
of the EST, to further expand the Alliance. The same principle would apply to the 
deployment of American BMD in Central and Eastern Europe. If the EST entered into 
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force, neither the Alliance as a whole nor the US alone would be allowed to install the 
BMD if any other signatory regarded this as a threat for its security. We could also observe 
that the EST would not offer any pretext for Russia to claim a sphere of special or 
privileged influence over its vicinity. Simultaneously, the treaty would not codify the right 
of any nation to freely choose its security arrangements, including accession to a military 
alliance, either. Instead, the EST would create the right of states to oppose the expansion of 
security groupings which some states perceive as threatening. 
  
The EST would not provide an adequate solution to the problem of diverging interpretation 
and application of many legal norms already in place. It would therefore hardly contribute 
to the settlement of the “frozen conflicts”. The draft does not present any uniform principles 
that could be applied universally to all territorial disputes in the Euro-Atlantic space. The 
inconsistency between some existing legal norms, such as the principle of territorial 
integrity and the right of nations to self-determination, is not being addressed by the 
Russian proposal at all. In general, the draft EST does not deal with specific hard security 
problems. The issue of conventional arms control is left out entirely from the draft. Instead 
of addressing concrete problems, the EST would establish some general rules of behavior 
which would, according to Moscow, gradually lead to solution of specific issues. On top of 
that, the centerpiece of the proposal – the principle of indivisibility of security is not 
sufficiently defined. Not only would the EST miss the opportunity to agree on uniform 
application of existing norms. The vague definitions contained in the draft could ultimately 
lead to new disputes over the interpretation and implementation of another rule. 
 
Western countries have well understood the main objectives of the Medvedev initiative. 
This explains their reluctant stance towards the EST. The reset of US-Russian relations has 
not decisively affected the Medvedev initiative. The US does not see any need to negotiate 
a new treaty on European security. By nature, Washington is opposed to any legally 
binding commitments that could, even theoretically, weaken the role of NATO in European 
security affairs or limit its freedom of action. As we have seen, the EST would impose new 
obligations and restrictions on both Washington and Brussels. The US is of course satisfied 
with the current NATO-centric character of European security architecture.  
 
The EU‟s response to the Russian endeavor is slightly different to that of the US. Even 
though the EU is not very keen about the Russian proposals either, it portrays itself as ready 
132 
 
to talk about all issues of European security, including the Medvedev initiative. Similar to 
the US, the EU does not support creation of any new format to discuss the Russian 
proposals should. Both Russian partners regard the OSCE as the best fitting place to pursue 
dialogue on European security. The OSCE has an inclusive membership and it promotes 
comprehensive approach to security. This enables the EU to advance some of its agenda as 
well – namely to promote human aspects of security.  
 
As a consequence of initial Russian proposals on rearrangement of European security and 
the positions of the West towards this initiative, the Corfu Process was launched in the mid-
2009. Both the US and the EU favor to discuss all Russian proposals in this format. 
However, the EST has not become an integral part of the Corfu dialogue. The link between 
current OSCE discussions and the Medvedev initiative is feeble. Yet, the Corfu Process has 
started a long needed dialogue on the future of European security. It also gave some real 
political agenda to the OSCE. This process is leading to first results. After more than a 
decade, an OSCE Summit will be convened in December 2010 in Kazakh Astana. And the 
dialogue about European security will be among the top issues on the agenda.  
 
Simultaneously to the Corfu Process within the OSCE, talks about some concrete security 
issues that lie behind the Medvedev initiative went on in the framework of the NRC. The 
revitalization of the NRC endorsed by the efforts of NATO Secretary General Fogh 
Rasmussen to further strengthen cooperation between NATO and Russia have not yet 
yielded any concrete results in respect to the EST. Nevertheless, the Alliance now seems to 
be more interested in cooperation with Moscow. Russian involvement in the Alliance‟s 
ballistic missile defense program is one of the options how to enhance the partnership. 
Creation of a common legal security system could be another one. Already the next NATO 
Summit could reveal if NATO and Russia are ready to embark on the road towards creation 
of one security-community.  
 
Even though the West is now more willing to address the security concerns of Russia, it is 
not ready to enter into negotiations on a new pan-European security treaty proposed by 
Moscow. The current dialogue on European security takes place at the level of cooperative 
security. The task now is to move beyond this pattern towards the formation of a security-
community in the Euro-Atlantic space. At the same time, the vision of an ideal collective 
security should not be abandoned.  
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The experience of the League of Nations has showed us that collective security does not 
work if major powers do not agree on some common rules, norms and values. Russia and 
the West should now make every effort to achieve this goal. They need to openly talk about 
all aspects of security in order to create a security-community where common values and 
mutual trust prevail, and war becomes unthinkable. Common values such as democracy and 
respect for human rights should not be required as a precondition for further talks. They 
represent the desired outcome of further cooperation.  
 
Even though the Russian objectives behind the Medvedev initiative are influenced by the 
realist school of thinking, Moscow chose the strategy of cooperation over the policy of self-
help. Russia seeks to avoid its isolation and prevent confrontation with other countries. So 
far, the Medvedev initiative has achieved at least one substantial goal: to bring the question 
of European security architecture and Russia‟s place in it back to the top of the agenda of 
European politics. 35 years ago, in the middle of the Cold War, states succeeded to move 
beyond the collective defense and cooperate across the military alliances. Today‟s leaders 
should dare to make the next step. Russia and the West should work jointly towards 
creation of a security-community and later on of a genuine collective security system. The 
Medvedev initiative should be seen as Russian contribution to this process aiming at 
creation of a truly unified Europe.   
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Draft of the European Security Treaty 
 
As published on November 29, 2009 on the official web page of President of Russia. 
http://eng.kremlin.ru/news/275 Accessed September 25, 2010.  
 
EUROPEAN SECURITY TREATY 
(Unofficial translation) 
Draft 
The Parties to this Treaty, 
Desiring to promote their relations in the spirit of friendship and cooperation in 
conformity with international law, 
Guided by the principles set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, Declaration 
on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation 
among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations (1970), 
Helsinki Final Act of the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(1975), as well as provisions of the Manila Declaration on the Peaceful Settlement 
of International Disputes (1982) and Charter for European Security (1999), 
Reminding that the use of force or the threat of force against the territorial integrity 
or political independence of any state, or in any other way inconsistent with the 
goals and principles of the Charter of the United Nations  is inadmissible in their 
mutual relations, as well as international relations in general, 
Acknowledging and supporting the role of the UN Security Council, which bears the 
primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security, 
Recognizing the need to join efforts in order to respond effectively to present-day 
security challenges and threats in the globalized and interdependent world, 
Intending to build effective cooperation mechanisms that could be promptly 
activated with a view to solving issues or differences that might arise, addressing 
concerns and adequately responding to challenges and threats in the security 
sphere, 
Have agreed as follows: 
Article 1 
According to the Treaty, the Parties shall cooperate with each other on the basis of 
the principles of indivisible, equal and undiminished security. Any security 
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measures taken by a Party to the Treaty individually or together with other Parties, 
including in the framework of any international organization, military alliance or 
coalition, shall be implemented with due regard to security interests of all other 
Parties. The Parties shall act in accordance with the Treaty in order to give effect to 
these principles and to strengthen security of each other. 
Article 2 
1. A Party to the Treaty shall not undertake, participate in or support any actions or 
activities affecting significantly security of any other Party or Parties to the Treaty. 
2. A Party to the Treaty which is a member of military alliances, coalitions or 
organizations shall seek to ensure that such alliances, coalitions or organizations 
observe principles set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, Declaration on 
Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation 
among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, Helsinki Final 
Act, Charter for European Security and other documents adopted by the 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, as well as in Article1 of this 
Treaty, and that decisions taken in the framework of such alliances, coalitions or 
organizations do not affect significantly security of any Party or Parties to the 
Treaty. 
3. A Party to the Treaty shall not allow the use of its territory and shall not use the 
territory of any other Party with the purpose of preparing or carrying out an armed 
attack against any other Party or Parties to the Treaty or any other actions affecting 
significantly security of any other Party or Parties to the Treaty. 
Article 3 
1. A Party to the Treaty shall be entitled to request, through diplomatic channels or 
the Depositary, any other Party to provide information on any significant legislative, 
administrative or organizational measures taken by that other Party, which, in the 
opinion of the Requesting Party, might affect its security. 
2. Parties shall inform the Depositary of any requests under para.1 of this Article 
and of responses to them. The Depositary shall bring that information to the 
attention of the other Parties. 
3. Nothing in this Article prevents the Parties from undertaking any other actions to 
ensure transparency and mutual trust in their relations. 
Article 4 
The following mechanism shall be established to address issues related to the 
substance of this Treaty, and to settle differences or disputes that might arise 
between the Parties in connection with its interpretation or application: 
a) Consultations among the Parties; 
b) Conference of the Parties; 
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c) Extraordinary Conference of the Parties. 
Article 5 
1. Should a Party to the Treaty determine that there exists a violation or a threat of 
violation of the Treaty by any other Party or Parties, or should it wish to raise with 
any other Party or Parties any issue relating to the substance of the Treaty and 
requiring, in its opinion, to be considered jointly, it may request consultations on the 
issue with the Party or Parties which, in its opinion, might be interested in such 
consultations. Information regarding such a request shall be brought by the 
Requesting Party to the attention of the Depositary which shall inform accordingly 
all other Parties. 
2. Such consultations shall be held as soon as possible, but not later than (...)days 
from the date of receipt of the request by the relevant Party unless a later date is 
indicated in the request. 
3. Any Party not invited to take part in the consultations shall be entitled to 
participate on its own initiative. 
Article 6 
1. Any participant to consultations held under Article5 of this Treaty shall be 
entitled, after having held the consultations, to propose the Depositary to convene 
the Conference of the Parties to consider the issue that was the subject of the 
consultations. 
2. The Depositary shall convene the Conference of the Parties, provided that the 
relevant proposal is supported by not less than (two) Parties to the Treaty, within 
(...) days from the date of receipt of the relevant request. 
3. The Conference of the Parties shall be effective if it is attended by at least two 
thirds of the Parties to the Treaty. Decisions of the Conference shall be taken by 
consensus and shall be binding. 
4. The Conference of the Parties shall adopt its own rules of procedure. 
Article 7 
1. In case of an armed attack or a threat of such attack against a Party to the 
Treaty, immediate actions shall be undertaken in accordance with Article8(1) of the 
Treaty. 
2. Without prejudice to the provisions of Article8 of the Treaty, every Party shall be 
entitled to consider an armed attack against any other Party an armed attack 
against itself. In exercising its right of self-defense under Article51 of the Charter of 
the United Nations, it shall be entitled to render the attacked Party, subject to its 
consent, the necessary assistance, including the military one, until the UN Security 
Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and 
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security. Information on measures taken by Parties to the Treaty in exercise of their 
right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the UN Security Council. 
Article 8 
1. In cases provided for by Article7 of this Treaty, the Party which has been 
attacked or threatened with an armed attack shall bring that to the attention of the 
Depositary which shall immediately convene an Extraordinary Conference of the 
Parties to decide on necessary collective measures. 
2. If the Party which became subject to an armed attack is not able to bring that to 
the attention of the Depositary, any other Party shall be entitled to request the 
Depositary to convene an Extraordinary Conference of the Parties, in which case 
the procedure provided for in Para.1 of this Article shall be applied. 
3. The Extraordinary Conference of the Parties may decide to invite third states, 
international organizations or other concerned parties to take part in it. 
4. The Extraordinary Conference of the Parties shall be effective if it is attended by 
at least four fifths of the Parties to the Treaty. Decisions of the Extraordinary 
Conference of the Parties shall be taken by unanimous vote and shall be binding. If 
an armed attack is carried out by, or a threat of such attack originates from a Party 
to the Treaty, the vote of that Party shall not be included in the total number of 
votes of the Parties in adopting a decision. 
The Extraordinary Conference of the Parties shall adopt its own rules of procedure. 
Article 9 
1. This Treaty shall not affect and shall not be interpreted as affecting the primary 
responsibility of the UN Security Council for maintaining international peace and 
security, as well as rights and obligations of the Parties under the Charter of the 
United Nations. 
2. The Parties to the Treaty reaffirm that their obligations under other international 
agreements in the area of security, which are in effect on the date of signing of this 
Treaty are not incompatible with the Treaty. 
3. The Parties to the Treaty shall not assume international obligations incompatible 
with the Treaty. 
4. This Treaty shall not affect the right of any Party to neutrality. 
Article 10 
This Treaty shall be open for signature by all States of the Euro-Atlantic and 
Eurasian space from Vancouver to Vladivostok as well as by the following 
international organizations: the European Union, Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe, Collective Security Treaty Organization, North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization and Community of Independent States in … from … to …. 
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Article 11 
1. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by the signatory States and to 
approval or adoption by the signatory international organizations. The relevant 
notifications shall be deposited with the government of ... which shall be the 
Depositary. 
2. In its notification of the adoption or approval of this Treaty, an international 
organization shall outline its sphere of competence regarding issues covered by 
the Treaty. 
It shall immediately inform the Depositary of any relevant changes in its sphere of 
competence. 
3. States mentioned in Article10 of this Treaty which did not sign the Treaty during 
the period indicated in that Article may accede to this Treaty by depositing the 
relevant notification with the Depositary. 
Article 12 
This Treaty shall enter into force ten days after the deposit of the twenty fifth 
notification with the Depositary in accordance with Article11 of the Treaty. 
For each State or international organization which ratifies, adopts or approves this 
Treaty or accedes to it after the deposit of the twenty fifth notification of ratification, 
adoption, approval or accession with the Depositary, the Treaty shall enter into 
force on the tenth day after the deposit by such State or organization of the 
relevant notification with the Depositary. 
Article 13 
Any State or international organization may accede to this Treaty after its entry into 
force, subject to the consent of all Parties to this Treaty, by depositing the relevant 
notification with the Depositary. 
For an acceding State or international organization, this Treaty shall enter into 
force 180 days after the deposit of the instrument of accession with the Depositary, 
provided that during the said period no Party notifies the Depositary in writing of its 
objections against such accession. 
Article 14 
Each Party shall have the right to withdraw from this Treaty should it determine that 
extraordinary circumstances pertaining to the substance of the Treaty have 
endangered its supreme interests. The Party intending to withdraw from the Treaty 
shall notify the Depositary of such intention at least (...) days in advance of the 
planned withdrawal. The notification shall include a statement of extraordinary 
circumstances endangering, in the opinion of that Party, its supreme interests. 
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List of abbreviations 
 
 
Art. – Article 
BMD – Ballistic Missile Defense 
CIS – Commonwealth of Independent States 
CSCE – Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe 
CSTO – Collective Security Treaty Organization 
DPRK – Democratic People‟s Republic of Korea 
CFE – Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe 
CFSP – Common Foreign and Security Policy 
ESC – European Security Community 
EST – European Security Treaty 
EU – European Union 
FM – Foreign Minister 
IFSH – Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg 
INF – Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty 
MD – Missile Defense 
NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
NRC – NATO-Russia Council 
OSCE – Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
Para. – Paragraph 
SC – Security Council 
SG – Secretary General 
SORT – Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty  
START – Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty 
UK – United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 
UN – United Nations Organization 
US – United States of America 
USSR – Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
WEU – Western European Union 
WMD – Weapons of Mass Destruction 
WTO – Warsaw Treaty Organization 
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Deutsche Zusammenfassung 
 
 
20 Jahre nach dem Ende des Kalten Krieges beklagt sich Russland über die fortlaufende 
Unfähigkeit der europäischen Sicherheitsarchitektur, gewaltsame Konflikte auf 
europäischem Boden zu verhindern und ein wirklich vereintes Europa zu verwirklichen. 
Moskau plädiert für eine Neurodnung der europäischen Sicherheitsstrukturen, die in Form 
eines neuen gesamteuropäischen Sicherheitsvertrages verwirklicht werden sollte. 
 
Die vorliegende Arbeit untersucht die russischen Vorschläge zur Modernisierung der 
europäischen Sicherheitsarchitektur, genannt auch Medwedew Initiative, und analysiert die 
Gründe, wieso Moskau den neuen pan-europäischen Sicherheitspakt anstrebt. Die 
theoretisch-konzeptionelle Zurodnung des Entwurfes von dem Europäischen 
Sicherheitsvertrag (EST) zeigt, dass kein System der kollektiven Sicherheit kreiert würde, 
wie die russischen Vertreter manchmal behaupten. Anstatt dessen würde der Vertrag ein 
neues hybrides Sicherheitssystem schaffen. Wichtige Elemente von zwei 
Sicherheitsmodellen –  dem der kooperativen und der kollektiven Sicherheit, sind in dem 
Vertragsentwurf enthalten. 
 
Die grundlegenden Ziele der Medwedew Initiative werden am Hintergrund der 
sicherheitspolitischen Problemfelder zwischen Russland und dem Westen analysiert. Die 
früheren russischen / sowjetischen Vorschläge zur Reform der vorherrschenden 
Sicherheitsarchitektur werden gleichfalls in Betracht gezogen. Die Medwedew Initiative 
widerspiegelt den Wunsch Moskaus, einen festen Platz in der europäischen 
Sicherheitsordnung zurückzugewinnen. Gleichzeitig kann darin die andauernde Opposition 
Russlands gegenüber dem NATO-Zentrismus der europäischen Sicherheitsstrukturen 
gesehen werden. Russland hofft, dass der neue Vertrag und die darin enthaltene Klausel zur 
Unteilbarkeit der Sicherheit die Handlungsfreiheit der NATO entscheidend einschränken 
würde. Demnach könnte weder die NATO, noch einzelne Staaten, Maßnahmen 
implementieren, die sich auf die Sicherheit anderer Staaten beträchtlich auswirken würden. 
Eine präzise Definition dieser Regel fehlt in dem Vertragsentwurf. Nach der russischen 
Auffassung wäre allerdings weitere NATO-Erweiterung oder die Stationierung des US-
Raketenschildes in Europa betroffen. Konkrete Fragen der europäischen Sicherheit, wie 
zum Beispiel die konventionelle Rüstungskontrolle oder das Problem der unterschiedlichen 
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Auslegung vieler bestehenden Normen, werden von dem Entwurf des Europäischen 
Sicherheitsvertrages nicht behandelt.  
 
Die Reaktionen westlicher Länder gegenüber der russischen Vorschläge sind überwiedend 
zurückhaltend. Trotzdem zeichnet sich ein Wille ab, über die Fragen der zukünftigen 
europäischen Sicherheitsordnung mit Russland zu diskutieren. Der Dialog über die 
europäische Sicherheit, der zwischen Russland und dem Westen geführt wird, findet schon 
jetzt in verschiedenen Foren statt. Sowohl der Korfu Prozess, der sich in der OSZE entfaltet 
hat, als auch die Diskussionen im NATO-Russland Rat, stellen eine eine ausgezeichnete 
Gelegenheit dar, die sicherheitspolitische Zusammenarbeit zwischen Russland und dem 
Westen zu vertiefen. Bildung einer Sicherheitsgemeinschaft sollte angestrebt werden, mit 
dem zukünftigen Ziel, ein echtes System kollektiver Sicherheit zu etablieren. Die 
russischen Vorschläge zum Europäischen Sicherheitsvertrag sollten als ein Beitrag zu 
diesem Prozess verstanden werden. 
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Abstract 
 
 
20 years after the end of the Cold War, Russia is still complaining about the ongoing 
ineffectiveness of the European security architecture to prevent violent conflicts on 
European soil, and its inability to create a truly unified Europe. This study investigates the 
Russian proposals to rearrange the European security architecture. A theoretical and 
conceptual analysis of the draft of the European security treaty is undertaken. The 
objectives of the so-called Medvedev initiative are being explored against the background 
of prevailing trends in Russian foreign policy as well as of the major hard-security issues 
between Russia and the West. So far, the reactions of Western countries towards the 
Russian proposals have been rather lukewarm. Nevertheless, the West is showing 
increasing willingness to engage into dialogue with Russia about the future of European 
security. 
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